Does the type of policy being considered determine the politics surrounding it? In this article, I examine how policy reversals may produce different politics than initial policy adoptions in the context of state river management policy. Traditionally, dam building was the dominant management policy, but in recent decades, efforts to restore rivers to their natural conditions through the removal of dams have become more prominent. I find that the patterns of state policymaking for policy reversals are generally similar to those that have been documented for policy adoptions, but with some important differences. Diffusion of reversals involves more states outside of active regions than is seen typically with policy adoption, and reversal diffusion occurs more gradually than adoption diffusion with many policy innovations. Finally, the most important determinants of these state policy reversals are a state's fiscal health and the presence of relevant interest groups.

During every election cycle, election administrators validate voter registration applications submitted at different times and through various sources, with a notable peak in the demand for voter registration as Election Day approaches. The process of registering to vote, however, is error-prone and may depend on the voter's capacity to fill a form correctly, or the election administrator's capacity to successfully process applications as the voter registration window closes. Such errors can limit a prospective, and eligible, voter's ability to cast a valid ballot. This study assesses the impact of time and registration source on the rates of rejected voter registration applications by analyzing monthly county-level voter registration reports during the 2012 election cycle in Florida. I find that there is a dynamic relationship between administrative and seasonal factors at the county level, which condition the rates of rejected voter registrations as the registration deadline approaches. These findings suggest complications in not only the process of registering to vote that may stem from differences in voter engagement but also the variation in administrative oversight throughout the election cycle.

Our fundamental objective in this article is to explain why certain counties within the U.S continue to restrict the sale of alcohol at the start of the 21st century. What factors identified as important for the initial drive for Prohibition remain important nearly 80 years later? We assess to what extent social, political, and economic variables are related to the presence of restrictions on the sale of alcohol at the county-level across the United States. Analyzing contemporary county-level data from over 3,000 U.S. counties, the strongest factor associated with “dry” status of a county is the religious composition, specifically the presence of Evangelical Protestants. Conversely, a larger concentration of Roman Catholics inhibits prohibition in a county. The regional character of the political geography of contemporary prohibition—the phenomenon is almost entirely Southern—appears to be driven by the uneven distribution of different religious adherents across the country.

Over the past 20 years, nearly every major city in the United States has faced making the decision of whether to build a new stadium or other professional sports facility. In this period, 41 referendums have been held to authorize the public financing of such a facility. Previous studies have demonstrated that elite endorsements affect referendum voters, but these studies have not differentiated the effects of different kinds of elites on public support. We examine the differing effects of the support and opposition of elected officials, business groups, minority leaders, and community groups when modeling referendum outcomes. Our analysis reveals that among these elites' cues, opposition by elected officials (either Republican or Democratic) has the greatest effect on the final referendum vote and that the size of the public subsidy has a significant influence on public support. We also find evidence that opposition by elected officials is exogenous to public opinion.

Scholars of social networks often rely on summary statistics to measure and compare the structures of their networks of interest. However, measuring the uncertainty inherent in these summaries can be challenging, thus making hypothesis testing for network summaries difficult. Computational and nonparametric procedures can overcome these difficulties by allowing researchers to generate reference distributions for comparison directly from their data. In this research, I demonstrate the use of nonparametric hypothesis testing in networks using the popular network summary statistic network modularity. I provide a method based on permutation testing for assessing whether a particular network modularity score is larger than a researcher might expect due to random chance. I then create a simulation study of network modularity and its simulated reference distribution that I propose. Finally, I provide an empirical example of this technique using cosponsorship networks from U.S. state legislatures.

Two of the most notable changes in political interest communities in recent decades have been the rise of direct lobbying by institutions and the decline of collective lobbying via associations. These trends may be related to each other, since institutions can choose to lobby through either or both approaches. The shifting balance between direct and collective representation of institutional interests may signal important changes in how institutions perceive their interests, how those interests are pursued, and how diverse interests are aggregated in public policy. We present four theoretical perspectives—the demographic opportunity, collective action, competitive exclusion, and crowded room perspectives—to develop hypotheses about the relationship between these two forms of representation. We then employ both aggregate data on state lobby registrations and survey data on state lobbying by institutions to distinguish between these hypotheses. We find strongest support for the crowded room perspective, such that the relationship between direct and collective forms of interest representation tends to be one of mutualism rather than competition.

Modern American state governorships have great formal policymaking authority, but, like the presidency, they also possess various informal powers to influence policymakers and policymaking. Among the most important of these informal powers is a governor's popularity with the public. Efforts to explain variation in gubernatorial popularity have yielded mixed results, in part because of limited data on governors' approval ratings and underspecified models. We assess the determinants of gubernatorial popularity that fall along both a national-state dimension and an economic-political dimension using the new U.S. Officials Job Approval Ratings dataset. Our results suggest that the proper focus of gubernatorial popularity research should be to distinguish not between its national and state influences but between its economic and political influences, as both national and state unemployment rates are central to explaining public assessments of governors in our models.

Most American congregations belong to denominations. These national networks often promote relevant political issues that constituent congregations may choose to address. Therefore, religious organizations might play a significant role in promoting the process of policy diffusion in the U.S. states. At the same time, congregations are tradition-maintaining institutions that focus first on their own immediate concerns, promoting the maintenance of distinctive regional political contexts and reinforcing the variation of federalism. In this article, we assess the role that religious organizations play in American federal democracy, promoting diffusion or the status quo, with respect to one crucial issue on which religious groups have been particularly vocal: the environment and global warming. We employ two datasets (a large-N national survey and two in-depth survey case studies of clergy in Ohio and South Carolina) and find evidence that religious organizations are vast communication networks that can promote policy diffusion, but typically do not.

The use of deception is common in elite correspondence audit studies. Elite audit studies are a type of field experiment used by researchers to test for discrimination against vulnerable populations seeking to access government resources. These studies have provided invaluable insights, but they have done so at the cost of using deception. They have relied on identity, activity, and motivation deception. In addition, they request unnecessary work. Is there a less deceptive alternative? In this article, I present results from a field experiment with state legislative offices that minimize the use of deception. Consistent with elite correspondence audit studies, I find evidence of discrimination against Hispanics among state legislative offices. In addition, I find that discrimination is mitigated when subjects believe their behavior will be public knowledge. This suggests that discrimination can be mitigated through increased monitoring. This article advances the discussion on how to minimize the use of deception in elite field experimentation and how to mitigate discrimination against vulnerable populations.

Research shows that when the more liberal Democratic Party controls the national government, unemployment is lower, but whether liberal state governments are associated with lower unemployment has not been examined. We argue that more left-leaning governments in the U.S. states have the same preference for and willingness to use government to reduce unemployment, but that the greater resource and policymaking constraints that the states face during economic downturns limit their ability to shape unemployment to economic growth periods. We find evidence for these arguments in an analysis of the U.S. states for the period of 1975–2010. Specifically, when economic growth is low, liberal state governments are associated with increases in unemployment rates similar to or even somewhat higher than conservative governments, but when growth is moderate to high, liberal state governments are associated with greater-than-expected reductions in unemployment. We also provide some evidence that different state spending decisions between liberal and conservative state governments may explain these patterns.

Presidential vote shares in legislative districts are widely available for congressional districts and are often used by scholars in their research. Here, I describe the general methodology to construct statewide vote shares within districts and apply these methods to a new database of presidential vote shares within 36 states' legislative districts.

Recent studies (Brace and Hall 1990, 1995, 1997; Hall 1987, 1992; Hall and Brace 1989) have demonstrated that state supreme court judges' decisionmaking is influenced by the type of selection mechanism that put them into office. In particular, judges are found to respond to the interests of those who have placed them on the bench. We extend this line of inquiry further by testing the effect of rules governing the retention of these judges in merit systems. Do these judges respond to the subtle differences in constituency that these rules establish? We address this question with a larger dataset than that used in previous studies of decisionmaking (Brace and Hall 1995, 1997; Hall 1987, 1992), and we find overwhelming evidence of the effects of these retention rules. In fact, we also conclude that judicial decisions are more influenced by the actor charged with retaining them than the actor who placed them on the bench in the first place.

Previous research has largely concluded that House elections have become less competitive in the modern era. Our research examines one area where we expect to observe more competition—namely, primary elections. In this article, we investigate when and where a state legislator will emerge to run in a congressional primary. All else equal, we expect that state legislators who can carry a large portion of their old state reelection constituency to the “geographic” congressional constituency will be more likely to emerge and receive a higher vote share in the election. Using geographic information systems (GIS) techniques, we are able to derive a measure of constituency congruency by focusing on the degree of intersection between state legislative and congressional districts. Our results indicate that state legislators are more likely to emerge in a primary if constituency congruency is high, especially in open seat contests. Congruency does not appear to provide an electoral advantage at the polls.

The opinion-writing process is a vital yet understudied aspect of judicial decision making on state supreme courts. We argue that this process is influenced by the political context and particularly by institutional rules that serve to reactivate and reinforce divisions among justices, leading to less cooperation on the court. We test our theory with original data comprising all education cases decided from 1995 to 2005 in all 50 states and find evidence to support our theory. Specifically, we find that elections lead to fewer unanimous decisions and more separate written opinions, indicating that judicial elections may have a more pervasive effect on the daily work of these courts than previously thought.

Does direct democracy make it impossible to balance public sector budgets? I address this question with evidence from California, where it is widely believed that voter initiatives have paralyzed the state budget process by locking in high spending while simultaneously prohibiting tax increases. A review of all initiatives approved since 1912 shows that no more than 32 percent of appropriations in the 2003-04 California state budget were locked in by initiatives and that initiatives placed only minimal constraints on the legislature's ability to raise revenue. Moreover, it is likely that the legislature would have allocated much of the money to its dedicated purpose even if it had not been required to do so by initiative. Initiatives do not appear to be a significant obstacle to balancing the state budget in California.

Although many people believe that women are disadvantaged by the electoral process, recent research shows women generally do at least as well as men when they run for office. We investigate the gender dynamics of state supreme court elections. We find evidence that women do enjoy an electoral advantage when they run for judicial office. However, unlike previous work, we find that this advantage is highly contingent on the electoral context. Using an original dataset of competitive judicial elections from 1998 to 2014, we find that women only have a significant vote share advantage when they run as a challenger against a sitting incumbent. The advantage does not apply to women as incumbents or in open seat elections. These findings raise important questions about the interplay of institutional barriers and election aversion for the advancement of women in electoral judicial politics.

Do term limits affect the probability that an incumbent state legislator will run for the United States Congress? The theory of strategic politicians suggests that by reducing legislators' opportunity costs of running for higher office, term limits should push some legislators into congressional campaigns they would have foregone had a long-term legislative career been an option. To test this hypothesis, I analyze data from congressional elections held from 1992 through 2004 in the 15 states where term limits were operative in 2004. I find that sitting state legislators who have hit the limit of their state legislative service are more likely to run for Congress than those who are eligible to serve additional terms, whether those terms are limited or not. However, there is no statistically significant difference between the congressional-candidacy rates of legislators whose re-election eligibility is limited, but not exhausted, and legislators whose terms are not limited. By increasing the supply of experienced challengers, term limits may increase competition in elections for non-term-limited offices and, consequently, the quality of representation provided by those elected.

I re-examine theories of legislative committee organization by using simulation to assess how representative state legislative committees are of their parent bodies. I find that clearly unrepresentative committees are rare and concentrated in a few chambers. I also find that comparing committee and chamber medians leads to very different conclusions about representativeness than does comparing means. My findings tend to confirm the informational model of committees and disconfirm the partisan model, but they cannot directly address the distributive model.

We report the results of a survey of over 300 lobbyists in three states—Colorado, Ohio, and West Virginia. In the first half of this article, we provide a comprehensive portrait of state lobbyists' attempts to affect state government decisions. In the second half, we address the following research question: What factors affect the lobbying behavior of state lobbyists? Our results suggest a number of conclusions about lobbying in the new millennium, including the following: (1) state lobbyists target the governor's office more than most previous studies suggest; (2) state lobbyists aim their grassroots lobbying efforts at the governor and executive agency bureaucrats as well as legislators; (3) state lobbying remains an intensely personal game, as techniques involving face-to-face contact with government officials remain the most effective; and (4) several variables affect a lobbyist's decisions regarding which techniques to use and where to aim his or her efforts, including the receptivity of potential targets and the type of group for which the lobbyist works.

The authors examine the impact of political party control of government on the restrictiveness of a U.S. state's abortion policy, measured by the enactment of a parental involvement law. The empirical results show that (1) institutional control of a state's legislative and executive branches of government by the Republican Party increases the likelihood a state will enact a parental involvement law, while Democratic Party control decreases this likelihood; (2) the more conservative state public opinion is on abortion rights, the more likely a state is to enact a parental involvement law; (3) public anti-abortion attitudes do not act as a moderating force on the link between political party control and the enactment of a parental involvement law; and (4) the impact of political party control on the enactment of a parental involvement law has grown larger over time.