Democratic accountability relies on voters to punish their representatives for policies they dislike. Yet, a separation-of-powers system can make it hard to know who is to blame, and partisan biases further distort voters’ evaluations. During the COVID-19 pandemic, precautionary policies were put into place sometimes by governors, sometimes by mayors, and sometimes by no one at all, allowing us to identify when voters hold out-party versus in-party politicians responsible for policies. With a survey spanning 48 states, we test our theory that attitudes toward policies and parties intersect to determine when selective attribution takes place. We find that as individuals increasingly oppose a policy, they are more likely to blame whichever level of government is led by the out-party. This is most pronounced among partisans with strong in-party biases. We provide important insight into the mechanisms that drive selective attribution and the conditions under which democratic accountability is at risk.

Why have some states adopted policies expanding ballot access while others have restricted access to the ballot? Since the 1990s, some states have been adopting policies restricting access to the ballot such as requiring identification. At the same time, states have been adopting a variety of registration reforms that lower the barriers to registration and voting. Using an original, 45-state dataset, we examine state innovation within the policy domain of electoral reforms in US states. We find reforms have an independent and, sometimes, negative effect on the innovation of states in electoral reforms. Next, we use dyad analysis to examine the spread of a single policy: automatic voter registration. We find that the propensity to innovate both within and across a state makes the spread of automatic voter registration more likely. Our paper contributes to the broader understanding of why states adopt electoral reforms.

This study uses prediction market data from the nation’s historical election betting markets to measure electoral competition in the American states during the era before the advent of scientific polling. Betting odds data capture ex ante expectations of electoral closeness in the aggregate, and as such improve upon existing measures of competition based on election returns data. Situated in an analysis of the 1896 presidential election and its associated realignment, I argue that the market odds data show that people were able to anticipate the realignment and that expectations on the outcome in the states influenced voter turnout. Findings show that a month ahead of the election betting markets accurately forecast a McKinley victory in most states. This study further demonstrates that the market predictions identify those states where electoral competition would increase or decline that year and the consequences of these expected partisanship shifts on turnout. In places where the anticipation was for a close race voter expectations account for a turnout increase of as much as 6%. Participation dropped by 1%–6% in states perceived as becoming electorally uncompetitive. The results support the conversion and dealignment theories from the realignment literature.

How representative are conference delegations in state legislative chambers? I argue that differing conference rules across state legislative chambers influence majority party control over conference delegations. With an original data set encompassing all state-level conference committees from 2005 to 2016, I compare the observed policy preferences between conference delegation and majority party medians when the majority party unilaterally appoints and when the minority party has influence over conferee selection. My results show that in state legislative chambers where the minority can influence conference appointments, delegations are ideologically biased away from the majority party. These findings underscore how majority parties are limited when minorities have procedural rights.

Executives are important elites, and ideology is important to elite behavior, but measurement challenges and a focus on the presidency have kept scholars from fully exploring executive ideology. This article advocates studying US governors to learn more about executive ideology. It provides an overview of the data scholars can use to measure gubernatorial preferences, and highlights Bonica’s campaign finance-based ideology scores (CFscores) as offering the greatest coverage and allowing common-scale comparisons with other actors. As a validation exercise, I find that CFscores explain within-party variation in other measures and predict the decisions that governors make when in office. Then, I run a preliminary test of the substantive importance of executive ideology. Four models explain state policy liberalism as a function of executive, legislative, and citizen ideology. Gubernatorial preferences emerge as most predictive of the three. These results encourage greater investigation into the role of executive ideology in the policy process.