Historical and social scientific explanations often rely on major happenings and crises to define the topics of our inquiries or to delineate historical periods. But these models often prove limited and problematic. The challenge is to understand how action unfolds in a crisis and, in the process, reconfigures resources, opportunities, and horizons of possibility for new lines of strategic response. These questions are addressed through a comparison of Herbert Hoover and Harry Hopkins as they dealt with the onset of the Great Depression. Both men had the skills, network ties, and reputational resources that figure centrally in models of effective agency, but the contemporary assessments of their efforts differed dramatically. This pair of lives—Hoover and Hopkins—permits a cross-sectional comparison as both men wrestled with the onset of economic collapse and a sequential comparison as Hopkins inherited responsibility for relieving a crisis that had been shaped and reshaped by Hoover's actions.

This paper examines the demographic categories in the first few US censuses, which are asymmetrical combinations of race and legal status not mandated by the US Constitution. State actors explicitly introduced and revised these categories; however, these state actors successfully introduced these categories into the census only when they were already widespread throughout society. Thus, more generally, the paper points to flaws in a “state-centered” view of information gathering, which stresses how state actors create census categories that, in turn, shape social conditions as they become subsequently widespread. In contrast, this paper suggests that politicians draw on widespread social categories when creating census categories, showing how state and social influences interact to create the information in censuses.

Did the United States circa 1850 provide more primary education to its youth than other European countries, especially Britain? And was its more decentralized and democratic polity an important reason why? Analyzing census data, parliamentary reports, and election results, I find the perceived American advantage in regard to enrollments is due to an underestimation of the population at risk, a confusion of enrollments with attendance, and a lack of attention to differences in the length of school terms. In neither northern or southern counties in the United States did the extension of the franchise correlate with more tax dollars for elementary schools; rather it materialized in counties with more Whig and moral reform partisans whom institutional and social historians have identified as being motivated by external benefits/ social control objectives. More similarities in educational status may exist between the two nations than is often acknowledged and a North Atlantic perspective might be fruitful. Agricultural employments and racial/ ethnic differences surfaced as deterrents to 3R competency in both places, though the spread of a high-fertility population into low-density areas presented the United States with a special challenge. These results suggest that the effects of late-nineteenth-century compulsory attendance and other education legislation merit a reevaluation.

Individuals engaged in overseas trade in the early modern period often faced high levels of uncertainty regarding their prospects for trade. One way of managing uncertainty is to gather information from others through social interactions, that is, through social networks. Here we consider how social ties impacted trade patterns by analyzing the relationship between port traffic and early modern ship captains’ exposure to information about ports using informal relations. We consider the possible impact of strong and weak ties and the use of ties under different types of uncertainty. The analysis suggests that social networks encouraged trade at port cities with already high rates of traffic, though this effect is less pronounced than for other means through which information was distributed throughout the trade system.

This is a study of the growth and decline of cities for the purpose of identifying those events in which they significantly increased in size. Significant changes in the scale of cities are important for understanding the long-term trend toward more complex and hierarchical human societies. We report the results of an inventory of cycles, upsweeps, and collapses of settlements in five separate interpolity systems. Upsweeps are instances in which the largest settlement in a world system significantly increases in size. Collapses occur when the size of the largest settlement greatly decreases and stays down for a significant period of time rather than rebounding. We use regional interpolity systems (world systems) rather than single polities or settlements as our unit of analysis. Because the accurate designation of sweeps requires interval scale measures, we are limited to those regions and time periods for which quantitative estimates of largest settlement sizes are regularly available. We find a total of 18 upsweeps and five downsweeps, and only two instances of prolonged systemwide settlement collapse. We also investigate whether or not the rate of cycles has increased over the long run, and we find that cycles of city growth and decline have not accelerated. We also find a greater rate of urban cycles in the Western (Central) System than in the East Asian System, which supports the usual notion that the Western city system was less stable than the Eastern city system.

Recent scholarship on Mexican Americans in the United States, relying largely on qualitative evidence, sees racism and exploitation as the major explanatory factors in their history. Using representative samples of persons of Mexican origin, we argue that immigration is fundamental to their historical experience. A small, beleaguered community in 1850, the Mexican-origin population grew during the late nineteenth century due to greater security under US jurisdiction. However, immigration between 1900 and 1930 created a Southwest broadly identified with persons of Mexican origin. Economic development in Mexico, restriction of European immigration to the United States, and extreme cross-border wage differentials prompted extensive emigration. Despite low human capital, circular migration, and discrimination, immigrant Mexicans earned substantially higher wages than workers in Mexico or native-born Hispanics in the United States. They followed typical immigrant paths toward urban areas with high wages. Prior to 1930, their marked tendency to repatriate was not “constructed” or compelled by the state or employers, but fit a conventional immigrant strategy. During the Depression, many persons of Mexican origin migrated to Mexico; some were deported or coerced, but others followed this well-established repatriation strategy. The remaining Mexican-origin population, increasingly native born, enjoyed extraordinary socioeconomic gains in the 1940s; upward mobility, their family forms, and rising political activity resembled those of previous immigrant-origin communities. In the same decade, however, the Bracero Program prompted mass illegal immigration and mass deportation, a pattern replicated throughout the late twentieth century. These conditions repeatedly replenished ethnicity and reignited nativism, presenting a challenge not faced by any other immigrant group in US history.

Recently, a shared understanding has emerged concerning the migration patterns of US female teachers from 1860 to 1880, but the evidence is scattered in the literature and largely qualitative. This paper provides a unifying understanding of their migration patterns based on the US census. Our quantitative findings generally confirm the shared understanding. First, teachers more often migrated to urban than rural areas; higher wages and other forms of compensation in urban areas appear to be the reason. Second, teachers born in the Northeast migrated the most, and the majority went to the Midwest; the Southern movement was never widespread, even during Reconstruction. Third, teachers born in Massachusetts migrated most commonly among teachers born in the Northeast; the oversupply of teachers in the state seems to have been the influencing factor.

According to the sociologists Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens, modern societies have become increasingly preoccupied with the future and safety and have mobilized themselves in order to manage systematically what they have perceived as “risks” (Beck 1992; Giddens 1991). This special section investigates how conceptions of risk evolved in Europe over the course of the twentieth century by focusing on the creation and evolution of social policy. The language of risk has, in the past twenty years, become a matter of course in conversations about social policy (Kemshall 2002). We seek to trace how “risk” has served as a heuristic tool for understanding and treating “social problems.” A key aim of this collection is to explore the character of social policy (in the broadest sense) as an instrument (or technology) that both constructs its own objects as the consequences of “risks” and generates new “risks” in the process (Lupton 2004: 33). In this way, social policy typifies the paradox of security: by attempting literally to making one “carefree,” or sē (without) curitās (care), acts of (social) security spur new insecurities about what remains unprotected (Hamilton 2013: 3–5, 25–26). Against this semantic and philological context, we suggest that social policy poses an inherent dilemma: in aiming to stabilize or improve the existing social order, it also acts as an agent of change. This characteristic of social policy is what makes particularly valuable studies that allow for comparisons across time, place, and types of political regime. By examining a range of cases from across Europe over the course of the twentieth century, this collection seeks to pose new questions about the role of the state; ideas about risk and security; and conceptions of the “social” in its various forms.

To argue that the future was (re-)invented in the 1970s and the 1980s might seem especially puzzling in light of arguments that the optimism associated with utilitarian, modernization, and socialist theories withered at the time amidst widespread debate over a variety of “crises.” Nonetheless, it was in this peculiar constellation that ideas of the future became fundamentally renegotiated. “New risks” were juxtaposed with prevailing older ideas of social security that were predicated on individual and collective risk management. Focusing on West Germany, this article examines the various technical and political debates over “gaps” in terms of the finances, demographics, and trust in the system of social policy, which helped to put technical and political diagnoses of “new risks” squarely on the political agenda. This demographic argument is of particular interest, as it dramatized the unintended side effects of older social policy and created new, dystopian future scenarios of total systemic breakdown. At times, however, these discussions about managing the risks associated with Germany's demographic future verged on the utopian. New concepts of governmentality and biopolitics prevailed in this context. Moreover, pragmatic and sometimes technocratic concepts of new “governance” (and thus risk management) were proposed by social scientists and politicians as a means to address anxieties about the demographic future, and new models of risk-taking and risk-managing individuals also flourished at the time. With their descriptive but also prescriptive features, these theories contributed to ongoing academic efforts to explain the present and the future in terms of risk.

What is public, what is private, and what is the relationship between them? Can the public interest be clearly identified and protected? What role should government play in the lives of ordinary citizens? These are questions currently engaging policy makers and the general public as well as scholars in a range of disciplines. The provision and financing of urban public goods is one arena in which such questions have arisen. Historically, governments, private entities, and mixed forms such as public-private partnerships have undertaken these activities in the United States and other countries (Beito et al. 1989; Dyble 2010; Goodrich 1960; Hodge et al. 2010; Jacobson and Tarr 1995). In the late-twentieth- and early-twenty-first-century United States, tax revolts and concerns about “big government” led to increased scrutiny of the appropriate role of government. Contracting out of government activities and privatization both assumed increased importance (Dyble 2012; Light 1999).

Statistics originally meant state-istics, a scientific representation of the state for governmental purposes. It did not just cover the growing need for information in the emerging nation-states, but also contributed to establishing a new idea of government. This paper analyzes the rearticulation of the household within modern state-istics. The Belgian population censuses, which were first organized by Adolphe Quetelet, provide the material for our analyses. More particularly, we focus on the period from the mid-nineteenth until the mid-twentieth century, when the welfare state started to develop alternatives to household dependence. We discuss how the orientation shifted from the de facto to the de jure population; the state became involved in redefining the conditions for household membership. Two types of co-residential units were distinguished: family household and collective household. But inmates of collective households caused much concern; statisticians tried to reassign them administratively to households considered more appropriate. We also discuss the articulation of intrahousehold relations. Changes in the notion of “belongingness” show how the state articulated its expectations regarding the proverbial cornerstones of society.

This study explores how industry-specific technological, organizational, and managerial features affected the employment of old male manufacturing workers in the early-twentieth-century United States. Industrial characteristics favorably related to the employment of old industrial workers include high labor productivity, less capital- and material-intensive production, short workdays, low intensity of work, high job flexibility, and formalized employment relationships. Results show that aged industrial workers were heavily concentrated in “unfavorable” industries, suggesting that the contemporary argument of “industrial scrap heap” was applicable for most of the manufacturing workers in the early-twentieth-century United States.

Work-life balance, or the reconciliation of work and family, has been discussed recently as a “new social risk” in comparative research on the welfare state. According to this discussion, the social security systems of traditional welfare states were built after World War II in order to protect (male) breadwinners against the “old social risks” such as the loss of income due to old age, sickness, accident, or unemployment. Scholars have argued, however, that these postwar policies have been inadequate for dealing with the new types of risks that resulted from complex changes in employment practices and family life. This article reflects critically upon the conceptualization of work-life balance as a new social risk by focusing on one of the Nordic countries, which have come to be known for their policies that combine (female) parenthood and paid work. In particular, it analyzes the problematization and governance of work-family reconciliation in twentieth-century Finland. Overall, the article argues that social scientific knowledge played a key role in the ways in which work-life balance was rendered intelligible and manageable as a social policy issue.

By analyzing the different factors affecting labor agricultural productivity in early-twentieth-century Spain, this article shows that common lands were not detrimental to agricultural development. Even though privatization fostered output per worker by bringing more land into cultivation, the role of the commons as provider of pasture and fertilizing materials counteracted that effect, especially in humid regions. The supposed advantages of dismantling the communal regime are thus not supported by the data.

Despite the recently demonstrated importance of consumer credit for the economic health of nations and families, little is known about the history of consumer credit markets and their regulation. An important chapter in the history of consumer credit regulation came between 1909 and 1941, when policy experts at the Russell Sage Foundation (RSF) engaged in a national campaign to transform small loan markets and policy in the United States. Concentrating its efforts on state-by-state passage of the Uniform Small Loan Law, the foundation's political success hinged upon an alliance with the American Association of Personal Finance Companies. While most scholarship portrays experts as being dominated or co-opted by industry, our case provides a countervailing example. Far from controlling RSF experts, lenders became dependent on the foundation for legitimating their political lobbying and their business activities. We explain how the foundation built its expert reputation through a process of reputational entrepreneurship, and we trace how RSF experts deployed this reputation as a power resource in their negotiations with small loan lenders.

In the United States, significant variation regarding the quality of public goods exists across local governments. In this article, I seek to explain these patterns. I argue that economically and racially homogenous communities are collectively willing to invest more resources in public goods relative to diverse communities. I provide evidence in support of this claim by analyzing the relationship between race and income diversity and the share of community security and education that is provided by private entities. I find that as racial diversity and income inequality increase, the share of private security guards and white children enrolled in private school is higher.

The emergence of postwar welfare states in Europe is usually understood as a social and political phenomenon, as a social policy to prevent against forms of mass poverty and to grant general social rights and entitlements to populations during a period of rising prosperity. Beyond these sociopolitical aspects, the foundation of systems of social security after 1945 also had important cultural and epistemic implications. The promise of the state to provide a generalized form of security represented an important cultural factor in securing the social and political stability of postwar societies in Europe. This article examines some exemplary aspects of the meaning of social security by tracing their historical roots and their effects on postwar welfare states in Western Europe. In order to chart the various, interconnected cultural meanings of social security, it juxtaposes two institutional contexts in which social security and prevention were discussed: an international organization of social security experts and a Swiss life insurance company with an innovative health promotion service. The article shows how security was seen ultimately as an utopian response to the multiplication of risks and damages through the processes of industrialization and modernization and thus reveals how security served as both a technical concept for managing integrated systems of insurance and an instrument of control and calculation to help administer the economic and social policies of modern societies. By focusing on the example of life insurance, it demonstrates how security acted as an umbrella term for a generalized model of prevention that targeted the specific risks of a modern, middle-class consumer society.

Modern research demonstrates that there may be wide differences between scientific and popular risk assessments. Popular risk perception is multidimensional; some risks that seem uncontrollable or dreadful are especially abhorrent. Risks are also socially constructed and they may be augmented or attenuated by opinion leaders, advocacy groups, and media treatments. In extreme cases “information cascades” can lead to a self -reinforcing process that amplifies perceived risks resulting in the stigmatization of a technology or a company. We apply these insights to an historical case study of the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad during the years 1911 through 1914. During these years the New Haven experienced a burst of train wrecks. Sensational reporting of these accidents, along with increasingly shrill government investigations, coincided with ongoing exposés of the company's questionable financial practices and turned the New Haven into a pariah company, stigmatizing and forcing out its management. Yet statistics available at the time show that the New Haven was no more dangerous than average. The example of the New Haven also encouraged all railroads to introduce safer methods and technologies than they otherwise would have.

This paper analyzes rural conflict in one of the most volatile areas of interwar Europe, the latifundia regions of the South of Spain. The historical and economics literature argues that rural conflict is a bottom-up response of landless peasants to unemployment, bad harvests, landownership inequality, changes in property rights, and poor enforcement of proworker legislation. A second generation of historical studies has focused on democratization and concomitant changes in collective bargaining and labor market institutions. Was conflict caused by structural factors like poverty, inequality, or unemployment or was conflict an endogenous response to political change? This paper uses municipal-level time series and cross-sectional variation in rural conflict in three Andalusian provinces (Córdoba, Jaén, and Seville) in the early 1930s to argue that, although collective misery certainly shaped the main issues of contention, inequality or deteriorating living standards did not explain the explosive intensification of conflict during the Second Republic. Geographic variation in conflict would be consistent with unobserved locational advantages and higher agricultural incomes, thicker labor markets, facility of communication, and market access and information, irrespective of the intensity of inequality or the degree of local Socialist political power. Poor harvests can only explain a small part of the time-series evolution of conflict from April 1931 to June 1934, while good harvests probably intensified the competition of temporary migrants and local workers for well-paid harvest jobs. Large gains in rural laborers’ bargaining power, organizational buildup, and reactions to policy changes and state intervention are more promising explanatory factors of the temporal evolution of conflicts in the period.

Nineteenth-century Pittsburgh and New Orleans were a mess: trash filled the streets impeding travel, hindering commerce, and spreading disease. City officials in Pittsburgh turned to private contractors to collect trash at public expense while in New Orleans they relied on city employees (through the mechanism of widows carts). Like Pittsburgh and New Orleans, nineteenth-century cities faced a mounting garbage problem and, like Pittsburgh, northern cities more often chose contract while southern cities more often chose city collection. In this paper, we look in depth at how Pittsburgh and New Orleans chose contract and city collection, what those solutions looked like in practice, and how these two cases might shed light on the North-South difference. We find that both cities rebuffed offers of assistance that may have led to better trash collection and instead based their collection practices on politics. Moreover, the solutions in practice defied the dichotomous labels of public and private and the assumptions that underlie each.