Halfway between the publication of Széchenyi's Credit (Hitel, 1830) and the revolutionary year 1848, the Diet of 1839-40 stands out as an interesting episode of the Hungarian Reform Age. The importance of this period is generally recognized, but its interpretation is still problematic. Pre-World War I liberal historiographers tended to blame the “government of Vienna” for all the blunders committed before 1848. The conservative Szekfű school, more charitable to Metternich and Austria, was no less nationalistic in its approach to the non-Magyar minorities of Hungary, maintaining the myth of Magyar “spiritual supremacy” between the two world wars. Today, Marxist Hungarian historians try to be fair in their writings about the nationality problem but frown upon analyses of Austro-Hungarian cooperation, considering them apologies for the Habsburg Gesamtmonarchie. Modern Western historians, too, differ in their evaluation of nineteenth-century Hungarian reform and its leaders.

The Yugoslav nationalities question has always been a source of fascination for Western scholars. Inevitably, discussion has centered on the differences between the major Slav nationalities—the Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, and Montenegrins. Less attention has been paid to the problem of the national minorities, although this issue has bedeviled the Yugoslav state since its formation in 1918. Minorities make up approximately a fifth of the Yugoslav population. In times of peace they have been the object of discrimination and exploitation. In times of crisis, the minorities have been the greatest single threat to the internal security of the Yugoslav state.

Over the years since 1918, four nationalities have proven particularly troublesome for the Yugoslavs: the Albanians, Hungarians, Germans, and Italians. The majority of the Albanians live in the autonomous oblast of Kosovo-Metohija (Kosmet) and are Moslem, belonging to the northern, Gheg, Albanian clan.

Like Balzac and Dickens, Dostoevsky is one of the great mythographers of the modern city; and, like them, he was a journalist as well as a novelist. The motley contents of his Diary of a Writer are, if not well known, at least available to the curious in English translation. His journalism before 1873 is a different matter: this work remains untranslated and largely unexamined, though it contains much that sheds light on his artistic practice—including the feuilletons, published at the very beginning of his career and called, significantly, a “Petersburg Chronicle.” What they show us is the young writer, in search of a persona, confronting the city and experimenting with the themes and attitudes that would later go into his myth of Petersburg.

The terms of the experiment were in good part furnished by the times.

A number of studies of income distribution have suggested that income inequality in the United States showed some tendency to decline during the 1930's and the war years. Although the extent and timing of the decline may be in dispute among specialists in this area, and some recent studies suggest that no significant changes in income shares have occurred since 1944, the American Income Revolution has nonetheless been widely accepted and acclaimed. All the more reason, it would seem, that studies of changes in income inequality in Soviet Russia should prove of great interest. If income inequality has been reduced in the world's major capitalist economy, what has been happening to income distribution in the Soviet Union?

The idea and practice of democracy antedates the Industrial Revolution. It has usually flourished, however, in an urban setting, and it was industrialization that was mainly responsible for its vast upsurge over the last century and a half. Its extension, too, into the field of social reform has been one of the accompaniments of the rise of an urban proletariat.

The last tsarist statute to deal with illegitimate children, the law of June 3, 1902, improved the lot of these “untouchables” somewhat but left them still in a most unfavorable economic and social position. It permitted proof of paternity and established the father's civil responsibility for support. But it denied to the father the right to acknowledge his child, and to the child the right to inherit from his father or to use his name. Some of the mother's property but not that of her relatives could be passed on to the illegitimate child if she acknowledged him in writing and if this property had been acquired by “honorable” means. “Legal” status could be conferred by the marriage of the parents or by adoption, but such marriage was permitted only if there were no children from a previous lawful union.

In contrast to the purge of the “anti-party group” in June, 1957, the removal of Marshal Georgii Zhukov from power has occasioned relatively little comment from Soviet authorities. However, even if the agents of Soviet totalitarianism have remained silent about the reasons for the purge of Zhukov, a consideration of the dynamics of the totalitarian system may help us to reach an explanation.

This study will first explore the official charges on the basis of which his removal was justified in the Resolution of the Central Committee, Marshal Konev's speech, and subsequent statements. These charges were: (1) promotion of the cult of Zhukov in the Soviet Army; (2) reduction and curtailment of party control over the army; (3) misdirection in military matters, particularly in military science and organizational questions; (4) adventurism and Bonapartism.

In 1924, immediately after Lenin died, the Central Committee of his party called upon all who had a shred of writing from his hand to deposit it in the party's archives. The holders hastened to comply. All his letters were ostensibly published in three substantial volumes, supplemented by items in a number of “Miscellany” (Sbornik) volumes, Not one letter to or from Inessa Armand appeared in that flood of Leniniana.

On February 27, 1939, Krupskaia died. Four months after her death, Bolshevik (No. 13, July, 1939) published the first of two letters from Lenin to Inessa on the “woman question.” The letters were not so much an expression of Lenin's views as a comment on Inessa Armand's. Planning in the course of her Bolshevik work with “working women” to write a brochure addressed to them, Inessa had dutifully submitted her outline to Lenin.

The Palestine war of 1947-48, which resulted in the defeat of the combined armies of several Arab states and led to the establishment of the state of Israel, set in motion a process of political, economic, and social change in the Arab East the end of which is not yet in sight. This fermentation brought with it frequent outbursts of passion and violence—witness the chronic instability of Syrian politics, the Egyptian revolution (1952), upheavals in Lebanon (1958), Iraq (1958 and 1963), Yemen (1962), and numerous abortive attempts to overthrow Jordan's King Hussein. Nourishing the fermentation and gripping the entire area was a fever of intense nationalism that held the Western powers responsible for the emergence of Israel and demanded immediate and unconditional termination of Western interference in Arab affairs.

The story of armed resistance to Soviet rule in postwar Lithuania is of interest both to historians and to political scientists. On the one hand, it unveils an important period of modern Lithuanian history and offers a glimpse into the dilemma of East European nationalism, caught between Nazis and Communists in World War II. On the other, it allows an insight into the nature of a movement that seeks to produce political changes by the use of violence. In an age when political practitioners use guerrilla warfare and paramilitary tactics as basic means of struggle for power, justification of a study of partisan movements seems hardly necessary. By showing academic interest, the social scientist merely recognizes their growing practical importance.

The Lithuanian partisan resistance to the Soviet regime now can be analyzed with the help of varied source material, including firsthand testimony of both nationalist and Communist origin.