The article argues that Karl Barth's Church Dogmatics presents human ‘neediness’ as the constitutive element of his theological anthropology. Since this element has had little notice in Barth scholarship, the article focuses on describing the consistent reiteration of this theme in theologically substantive locations throughout the Dogmatics. It begins with Barth's observation that the emergence of humanity on the sixth day discloses humans to be ‘the neediest of all creation’. Barth elaborates the dimensions of human neediness in his discussion of ‘the readiness of humanity for God’, propounding the human need for God as the precondition of knowledge of God that is in actuality undercut by the sin that denies any such neediness. Barth thus describes a potential ‘blessed neediness’ and an actual ‘wretched neediness’ that together define the glory and the tragedy of all that is human, and which inform not only Barth's epistemology and hamartiology, but also his accounts of christology, forgiveness, redemption, worship and Christian witness.

The paper argues that Christian theological anthropology is best understood, in the contemporary world, in terms of relationships. Human persons are formed in and through sedimented interactions with other persons. In the paper these interactions are considered against the backdrop of the concept of naming. In being named we are invited into relationships of increasing intimacy in which we are challenged to reveal more of who we are and what our name genuinely means. In each interaction it is possible to be embraced or to be rejected. Embrace encourages greater openness to relational interaction; rejection encourages closure and an unwillingness to open ourselves to further hurt and pain. It is possible to reflect on the use and power of names in the Bible where narratives using names can be read as models of the creative and redemptive activity of God. Gen 2–3 is examined as a 'case study' of this theory and then linked to other significant instances of naming in the Bible to demonstrate that this reading is a legitimate one. There are quite profound implications of thinking about theological anthropology in this way: challenges to our understanding of personhood, styles of ministry, sin and atonement and perhaps most of all to our view of God – the divine person who in revealing the divine name in every age invites humanity to enter into the divine life.

A Central theme in J. Moltmann's The Crucified God is that since Jesus was God and Jesus was crucified, God may be called the crucified God. In other words God himself may be said to have suffered and died on calvary. The purpose of this article is to discuss the philosophical problems raised by Moltmann's striking assertion. The difficulties it raises will be considered and Moltmann's solution will be criticised as unsatisfactory. We shall then suggest a possible solution via the notions of a double-role christology and a particular view of divine infinity.

Great strides have been made in the study of John Cassian over the last half-century, and yet persistent concerns are still expressed in regard to his theological competence. Invariably, the standard against which Cassian is found wanting is Augustinian orthodoxy. And there is nothing new in this: these concerns were first expressed by Cassian's contemporary, Prosper of Aquitaine, especially in his polemic Contra collatorem. Prosper is the harbinger of medieval Augustinianism and this makes his claims seem almost inevitable in retrospect – but as this analysis will demonstrate, his evaluation and denunciation of Cassian is systematically flawed. Close attention to Prosper's work reveals not only that his criticism of Cassian was ill-considered; it also shows that Prosper's own theological insight is less penetrating than one might have hoped to find in the ‘first Augustinian’. The consequences for the study of Cassian, I suggest, are that Prosper's threadbare accusations no longer need to be entertained. But there is further significance in this finding: it is Prosper's polemic against Cassian that provides the categories that have regularly been used to evaluate the early reception of Augustinianism. If, as is shown in this paper, Prosper was an opportunistic controversialist who can be seen to have distorted, embellished and in some cases even fabricated his opponent's arguments, then we should be extremely reserved in using his polemic as the point of departure, not just for studying Cassian, but for studying the development of Augustinianism as a whole.

This essay situates two embodied practices of palliative care, namely, the act of sitting with another in silence, and the act of gentle touch, within the broader conceptual framework of creatio ex nihilo. Centring on themes of particularity, creatureliness, and relationality, I argue that these practices, understood theologically, can be reframed as active participations in the self-giving love of God – thus setting forth a mode of loving relation with the dying person, rooted in a deep, attentive presence.

‘The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ and the love of God the Father and the fellowship of the Holy Spirit be with us all.’ This is an ancient form of benediction very generally used in the Christian church. I should like to take it up here, asking what is meant by ‘the fellowship of the Holy Spirit’? Does the divine Spirit enter into community with us human beings? Does he admit us into his ‘community’ with the Father and the Son? Why does the benediction not talk about divine sovereignty and absolute human dependence in connection with the Holy Spirit? Why does it so emphatically use the word ‘fellowship’ instead?

Though renowned for restoring the dogma of the trinity to a place of honor in Protestant dogmatics, Karl Barth has faced widespread criticism for allegedly introducing an ancient heresy into that very doctrine: the heresy of modalism. In this paper, we analyze: (a) Barth's doctrine of the trinity as presented in his Church Dogmatics I/1; (b) the arguments Barth himself employs against modalism; and (c) those aspects of Barth's doctrine of the trinity which, is his critics' view, commit him to some form of modalism. On this basis, we argue that Barth, in spite of infelicities and even errors in his doctrine of the trinity, does not in any way endorse the heresy of modalism.

Aquinas's analysis of chastity as a part of temperance points the way towards a positive virtue ethic of sexuality, even though he himself did not develop his analysis in this direction. This alternative illustrates that ‘the tradition’, that is to say, the moral heritage in terms of which Christians define themselves through affirmation or rejection, is more complex than we sometimes assume, including diverse approaches to difficult topics even within one author. Even more importantly, considered on its own merits a broadly Thomistic, virtue-oriented approach offers an attractive sexual ethic which implies that ideals of restraint and consideration for others have substantive content, without tying these ideals to specific norms in a reductive or overly inflexible way.

The thesis of this article is that an appropriate apocalyptic is remarkably pertinent, perhaps essential, in addressing certain theological challenges of our time. What an appropriate understanding of apocalyptic might be will, I trust, emerge with discussion; clarifying the contemporary challenges will be the first concern. Once that is done, the argument will proceed through two steps or concepts: first, the issue of concreteness and second, a concept I will call ‘contextualisation’. These steps establish the connection between the challenges and apocalyptic. I conclude by sketching some implications. Throughout, the article is guided by an ongoing conversation with Karl Barth, especially II/1 of the Church Dogmatics.

Henri DeLubac's work on multi-sense scriptural reading has become a major resource for Catholic and Protestant theologians seeking a new integration of biblical studies and theology. Rarely, however, is it noticed that De Lubac's account of scriptural interpretation involves a robust notion of the soul and its transformation in the Christian life – and that in linking these themes De Lubac accurately reflects a central theme of pre-modern exegesis. This article thus suggests, first, that defending a notion of soul is important for those seeking to appropriate pre-modern exegesis. The article then argues that such a project is only possible if we move beyond Harnackian notions of early Christianity's ‘hellenisation’ and see the soul as a theological doctrine. The soul is the fundamental locus of a transformation in which Christians act in and through the Spirit as members of the body of Christ. Once the status of the soul is acknowledged, we are then best able to follow De Lubac's call for the reintegration of moral-practical aspects of Christianity and the discipline of theology. The article finally argues that Christian accounts of scriptural interpretation should find their core in an understanding of scripture as a graced resource for the formation of Christians, and that these accounts should be ever attentive to the place of scripture within the drama of salvation.

In this article we will argue this thesis: even with classical theism and meticulous providence, one can properly say God exercises creativity. This is not merely to say that God is creative – which is perhaps tautologous given that God is the Creator – but further, it is to say that God's activity in relation to the cosmos displays creativity. We will examine open theism, which resides at the other end of the spectrum, in order to provide contrast with the position defended in this article. There are three aspects we intend to affirm in saying God exercises creativity. First, the product (the cosmos which God made) exhibits creativity. This should not be particularly contentious and we will not pursue this aspect here. Second, the agent (God) exhibits creativity. Third, the process exhibits creativity. Both of these latter aspects will be defended. In this article we argue that God's freedom, creation's contingency, creation's reality and actuality, and considerations from the incarnation all enable meaningful ways in which one can speak of divine creativity while still affirming classical theism and meticulous providence. First, in support of our thesis we will use possible world talk as a heuristic device. Possible world talk involves modal claims, modal logic and counterfactuals. We use this conceptual device, operating within a theistic framework, to approach with clarity theological issues such as the divine decree, creation ex nihilo and providence. Second, we will utilise a two-nature christology to speak meaningfully about divine creativity. Against those who describe God's creativity in terms of divine attributes, we suggest that it is possible to understand God's creativity in terms of the incarnation. Drawing upon the work of Thomas Weinandy, we suggest that it is possible to speak about God experiencing something genuinely new in the person of Christ. As such, one can hold to a classical doctrine of divine creation and use language associated with human creativity, such as ‘risk’, ‘process’ and ‘discovery’, to speak about God. We hope to demonstrate that the affirmation of divine creativity need not be exclusive to positions such as open theism.

The article presents one aspect of the theology of the leader of the Athonite followers of Onomatodoxy, Hieroschemamonk Anthony Bulatovich, namely his doctrine of divine revelation and words of God in the Bible as uncreated energies of God. This article shows that this doctrine is in conformity with the views of the Fathers of the Eastern Church as well as with the Old Testament theology of the Divine Name.

In the history of exegesis there have been few books within the Old Testament which have roused more vigorous controversy than the interpretation of the Book of Jonah. There was a time when one's orthodoxy could be quickly determined simply on the basis of opinions held regarding its historicity. Yet in spite of the stormy past it is a surprising fact that in modern times there has been a great unanimity of interpretation reached among Old Testament scholars. On the one hand, the attempt of the older expositors, such as Pusey and Orelli, to defend the book as literal history has been almost universally rejected as untenable. On the other hand, the allegorical interpretation of G. A. Smith has found few followers. Rather, the great majority of modern scholars have reached the conclusion that the book of Jonah is simply a narrative which the author used as a means of conveying a general truth in an interesting and effective manner. R. H. Pheiffer is typical when he calls it ‘a short story with a moral’. The spiritual message of the book is the lesson that God's love is not exclusively confined to Israel, but that Israel carries a responsibility of sharing it with others.

Today scholars still struggle to apprehend the meaning of hebel (vanity) in the Book of Ecclesiastes. It has become recognized that Old Testament theologians like Walter Eichrodt, Gerhard von Rad, and Ronald Clements did not essentially integrate the Wisdom Tradition of ancient Israel into the development of their theologies. In his Tyndale lecture on the Old Testament of 1965, David Hubbard argued for a new sensitivity to the relationship that must exist between covenant and wisdom in the community of faith. A. Graeme Auld has insisted that the alienation of wisdom from covenant traditions has caused such acute problems in understanding the Old Testament that we are in danger of not grasping at all the relation between the Word of God and the Word of Man. These problems may be linked not only to the question about why the Book of Ecclesiastes was allowed into the Canon of Israel, but also to the very hearing we claim to possess of the revelation of the Word of God in the world and the way the world has actually been made to be. All this should tell us that the significance of the concept of hebel in the Book of Ecclesiastes requires a real clarification of profound consequence for our knowledge of God in the world.

The two books under review here are remarkably similar, although (it would appear) entirely independent of each other. Further, I must say right at the start that, in many respects (perhaps the most important respect), I am entirely in agreement with many of their conclusions, and their manner of reaching those conclusions. So maybe this ‘critical’ review is not critical enough!

• - Both authors are English; and both books come across (to me) as very ‘English’: the argument is cautious, fully acknowledging caveats, never overstating the case, etc.

• - The prime issue addressed in both is the relationship between Thomas and the Synoptics.

• - Both argue for a broadly similar conclusion – that Thomas is dependent (whether directly or indirectly: see below) on at least Matthew and Luke.

• - Both reach this conclusion via an almost identical methodology: seeking to identify possible elements of Synoptic redactional activity in Thomas as an indication of Thomas’ dependence.

• - Some (but not all) of the evidence cited is common, e.g. Th 5 / / Luke 8:17; Th 14 / / Matt 15:11; Th 31 / / Luke 4:24. (However, other examples do not overlap.)

• - Both are reticent about relying too much on theories about Q (perhaps surprisingly, Goodacre less than Gathercole).

• - Both see Thomas as potentially mystifying, not necessarily aiming at clarity, but demanding hermeneutical effort on the part of the reader.

• - Both emphasise the importance of taking seriously the evidence of the Greek fragments, and indeed both at different points use the Greek evidence closely.

• - Both offer powerful critiques of the older form-critical ‘norms’, or ‘laws’, about the development of the tradition, both effectively denying that such rigid ‘laws’ have any validity at all.

• - Both address in detail the more general arguments of others defending Thomas’ independence, e.g. on order, the apparent lack of ‘much’ agreement with the Synoptics, the possibility of assimilation in the textual transmission, etc.

• - Both also offer good arguments referring to the possibility of being misled by the phenomenon of the Synoptic Gospels about what level of agreement might be expected in a case of dependence. (The Synoptics may be highly unusual in the high level of agreement (in wording and order) they display.)

• - Both emphasise the danger of polarising the debate prematurely, of simply claiming that one's own theory has ‘won the day’ and ignoring others who disagree. Certainly both authors here take on, and engage with (in my view very fairly) the views of others who disagree.

In a recent article in this journal, Professor Wiebe has attempted to discard the traditional thesis about the relationship between faith and reason in Kant's critical philosophy and substitute a decidedly novel and superficially attractive interpretation. While traditional readings of Kant's theology have taken his denial of knowledge in order to make room for faith at more or less face value and have thus attributed to him a rather different sort of theology, Professor Wiebe rejects this polarity of knowledge and faith. Kant's faith, according to Wiebe, is a ‘cognitive faith — a source of belief that can quite legitimately, even if only in a weak sense, be referred to as religious knowledge’. This claim in turn rests upon the assertion that the traditional distinction between belief and knowledge is untenable, that ‘… “knowledge” and “justified belief” are indistinguishable’. Wiebe would thus recast Kant's claim of denying knowledge to make room for faith to denying theoretical knowledge to make room for practical knowledge. Kantian faith then, ‘is not outside the realm of reason, but is rather one aspect of reason, as is knowledge’. It is in this sense that there is ‘a basic continuity in Kant's thoughts on religion with the theologies of the past’

Perhaps the most striking feature of 1 Jn. is the teaching which it contains on sin. On the one hand there is the attitude taken by the author in 1:8ff- the Christian ought not to sin, but in fact does. He cannot claim to be sinless without lying. Nevertheless, if they confess their sins, Christians are consistently being forgiven through Christ. On the other hand there is the teaching in chapter three that the Christian does not sin and indeed cannot sin. This teaching is recapitulated in chapter five. The purpose of this article is to show that, far from being inconsistent, the writer of 1 Jn. is perfectly orthodox in his doctrine of sin and is, in fact, writing in a way completely appropriate to the circumstances.

We do not possess a large amount of information about the worship of Christians in the early days of the church and most of what we do comes from First Corinthians. In it Paul answers various questions raised by the Corinthians, among them one about spiritual gifts. We ought probably to envisage a small group meeting in a house (cf. 1 Cor. 16.19; there would have been a number of such ‘house-churches’ in Corinth). In these meetings the Christians present made various contributions to the worship according to their abilities, or, more correctly, their spiritual gifts, charismata.

Traditionally Romans 8.26 has been a text to which at least some Pentecostals have appealed as scriptural support for the practice of speaking in tongues. However, this interpretation has by no means found favour with all commentators: Adolf Schlatter explicitly denies it, arguing that (a) the powerlessness that is described here is not an affliction peculiar to a few individuals but is the mark of all Christian prayer, whereas speaking with tongues is considered by Paul to be a gift given to certain individuals only, (b) it is a gift of thanksgiving and of singing of God's secrets, not of groaning, and (c) it is not ‘unspeakable’, for some interpreted it.2 Rather, he argues, the groaning here is wordless, but yet intercessory. Many commentators share Schlatter's view that Paul's language here does not fit the phenomenon of glossolalia: so Dodd refers to an ‘inarticulate aspiration’ that expresses itself in ‘sighs that are beyond words’, and Barrett explicitly prefers to see here a reference to an immediate communion between the ‘Spirit (-filled worshipper) and God’ which needs no spoken word.

One of the major discoveries—it may be only a rediscovery—of recent theology has been the central place which analogy occupies in theological inquiry of all kinds. Our present task falls into three parts: (1) to indicate the different areas to which the problem of analogy seems to be relevant; (2) to discuss the origin of the interpretations of the nature of analogy which are gaining a certain acceptance today; and (3) finally, to estimate the use that may validly be made of the traditional analyses of analogy.