Published online by Cambridge University Press: 16 July 2013
In an age where the church needs to foster moral concern for the environment, some are suggesting that Christian theology itself must be changed to produce this result. This article argues that such emendations are unnecessary because Dietrich Bonhoeffer, working a couple of decades before ecological concern was even seen as necessary, manages to craft a theological and ethical approach which is sensitive to ecological concern while retaining large portions of the Christian tradition. Bonhoeffer's anthropology robustly affirms humanity's connection with the natural environment and does not separate humans from the natural order. In fact, his novel approach to the image of God emphasises the necessity of human physicality and the ethical responsibility for the other, which seems to be extendable to the natural order as well. In addition, Bonhoeffer's interpretation of the command to have dominion sees the injunction as a call to be ‘bound’ to nature as a servant, not as a lord free to exploit the earth for wanton pleasure. Consequently, Bonhoeffer interprets the industrial revolution as the failure of humans to rule and serve creation well. Finally, his anthropology, unlike many in the tradition, does not extradite humans from the world, but rather situates them entirely within the matrix of interlocking relationships in the natural world. While Christian soteriology has been criticised for shifting Christian concern away from the environment and life in this world, Bonhoeffer's soteriology overcomes this criticism. Bonhoeffer vociferously repudiates two kingdoms theology in favour of a single unified reality of Christ, which unites God's work of creation and redemption into a unified whole. Furthermore, he interprets the incarnation as a robust affirmation of God's creation and thereby life in this present world. Finally, Bonhoeffer posits redemption encompassing the entire world order, rather than seeing humans as its unique constituents. Bonhoeffer's ethics of responsible action shows that humans need to evaluate not just their immediate actions, but also the long-term consequences of their actions, especially when it comes to use of the environment, both for the sake of other humans and for the sake of following Christ. Since disciples of Christ are supposed to be working towards the reality of Christ, one can conclude that Bonhoeffer's thought encourages humans to work towards the harmony that is to typify creation in the eschaton. Thus, Bonhoeffer's ethics encourages a moral concern for the environment both as a means of neighbourly love and as a means of following Christ.
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4 Berry, Earth, p. 75.
5 However, some have declared that Bonhoeffer was ‘Judaizing Christianity’ and therefore making emendations which dramatically altered Christian theology. See Bowman, Douglas C., ‘Bonhoeffer and the Possibility of Judaizing Christianity’, in Klassen, A. J. (ed.), A Bonhoeffer Legacy (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1981), p. 76Google Scholar. However, his claim has been countered: Vosloo, Robert, ‘Beyond Spirituality: Bonhoeffer and Responses to the Dejudaization of Christianity’, Journal of Theology for Southern Africa 127 (2007), pp. 82–95Google Scholar.
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8 Gen 1:28. All biblical quotations come from the NRSV.
9 For information on these lectures see de Gruchy, John W., ‘Editor's Introduction to the English Edition’, in Creation and Fall: A Theological Exposition of Genesis 1–3, ed. de Gruchy, John W., trans. Douglas Stephen Bax (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1997), pp. 1–5Google Scholar.
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11 Ibid., p. 78.
12 Ibid., p. 79.
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15 Ibid., p. 62.
16 Ibid., p. 113.
17 Ibid., p. 62.
18 Ibid., p. 63.
19 Ibid., p. 79.
20 Although at one point Bonhoeffer distinguishes between freedom ‘from’ creation and freedom for other human beings (ibid., p. 66), at other points he seems to extend this ‘freedom for others’ to the rest of nature as well: ‘For in their bodily nature human beings are related to the earth and to other bodies; they are there for others and are dependent upon others’ (ibid., p. 79; my emphasis). In light of this later passage, I think that Bonhoeffer's notion of ‘freedom for others’ sometimes includes the rest of nature (the earth), and is not just limited to human beings. Cf. Bonhoeffer, Ethics, p. 53. For this reason, I find Scott's assessment of nature in Bonhoeffer – that it is limited to human embodiment – inaccurate, at least in some of his works. In fact, I think Scott finds it so easy to expand Bonhoeffer's sociality to include non-human nature because it is already present in his thought. See Peter Scott, ‘Christ, Nature, Sociality’, pp. 424–30. It seems to me Scott is much more precise regarding Bonhoeffer's notion of nature in his later work. See Scott, Peter, Anti-Human Theology: Nature, Technology and the Postnatural (London: SCM, 2010), p. 23Google Scholar.
21 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, p. 66.
22 Ibid.
23 Perhaps Bonhoeffer here demonstrates a nascent form of the Gaia hypothesis. See Rasmussen, Larry L., Earth Community Earth Ethics (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1996), p. 298Google Scholar.
24 Bonhoeffer, , Letters and Papers from Prison, ed. de Gruchy, John W., trans. Isabel Best et al. (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1996), p. 500Google Scholar.
25 Ibid.
26 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, p. 67.
27 Ibid.
28 Northcott, Michael S., The Environment and Christian Ethics (Cambridge: CUP, 1996), pp. 211–21CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
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30 Bonhoeffer, Ethics, pp. 57–8.
31 Ibid., p. 58; his emphasis.
32 Ibid.
33 The discussion of radicalism and compromise can be found at ibid., pp. 153–7.
34 Ibid., p. 153.
35 Müller, Denis, ‘Some Reflections on Bonhoeffer's Ethics’, Modern Churchman 34/4 (1993), p. 30CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
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37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid., p. 157. In addition, the influence of Bonhoeffer's understanding of Chalcedonian christology should not be missed here. The uniting of Christ and the world reflects the union of the divine and human natures. See Manoussakis, John P., ‘At the Recurrent End of the Unending: Bonhoeffer's Eschatology of the Penultimate’, in Bonhoeffer and Continental Thought (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University, 2009), p. 228Google Scholar.
40 See e.g. the questions raised in the following: Plant, Stephen, Bonhoeffer (London: Continuum, 2004), p. 116Google Scholar; Marsh, Bonhoeffer, pp. 103–6.
41 Harvey, Barry, ‘Preserving the World for Christ’, Scottish Journal of Theology 61/1 (2008), p. 80CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
42 Müller, ‘Reflections’, p. 30. The author later makes the insightful observation that Bonhoeffer fails to account for the hermeneutical problem of interpreting the ultimate.
43 Bonhoeffer, Ethics, pp. 59–60. Here, it seems ‘polemical’ denotes the relationship between the realms as noted ibid., p. 59, n. 47. Feil also affirms this point by asserting that Bonhoeffer's unification of the ultimate and penultimate should ‘not lead one to the erroneous conclusion that what is Christian is already what is of the world’. Feil, Ernst, The Theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, trans. Rumscheidt, Martin (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1985), p. 147Google Scholar.
44 Bonhoeffer, Ethics, p. 63.
45 ‘In Ethics, we are presented with penultimacy not simply prior to the ultimate – as if in succession – but as impregnated by the ultimate things-to-come, which, since they are already to be found in the penultimate, that is, in the things-themselves, are not only to-come but also already here’. Manoussakis, ‘Recurrent End’, p. 231.
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47 One cannot overlook how Bonhoeffer embodied this principle in the last days of his life in a Nazi prison. The day after Abwehr's coup attempt failed, sealing Bonhoeffer's fate of execution, he still maintained a resolute ‘this worldliness’. See Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers, p. 485.
48 Bonhoeffer, Berlin, p. 286. According to Bonhoeffer, when this approach is not taken and one becomes ‘otherworldly’, then ‘One leapfrogs over the present, scorns the Earth; one is better than it; indeed, next to the temporal defeats, one has eternal victories that are so easily achieved’.
49 Bonhoeffer, Ethics, p. 96. Cf. Athanasius, On the Incarnation, p. 54.
50 Bonhoeffer, Ethics, p. 94.
51 Bonhoeffer, Dietrich, Christ the Center, trans. Bowden, John (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), p. 67Google Scholar. For another reiteration of this theme in Bonhoeffer, see Rasmussen, Larry L., ‘Redemption: An Affair of the Earth’, Living Pulpit 2/2 (1993), pp. 10–11Google Scholar.
52 Bonhoeffer, Christ, p. 67. It seems here that ‘nature’ refers to non-human nature as well since ‘all creatures’ are represented by Christ. Contra Peter Scott, ‘Christ, Nature, Sociality’, p. 424.
53 Bonhoeffer, Berlin, p. 295.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid., p. 297.
56 For the discussion of the various dimensions of responsible action, see Bonhoeffer, Ethics, pp. 52, 267–8. Regarding the freedom of God's commandment, see ibid., p. 385.
57 Ibid., pp. 52, 267–8. Because Bonhoeffer wants to consider all of these factors equally, I find it difficult to follow Burtness in saying that Bonhoeffer is more concerned about consequences than motives. See Burtness, James, Shaping the Future (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1985), p. 16Google Scholar.
58 Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers, p. 42.
59 See Hammelsbeck, Oskar, ‘In Discussion with Bonhoeffer’, in I Knew Dietrich Bonhoeffer, ed. Zimmerman, Wolf-Dieter and Smith, Ronald Gregor, trans. Smith, Käthe Gregor (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), pp. 182–3Google Scholar.
60 Gladwin, Thomas N. and Reiskin, Edward D., ‘Why is the Northern Elite Mind Biased Against Community, the Environment, and a Sustainable Future?’, in Bazerman, Max H.et al. (eds), Environment, Ethics, and Behavior (San Francisco: New Lexington, 1997), pp. 234–8Google Scholar.
61 For a circumspect understand of sustainability amidst the complexities of the natural world, see Rassmussen, Earth Community, pp. 162–73.
62 Bonhoeffer, Ethics, p. 53.
63 Ibid., p. 53.
64 Ibid., p. 55.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid., p. 54.
67 Ibid.
68 Ruether, Rosemary Radford, Gaia and God (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1992), pp. 223–5Google Scholar. To be fair to Ruether, she does advocate a mostly vegetarian diet because such a diet consumes fewer resources, making food more attainable for the poor. However, because she acknowledges the presence of predation in nature, she is forced to conclude that it cannot be prohibited.
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71 See McLaughlin, Ryan P., ‘Evidencing the Eschaton: Progressive-Transformative Animal Welfare in the Church Fathers’, Modern Theology 27 (2011), pp. 121–46CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
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73 Ibid., pp. 175–6. While he had in mind the kind of laws that the Nazis were implementing, it seems that this can be just as easily applied to environmental crises as well.
74 Ibid., p. 180.
75 Ibid., p. 185.
76 Ibid., p. 186.
77 Ibid., p. 214. While Rasmussen alludes to these realities, he does not seem to draw the explicit connection that pollution violates another's body (Earth Community, pp. 308–9). I realise that pollution might be part of the law of double-effect in that, in order for certain, beneficial economic activities to occur, pollution is an unintentional byproduct, which means it might not fit Bonhoeffer's category of ‘arbitrariness’. However, to the degree that people fail to limit pollution in order to enhance profits and personal gain, pollution becomes intentional because the failure to take necessary precautions is deliberate. For how pollution affects the bodily lives of human beings see, among others: Stevens, Gretchen A., Dias, Rodrigo H. and Ezzati, Majid, ‘The Effects of 3 Environmental Risks on Mortality Disparities across Mexican Communities’, PNAS 105/4 (2008), pp. 16860–5CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed; Kim, Janice J., ‘Ambient Air Pollution: Health Hazards to Children’, Pediatrics 114/6 (2004), pp. 1699–1707Google Scholar; Dockery, Douglas W.et al., ‘An Association between Air Pollution and Mortality in Six U.S. Cities’, New England Journal of Medicine 329/24 (1993), pp. 1753–9CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed; Millman, Alexander, Tang, Deliang and Perara, Frederica P., ‘Air Pollution Threatens the Health of Children in China’, Pediatrics 122/3 (2008), pp. 620–8CrossRefGoogle Scholar.