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Sin and human cognition of God

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 September 2011

Rik Peels
Rik Peels*
Affiliation:
Utrecht University, Janskerkhof 13a, 3512 BL Utrecht, The [email protected]
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Abstract

In this article I argue that the effects of sin for our cognition of God primarily consist in a lack of knowledge by acquaintance of God and the relevant ensuing propositional knowledge. In the course of my argument, I make several conceptual distinctions and offer analyses of 1 Cor 13:9–12 and Rom 1:18–23. As it turns out, we have ample reason to think that sin has had and still has profound consequences for our cognition of God, but there is no reason to think that sin has taken away all knowledge of God or that sin has resulted in a loss of specific cognitive faculties which are orientated towards knowledge of God.

Type
Research Article
Information
Scottish Journal of Theology , Volume 64 , Issue 4 , November 2011 , pp. 390 - 409
Copyright
Copyright © Scottish Journal of Theology Ltd 2011

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References

1 For more on the effects of sin upon our moral cognition, see Peels, Rik, ‘The effects of Sin Upon Human Moral Cognition’, Journal of Reformed Theology 4/1 (2010), pp. 42–69CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

2 See Aquinas, Thomas, Summa Theologica, vol. 1 (New York: Benziger Brothers, 1948), pp. 58Google Scholar, 478 (Ia, Q.13, art.12, Q.94, art.1).

3 See Canons of Dordrecht III/IV, arts. 1, 4.

4 As rightly noticed by Moroney, Stephen K., The Noetic Effects of Sin: A Historical and Contemporary Exploration of How Sin Affects our Thinking (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2000), p. 27Google Scholar, and Plantinga, Alvin, Warranted Christian Belief (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 20CrossRefGoogle Scholar. In contradistinction to Plantinga's comments on the noetic effects of sin, Moroney's study is primarily of a historical nature. It does critically evaluate the positions of some theologians, but it fails to offer a substantive independent exegetical and philosophical analysis of the cognitive consequences of sin, on the basis of which he could properly criticise these various views.

5 For an argument along these lines, see de Boer, J., ‘Reformed Epistemology: Three Replies’, The Reformed Journal 32 (1982), pp. 24–5Google Scholar.

6 The option of rejecting the use of our reasoning faculties in favour of listening to God's revelation in the Bible is incoherent, as Thomas Reid rightly points out (see Reid, Thomas, Lectures on Natural Theology (1780), ed. Duncan, Elmer H. (Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1981), pp. 1–2)Google Scholar, for both in interpreting the Bible and systematising its data about the main elements of Christian faith, we necessarily use our reasoning faculties.

7 Moroney, Noetic Effects of Sin, p. 81.

8 For the distinction that I make here – that between sin as act and sin as condition – see also Jüngel, Eberhard, Das Evangelium von der Rechtfertigung des Gottlosen als Zentrum des christlichen Glaubens: Eine theologische Studie in ökumenischer Absicht (Tübingen: Siebeck, 1999), pp. 78, 97Google Scholar, and Shuster, Marguerite, The Fall and Sin: What we Have Become as Sinners (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2004), pp. 102–27Google Scholar.

9 Cf. Bavinck, Herman, Gereformeerde Dogmatiek, part 3 (Kampen: Kok, 1998), pp. 121–2Google Scholar.

10 There are some biblical passages which deal with sin against other human beings rather than sin directly against God (see e.g. 1 Sam 2:25, Amos 1 and Matt 18:21). I will take it that there are indeed such things as sins against one's fellow creatures, but that these sins are always somehow contrary to the will (norms, laws) of God – which is why they are genuine sins – and, therefore, offensive to God.

11 Here, I will not go into the vexing issue of whether someone's doing something which she believes is objectively sinful makes doing that thing a sin, whether or not it is in fact contrary to the will of God. For this issue, see Swinburne, Richard, ‘Original Sinfulness’, Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie 27 (1985), p. 238CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Plantinga, Cornelius Jr., Not the Way it's Supposed to Be: A Breviary of Sin (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1995), p. 20Google Scholar.

12 Cf. Cover, Robin C. and Sanders, E. P., ‘Sin, Sinners’, in Freedman, David N. et al. (eds), The Anchor Bible Dictionary, vol. 6 (New York: Doubleday, 1992), pp. 32–3Google Scholar.

13 The distinction between affective and cognitive consequences of sin is also made by, for instance, van Woudenberg, René, ‘Over de noëtische gevolgen van de zonde: Een filosofische beschouwing’, Nederlands Theologisch Tijdschrift 52 (1998), p. 224Google Scholar, and Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, p. 205.

14 One may object that this distinction cannot properly be applied to the biblical concept of knowledge, since the biblical concept of knowledge is much more relational than our modern, purely mental concept of knowledge. I think this objection is mistaken: in the Bible, we clearly find instances of propositional knowledge (e.g. Deut 4:35; Ps 135:5; Luke 21:20; Rev 3:17), knowledge by acquaintance (e.g. Exod 1:8; Jer 15:14; John 4:10; 2 Cor 12:2) and procedural or practical knowledge (e.g. Gen 25:27, 1 Sam 16:18; Isa 29:1; Jer 1:6).

15 All Bible quotations will be from the New International Version (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2000).

16 For similar uses of μέρος, see e.g. Rom 11:25 (ἀπὸ μέρους), 1 Cor 11:18 (μέρος, ‘partly’, ‘to some extent’), 12:27 (ἐκ μέρους) and 2 Cor 1:14 (ἐπέγνωτϵ (. . .) ἀπὸ μέρους).

17 Thus also Garland, David E., 1 Corinthians, Baker Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 2003), p. 624Google Scholar.

18 Thus e.g. Robertson, Archibald and Plummer, Alfred, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the First Epistle of St Paul to the Corinthians, The International Critical Commentary (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1978), p. 298Google Scholar.

19 As is noticed by Senft, Christophe, La première épitre de Saint-Paul aux Corinthiens, Commentaire du Noveau Testament (Paris: Delachaux & Niestlé éditeurs, 1979), p. 171Google Scholar.

20 This view is defended by Conzelmann, Hans, Der erste Brief an die Korinther, Meyers Kritisch-Exegetischer Kommentar über das Neue Testament (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1969), p. 269Google Scholar. As Schrage says, ‘[d]as menschliche ἐπιγινώσκϵιν wird dem göttlichen entsprechen, insofern es ein ganz von der Liebe geprägtes und nicht mehr durch Vermittlung gebrochenes Erkennen und Anerkennen sein wird’ (Schrage, Wolfgang, Der erste Brief an die Korinther, vol. 3, Evangelisch-Katholischer Kommentar zum Neuen Testament (Zürich: Benziger Verlag, 1999), p. 315)Google Scholar.

21 Thus also e.g. Kremer, Jacob, Der Erste Brief an die Korinther, Regensburger Neues Testament (Regensburg: Pustet, 1997), p. 290Google Scholar, Schrage, Der erste Brief an die Korinther, p. 313, and Merklein, Helmut and Gielen, Marlis, Der erste Brief an die Korinther. Kapitel 11,2–16,24, Ökumenischer Taschenbuchkommentar zum Neuen Testament (Güthersloh: Güthersloher Verlagshaus, 2005), p. 159Google Scholar.

22 Thus, for instance, Pop, F. J., De eerste brief van Paulus aan de Corinthiërs, De Prediking van het Nieuwe Testament (Nijkerk: Callenbach, 1965), pp. 310–11Google Scholar; Conzelmann, Der erste Brief an die Korinther, p. 267; Robertson and Plummer, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the First Epistle of St Paul to the Corinthians, p. 297; Thiselton, Anthony C., The First Epistle to the Corinthians, The New International Greek Testament Commentary (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2000), p. 1065Google Scholar; and Garland, 1 Corinthians, pp. 622–3. On the basis of the use of ἐν τος τϵλϵίοις in 2:6 and τέλϵιοι in 14:20, it has been argued that the perfect state is not some future eschatological state, but a state of having become mature in one's faith. The context, however, clearly excludes such a reading of vv. 9–12. It is not Paul's intention to say that the use of χαρίσματα is limited to an immature Christian life (for one, this would clearly contradict 12:31, where Paul urges his readers to desire certain of these gifts).

23 Cf. Thiselton, First Epistle to the Corinthians, pp. 1069–70: ‘The quasimechanical attempt to put together fragments or parts of knowledge derived indirectly from various sources and experiences stands in utter contrast to the perfection of uninterrupted personal intimacy with God (implied by the passive) which is πρόσωπον πρὸς πρόσωπον, face to face, following the continuous βλέπομϵν, we are seeing’.

24 This seems to be presupposed by Garland, 1 Corinthians, p. 625.

25 As is rightly argued by Barrett, C. K., A Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians, Black's New Testament Commentaries (London: Black, 1968), pp. 306–7Google Scholar. According to Robertson and Plummer, Butler has shown that complete knowledge even of a ‘part’ of God is impossible, but it is not clear what this is supposed to mean and any serious substantiation of this claim is absent (cf. Robertson and Plummer, Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the 1 Corinthians, p. 297). Also, there is no good reason – at least not on the basis of what Paul says in 1 Cor 13:9–12 – to think that our incomplete knowledge is due to ‘the distorting medium of human thought and human language, figures, types, symbols, etc’ (ibid., p. 299). Rather, it is due to the effects of sin, especially the consequence of being separated from God, of not being able to talk with him face to face.

26 This is rightly noticed by Van Woudenberg, ‘Over de noëtische gevolgen van de zonde’, p. 231.

27 A similar thought can be found in v. 25: ‘They exchanged the truth of God (τὴν ἀλήθϵιαν το θϵο) for a lie, and worshipped and served created things rather than the Creator – who is forever praised. Amen.’

28 This is especially suggested by the mention of an overt form of idolatry and perverted homosexual relations. Cf. Schreiner, Thomas R., Romans, Baker Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1998), p. 81Google Scholar.

29 Thus also Schreiner, Romans, p. 78. The same concept of ὀργὴ θϵου can be found elsewhere in the same letter: 2:5, 8, 3:5, 4:15, 5:9, 9:22, 12:19, 13:4, 5.

30 ϕανϵρόω has a strong meaning: it indicates that there is some kind of obviousness, of clear demonstration, almost of proof (cf. for instance, the use of ϕανϵρόω in 1 Cor 4:5, 2 Cor 5:11, Eph 5:13 and 2 Tim 1:10).

31 Thus also Jewett, Robert, Romans, Hermeneia (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2007), p. 153Google Scholar.

32 It is remarkable that Paul speaks of τὸ γνωστὸν το θϵο. The genitive το θϵο has sometimes been interpreted as a genitivus partitivus, intimating that not everything of God can be known by human beings. For the widely shared interpretation of τὸ γνωστὸν το as ‘God in his knowability’, see Wilckens, Ulrich, Der Brief an die Römer, vol. 1, Evangelisch-Katholischer Kommentar zum Neuen Testament (Cologne: Benziger Verlag, 1987), pp. 105–6Google Scholar; Dunn, James D. G., Romans 1–8, Word Biblical Commentary (Dallas, TX: Word Books, 1988), p. 56Google Scholar, and Fitzmyer, Joseph A., Romans, The Anchor Bible (New York: Doubleday, 1993), p. 279Google Scholar.

33 Contrary to what Michel, Otto, Der Brief an die Römer, Meyers Kritisch-Exegetischer Kommentar über das Neue Testament (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1966), pp. 99, 100Google Scholar, contends, expressions such as τος ποιήμασιν and καθοράω suggest that the knowledge of God is obtained on the basis of nature, as in Ps 8:6 and 102:25, rather than God's creative acts or God's salutary deeds in history (cf. Herman Ridderbos, Aan de Romeinen, Commentaar op het Nieuwe Testament (Kampen: Kok, 1959), pp. 43–4, and Schlier, Der Römerbrief, p. 52). See also αὐτο γάρ ἐσμϵν ποίημα in Eph 2:10.

34 By ‘Pauline letters’ I mean letters in which the authorship is ascribed to Paul. It might be that the pastoral letters are pseudepigraphic. Even if they have not been written by Paul, however, it is clear that the language used in the letters which have genuinely been written by Paul has a strong affinity with that in the pastoral letters.

35 Cf. Ridderbos, Aan de Romeinen, pp. 42–3.

36 As is rightly noticed by Michel, Der Brief an die Römer, p. 101.

37 Cf. Fitzmyer, Romans, p. 273 (see also p. 274, where he expounds on natural theology), and van Bruggen, Jakob, Romeinen: Christenen tussen stad en synagoge, Commentaar op het Nieuwe Testament (Kampen: Kok, 2006), pp. 252–3Google Scholar. Zeller, Dieter, Der Brief an die Römer, Regensburger Neues Testament (Regensburg: Pustet, 1985), p. 56Google Scholar, does not do full justice to this fact.

38 For a discussion of this issue, see Lekkerkerker, A. F. N., De Brief van Paulus aan de Romeinen I, De Prediking van het Nieuwe Testament (Nijkerk: Callenbach, 1962), pp. 67–70Google Scholar. He may be right that γνόντϵς τὸν θϵὸν refers to an indissoluble relation between a creature and its Creator, but, obviously, this cannot be the whole story: the wording implies that the creature in question somehow has knowledge of her Creator.

39 The same idea is expressed by Fitzmyer, Romans, p. 281: ‘What is denied in these passages (Rom 1 and Eph 1; author) is the real, affective knowledge of God that includes love, praise, reverence, and thanksgiving. In this quasi-philosophical discussion the word gnontes connotes an inceptive, theoretical sort of information about God, which Paul thinks that pagans could not help but have.’

40 The moral consequences of rejecting God in the form of the moral desolation of human society is sketched in vv. 23–4.

41 Cf. Schlier, Der Römerbrief, p. 56, and Sanday, William and Headlam, Arthur C., Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, The International Critical Commentary (Edinburgh: Clark, 1980), pp. 44–5Google Scholar. The human heart is an open book to God (cf. Rom 8:27 and 1 Thes 2:4).

42 It is interesting that apart from ‘to become foolish’ or ‘to make foolish’ (see also 1 Cor 1:20), μωραίνω can mean ‘to lose what is characteristic for something’, e.g. in the case of salt's losing its saltiness (cf. Matt 5:13 and Luke 14:34). The Hellenistic claim to wisdom and its being foolishness in the eyes of God is a recurring theme in Paul's preaching.

43 In LXX μάταιος is often the translation of the Hebrew (for instance in MT Ps 94:11, LXX: Ps 93:11).

44 Cf. Sanday and Headlam, Critical and Exegetical Commentary on Romans, p. 46.

45 Cf. Ridderbos, Aan de Romeinen, pp. 42–3.

46 See, for instance, Heinrich Heppe, Die Dogmatik der evangelisch-reformierten Kirche, ed. Ernst Bizer (Neukirchen: Neukirchener Verlag, 1958), pp. 1, 38, 44, 259.

47 Thus also Schreiner, Romans, p. 86.

48 For this discussion see, for instance, Schlier, Der Römerbrief, p. 54. For the latter interpretation, see Sanday and Headlam, Critical and Exegetical Commentary on Romans, p. 43.

49 See Paul's use of μαρτυρϵν in Rom 3:21, 10:2, 1 Cor 15:15, 2 Cor 8:3, Gal 4:15 and 1 Tim 6:13.

50 The idea that God has revealed himself in nature and that man, albeit infected by sin, on that basis is able to acquire some kind of limited knowledge of him, has clearly found its way into several confessions and other church documents. One of the most well-known of these is art. 2 of the Belgic Confession: ‘We know him (God; author) by two means: First, by the creation, preservation, and government of the universe, since that universe is before our eyes like a beautiful book in which all creatures, great and small, are as letters to make us ponder the invisible things of God: his eternal power and his divinity, as the apostle Paul says in Romans 1:20. All these things are enough to convict men and to leave them without excuse. . . .’

51 In this context Barrett, C.K., A Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, Black's New Testament Commentaries (London: Black, 1957), p. 37Google Scholar, rightly speaks of ‘culpable ignorance’. This is why humans are without excuse if they do not believe in God (cf. Moo, Douglas J., The Epistle to the Romans, The New International Commentary on the New Testament (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1996), p. 106)Google Scholar.

52 Cf. Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, pp. 214–15: ‘Our original knowledge of God and his glory is muffled and impaired; it has been replaced (by virtue of sin) by stupidity, dullness, blindness, inability to perceive God or to perceive him in his handiwork. Our knowledge of his character and his love toward us can be smothered: it can even be transformed into a resentful thought that God is to be feared and mistrusted; we may see him as indifferent or even malignant.’

53 For this use of καταλαμβάνω, cf. Eph 3:17b-18: ‘And I pray that you, being rooted and established in love, may have power, together with all the saints, to grasp (καταλαβέσθαι) how wide and long and high and deep is the love of God.’

54 For similar ‘titles’, see Eph 2:2, John 12:31, 16:11.

55 I would like to thank Martien Brinkman, Kees van der Kooi, Eric Peels, Jeroen de Ridder and René van Woudenberg for their valuable criticisms of earlier versions of this article.