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Apokatastasis and apostolicity: a response to Oliver Crisp on the question of Barth's universalism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 October 2014

David W. Congdon
David W. Congdon*
Affiliation:
InterVarsity Press, 430 Plaza Drive, Westmont, Illinois 60559-1234, [email protected]
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Abstract

Oliver Crisp argues that Karl Barth is incoherent on the question of universal salvation. Making use of a modal distinction between contingent and necessary universalism, Crisp claims that Barth's theology leads to the view that all people must be saved, yet Barth denies this conclusion. Most defences of Barth reject the view that his theology logically requires the salvation of all people; they try to defend him by appealing, as Barth himself seems to do at times, to divine freedom. This article argues that, even though his theology does lead necessarily to the conclusion of universal salvation, it is still coherent for him to deny universalism on his own methodological grounds, since the necessity and the denial operate at different levels. Barth has other commitments in his theology than mere logical consistency. To support this claim, I argue that the necessity which belongs to God's reconciling work in Christ coincides with a double contingency: (a) the ‘objective’ contingency of Christ's particular history and (b) the ‘subjective’ contingency with which this reconciliation confronts particular human beings and calls them to participate in the apostolic mission of Jesus. In each case, necessity coincides paradoxically with a kind of contingency, such that, within Barth's theology, we can speak of what Kevin Hector calls ‘contingent necessity’ or what Eberhard Jüngel calls ‘eschatological necessity’. Most debates over universalism focus on the objective side. There the question is whether the necessity of Christ's universally effective work compromises divine freedom. But Barth's concern on this point is whether the necessity is ‘transcendent’ or ‘immanent’, that is, whether it is determined by God or the creature, and since God can indeed will the salvation of all, this poses no problem in principle for affirming universal salvation. Barth's central concern has to do with the issue of ‘subjective’ necessity. Barth denies that theology is ever a matter of describing what is objectively or generally the case regarding God and the world. On the contrary, he situates theology within the existential determination and subjective participation of the one called to bear witness to Jesus Christ. For this reason, he rejects all worldviews, including universalism. The rejection of universalism is the affirmation of apostolicity.

Keywords

divine freedomhistoricitymissionparticipationuniversal salvationworldview
Type
Research Article
Information
Scottish Journal of Theology , Volume 67 , Issue 4 , November 2014 , pp. 464 - 480
Copyright
Copyright © Scottish Journal of Theology Ltd 2014 

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References

1 Crisp, Oliver D., ‘On Barth's Denial of Universalism’, Themelios 29/1 (2003), pp. 18–29Google Scholar; and Crisp, Oliver D., ‘“I Do Teach it, But I Also Do Not Teach It”: The Universalism of Karl Barth’, in MacDonald, Gregory (ed.), ‘All Shall Be Well’: Explorations in Universalism and Christian Theology from Origen to Moltmann (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2011), pp. 305–24Google Scholar. The 2003 essay was reprinted in Crisp, Oliver D., ‘On Karl Barth's Denial of Universalism’, in Retrieving Doctrine: Essays in Reformed Theology (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2010), pp. 116–30Google Scholar. For related articles on Barth, see Crisp, Oliver D., ‘The Letter and the Spirit of Barth's Doctrine of Election: A Response to Michael O’Neil’, Evangelical Quarterly 79/1 (2007), pp. 53–67Google Scholar; Crisp, Oliver D., ‘Barth and Jonathan Edwards on Reprobation (and Hell)’, in Gibson, David and Strange, Daniel (eds), Engaging with Barth: Contemporary Evangelical Critiques (New York: T & T Clark, 2008), pp. 300–22Google Scholar. For related articles on universalism, see Crisp, Oliver D., ‘Augustinian Universalism’, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 53/3 (2003), pp. 127–45CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Crisp, Oliver D., ‘Is Universalism a Problem for Particularists?’, Scottish Journal of Theology 63/1 (2010), pp. 1–23CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

2 Jüngel, Eberhard, Barth-Studien (Zurich and Cologne: Benziger Verlag, 1982), p. 51Google Scholar. Trans. Paul, Garrett E., as Eberhard Jüngel, Karl Barth: A Theological Legacy (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1986), p. 44Google Scholar. In his 2003 essay in Themelios, Crisp misquotes the statement as: ‘I do not teach it (universalism), but I also do not teach it’ (Crisp, ‘On Barth's Denial of Universalism’, p. 18). It would seem that this is just a typographical error on Crisp's part, but then we find it repeated in his 2011 essay – this time with a comment in the footnotes. In the main text of the essay, he quotes it as, ‘I do teach it, but I also do not teach it’. Notice that this exchanges a double negative for a positive, which drastically alters the tenor of the original statement and loses the relation to Barth's Römerbrief, where revelation is understood as the negation of the negation. The odd part about Crisp's new essay is the footnote that follows this citation. He writes: ‘In fact the text says “I do not teach it, but I also do not teach it” – but it is clear from the context that this is a misprint. The phrase only makes sense if the first clause affirms Barth does teach it’ (Crisp, ‘Universalism of Karl Barth’, p. 310, n10). This is erroneous on two counts. First, the misprint is Crisp's, since both the original German (which Crisp never cites) and the English translation both have the double negation in the second clause. Second, Crisp entirely misses the significance of the double negation.

3 Crisp, ‘Universalism of Karl Barth’, p. 320.

4 Ibid., p. 323.

5 Ibid., p. 306.

6 Ibid., p. 307.

7 Ibid., pp. 307–8.

8 For the purposes of this article, this statement by Barth will be accepted as axiomatic. Its justification depends on considerations both exegetical (e.g. John 1) and theological (e.g. the doctrine of revelation) which cannot be elaborated here.

9 See Crisp, ‘On Barth's Denial of Universalism’, pp. 21–4.

10 Though I agree with Crisp on this point, one has at least to take into account the substantial literature on Barth's theology which would seem to belie such a claim. Crisp contrasts the ‘necessary universalism’ he finds in Barth with a ‘contingent universalism’ that says all people will be saved in the eschatological future, but this leaves out of account Barth's understanding of the threefold parousia. Barth's theology precludes any bifurcation between what must be and what will be on the grounds that Jesus Christ is the same yesterday, today and forever. As the subject and object of election, Jesus Christ determines what must be the case on the basis of God's eternal decision. But what Christ was and is cannot be separated from what he will be. The multitemporal nature of the Christ-event establishes an eschatological limit on our God-talk. It is precisely on this christological basis that both George Hunsinger and Bruce McCormack defend Barth's denial of universalism. See Hunsinger, George, ‘Hellfire and Damnation: Four Ancient and Modern Views (1998)’, in Disruptive Grace: Studies in the Theology of Karl Barth (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2000), pp. 226–49Google Scholar; McCormack, Bruce L., ‘So that He May Be Merciful to All: Karl Barth and the Problem of Universalism’, in McCormack, Bruce L. and Anderson, Clifford B. (eds), Karl Barth and American Evangelicalism (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2011), pp. 227–49Google Scholar. To use Crisp's terminology, Barth on this reading would be a ‘contingent universalist’, in the sense that all will be saved in the third and final form of the parousia. The lack of engagement with major Barth scholars on this point constitutes a lacuna in Crisp's argument. That being said, I would defend the claim that Barth is a necessary universalist on the grounds that the future is not undetermined for Barth, nor is the eschatological consummation a matter about which we can only be agnostic or silent. Barth is very clear that ‘in all these forms it is one event. Nothing different takes place in any of them.’ See Barth, Karl, Church Dogmatics, ed. Bromiley, G. W. and Torrance, T. F., 4 vols. (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1956–75)Google Scholar, IV/3.1, p. 293 (hereafter CD). Barth, Cf. Karl, Die kirchliche Dogmatik, 4 vols (Zollikon-Zurich: Evangelischer Verlag AG, 1932–70), IV/3.1, p. 338Google Scholar. Pages from the KD will follow the pages cited from the CD. Unless otherwise noted, all italics are restored from the original German.

11 CD II/2, pp. 319/350–1. Barth goes on to say that the threat of rejection is rendered ‘powerless [außer Kraft]’ and ‘impotent [unkräftig]’ (CD II/2, pp. 321/353).

12 Jüngel is attempting to address the way in which Jesus ‘must’ be the object of faith in the same way as God the Father in light of the resurrection.

13 Jüngel, Eberhard, ‘Das Wunder des Glaubens’, in Beziehungsreich: Perspektiven des Glaubens (Stuttgart: Radius, 2002), p. 146Google Scholar.

14 Hector, Kevin W., ‘God's Triunity and Self-Determination: A Conversation with Karl Barth, Bruce McCormack and Paul Molnar’, International Journal of Systematic Theology 7/3 (2005), p. 247CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Emphasis added.

15 CD IV/2, pp. 696/788.

16 CD IV/1, pp. 195/213.

17 CD II/1, pp. 238/268–9.

18 CD IV/1, pp. 221/242.

19 Barth makes the same argument regarding the resurrection and human faith. Both are free and yet both are necessary. See CD IV/1, pp. 309/340 (resurrection) and pp. 620/693 (faith).

20 CD IV/3.2, pp. 477/550.

21 Barth, Karl, Gespräche 1959–1962, ed. Busch, Eberhard, Gesamtausgabe 4/1 (Zürich: Theologischer Verlag, 1995), p. 503Google Scholar. Barth makes the same statement in his conversation with the World Student Christian Federation from earlier that same year: ‘What do we mean by apokatastasis? It is the theory that finally and ultimately all men, and possibly the devil too, will be saved, whether they wish it or not. It is a theory first propounded by Origen and then by many others’ (ibid., p. 431).

22 I am in agreement here with the excellent 2007 article by Tom Greggs. He argues, correctly in my opinion, that ‘it is the replacement of the person of Jesus Christ with a principle, rather than any limitation of the salvific work of God, that Barth dismisses in rejecting apokatastasis’. See Greggs, Tom, ‘“Jesus is Victor”: Passing the Impasse of Barth on Universalism’, Scottish Journal of Theology 60/2 (2007), pp. 196–212, here p. 199CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Whereas a principle can be generalised as a universal datum, a person is always a concrete particularity: ‘Barth rejects universalism, therefore, as he is determined to keep the particularity of the person of Jesus Christ – a particularity which cannot be gained from a principle’ (ibid., p. 206). The claim of this article is broader than that of Greggs, however, since he limits his focus to the question of salvation (in a person, not a principle), whereas I claim that the basis for this is Barth's entire understanding of theology (as apostolic speech grounded in an event of participation). I am thus setting forth the conditions in Barth's theology for the possibility of Greggs's article, which is correct as far as it goes – but it does not go far enough.

23 CD IV/1, p. 213/234; emphasis added.

24 This is a common refrain throughout Barth's theology. In his Göttingen dogmatics, Barth says ‘das “Deus dixit” ist Offenbarung, nicht Offenbartheit’. Karl Barth, Unterricht in der christlichen Religion, 1, Prolegomena, ed. Hannelotte Reiffen, Gesamtausgabe 2 (Zurich: Theologischer Verlag, 1985), p. 70. In the Münster dogmatics, he states: ‘The word of God that is only a historical datum [historisches Datum], only an object, only in a book, is not the word of God. Revealedness [Offenbartheit] is not revelation [Offenbarung]’. Karl Barth, Die christliche Dogmatik im Entwurf, ed. Gerhard Sauter, Gesamtausgabe 2 (Zurich: Theologischer Verlag, 1982), vol. 1, p. 469. In Die kirchliche Dogmatik, Barth criticises Roman Catholicism for understanding ‘itself and God's revelation [Offenbarung] in this constantly available relationship between God and humanity, in this revealedness [Offenbartheit]’ (CD I/1, pp. 41/40, rev.). Similarly, in his doctrine of scripture, Barth says that ‘it witnesses to God's revelation, but that does not mean that God's revelation [Offenbarung] is now before us in any kind of divine revealedness [Offenbartheit]’ (CD I/2, pp. 507/562).

25 CD II/2, pp. 184/202.

26 CD IV/3.1, pp. 255–7/293–6. Cf. Clifford Blake Anderson, ‘Jesus and the “Christian Worldview”: A Comparative Analysis of Abraham Kuyper and Karl Barth’, Cultural Encounters 2/2 (2006), pp. 61–80.

27 CD IV/3.2, pp. 655/750–1, rev.

28 Put another way, CD IV/1 and IV/2 cannot be properly understood apart from IV/3.

29 CD IV/3.1, pp. 375/434.

30 CD II/2, pp. 417–18/462, rev.

31 A very recent example of this line of argument is Mark Koonz, ‘The Old Question of Barth's Universalism: An Examination with Reference to Greggs, Tom and Torrance, T. F.’, Theology in Scotland 18/2 (2011), pp. 33–46Google Scholar.

32 CD II/2, pp. 410/453–4, rev.

33 CD II/2, pp. 415/458–9, rev.: ‘Each elect individual is as such a messenger of God. This is his service and commission. . . . He is sent. He is an apostle: on the basis of the fact that Jesus Christ was elected to be the apostle of grace and in connection with the apostolate of grace which is the meaning and order of the life of [Christ's] whole community. The determination of the elect is to allow the light which has kindled within himself to shine.’ Cf. CD II/2, pp. 418/463: ‘[The elect individual] is called in order that he himself may be one who calls [ein Rufender] within the world’.

34 CD II/2, pp. 417/461.

35 Ibid., rev.

36 CD II/2, pp. 419/463. While it is beyond the scope of this article, this reading of Barth is amply confirmed in the 30-page small-print section that concludes §35.3, which is an exegetical survey of the election passages in the New Testament (ibid., pp. 419–49/464–98). The conclusion he draws is that election concerns one's calling to be an apostolic participant in Jesus’ mission. Barth closes by stating: ‘God elects a person in order to be a witness to Jesus Christ and thus a proclaimer of his own glory’ (ibid., pp. 449/498, rev.).

37 CD II/2, pp. 417/462. Crisp misses this entirely. When he cites this passage as part of his ‘catena’ of quotes noting Barth's denial of universalism, he quotes it as follows (the brackets are his): ‘It is His concern [i.e., the concern of God] what is to be the final extent of the circle [of salvation]’ (Crisp, ‘Universalism of Karl Barth’, p. 309). The circle of salvation is precisely not what it is. On the contrary, it is the circle of those who are engaged in active missionary witness to their already accomplished salvation in Christ. Think here of Barth's concentric circles: we have Christ at the centre as always, while the circle of reconciliation or salvation is the largest circle which encompasses everyone. The middle circle (between the centre and the outer circle) is the community of those who are awakened to the truth of their election in Christ. It is this middle circle to which Barth refers here.

38 We could say that apokatastasis collapses the important distinction in Barth between ‘active Christian’ and ‘virtual Christian’, between those who are both ontologically and subjectively ‘in Christ’ and those who are ontologically ‘in Christ’ but ‘only provisionally and subjectively outside him and without him in their ignorance and unbelief’. See CD IV/2, pp. 275/305.

39 It is this more nuanced understanding of election that Crisp fails to grasp. He says that ‘affirming both that election is a closed matter. . . and that election is still an open matter. . . implies a contradiction. And yet this is just what Barth does say in different passages in CD II/2!’ (Crisp, ‘Universalism of Karl Barth’, p. 320, n. 32). But there is no contradiction, once one sees that election is ontologically closed in Christ and yet existentially open in us – closed in the sense that all creation is ‘enclosed’ in Christ and open in that we can only speak about the actuality of election within the context of concrete witness – and both are true simultaneously. More than that, to proclaim one without the other is actually to falsify both. Barth's theology is dialectical from the ground up: one can only read him properly when one sees these dialectical statements not as a veil of some non-dialectical truth above and behind them, but rather as a witness to the truth itself precisely in their paradoxicality.

40 I would suggest, in fact, that Barth's appeals to divine freedom be read consistently in this manner. When Barth refers to God's freedom anywhere in his later dogmatics, it is not to suggest that God could change God's mind or that there are possible worlds in which God could have acted differently. On the contrary, this appeal is best understood as a way of acknowledging the historical contingencies and particularities associated with the concrete encounter between God and specific human beings.

41 My sincere thanks to Travis McMaken, John Drury and Oliver Crisp for reading an earlier version of this article and providing invaluable comments and recommendations. Any remaining mistakes are, of course, my own.