This essay argues that a prime source of contemporary technological pessimism is the loss of place that accompanied the conquest of space through the construction of large technological systems of transportation and communication. This loss may involve physical destruction, or it may involve the more subtle withdrawal of economic, political, and cultural meaning and power from localities in favor of these far-flung systems.

The argument proceeds in five stages. First, key terms are defined, notably “environmental damage” and “technological system.” Second, the origins of the modern ideology of circulation are traced in the development of a capitalist world-economy, and in the historical theories of Enlightenment philosophes (with special attention to Turgot and Condorcet). Third, possible relations between that ideology and nineteenth-century systems-building are briefly sketched. Fourth, the ambiguous political character of these systems — at once liberating and constraining — is noted. Finally, the cultural challenge of overcoming spatial alienation is described with reference to some late nineteenth-century writers who sought to trace new pathways both spatially and linguistically.

Soon after finishing his studies in 1900, Einstein makes a tactical retreat to the Patent Office in Bern where he develops a plan for returning to the academic fold. He is assisted in this by a central figure in the Zurich establishment, Alfred Kleiner, who grooms him for the return. More generally, I argue that Einstein's role in the emergence of theoretical physics as a discipline results from the interaction of two developments, one external and institutional, the other internal and personal. Certain institutional constraints influence Einstein's early academic career by providing a professional opportunity to which he can adjust his career plans. The existence of this professional context for Einstein's early work in physics plays a role in encouraging him to pursue the speculative work in physics that became his distinctive hallmark. The other side of the coin is that Einstein's personal legitimation as professor of theoretical physics in 1909 also confers legitimacy on his speculative research, which in turn infuses the term “theoretical physics” with new meaning. The key factor uniting Einstein's personal development with institutional opportunities is the special relationship that he enjoys with Kleiner, who serves as the focus of interactions between the external and internal developments described in the paper.

This paper deals with the achievements of those French mathematicians active in the period 1800–1830 who oriented their work specifically around the needs of engineering and technology. In addition to a review of their achievements, the principal organizations and institutions are noted, as is their importance as sources of employment and influence.

The argument is centered on the word ‘neglected“ in the title. A case is made that a mass of work was produced which made considerable impact at the time but has been overlooked or even completely ignored by historians since. The paper begins with a general discussion of the notion of context, both for the historical figures and for their supposed historians, and several examples of historical distortion are given.

Regarding France itself, we see a professional and research profile rather different from that in other countries. The question of national differences in the organization and prosecution of science is thereby sharply exposed.

A scientific work presupposes a body of texts that are a condition for its intelligibility. This paper shows that the study of intertextual reference — of the ways a text indicates its relation to other texts — provides a fruitful perspective in the study of science that deserves more attention than it has hitherto received. The paper examines intertextual reference in early nineteenth-century mathematics, first surveying a variety of mathematical texts in the period and then examining in detail W.R. Hamilton's work on quaternions.

Three questions are addressed: (1) What forms of intertextual reference are employed? (2) What is the range of intertextual reference? (3) What are the functions of intertextual reference? The answers to the first two questions provide an unexplored perspective on the institutional changes in science during the period. The transitional status of the period in the development of later professional science is reflected in the relative openness in the forms of intertextual reference employed and the range of texts to which reference was made. In virtue of these features the period is particularly fruitful in the study of the functions of intertextual reference. With some major qualifications, the paper defends a Mertonian view that intertextual reference needs to be understood in terms of the claim to intellectual property rights.

Albert Einstein had more than a passing and trivial involvement with patents and inventions. The historian seeking to fathom Einstein's thought processes would be ill-advised to pass lightly over his years at the Swiss Federal Patent office (1902–1909) and to consider his professional advice-giving about patents and his patenting of his inventions as merely peripheral to his core concerns and cognitive style. Years of reading patents and visualizing the machines, devices, and electromagnetic phenomena described in them is a formative experience. A number of inventors besides Einstein enhanced their power of visualization from reading and writing patent claims. It is reasonable to conclude that the Patent Office years honed his remarkable gift for visually conceptualizing systematic artifactual relationships that he used in articulating theory.

A discussion of the circumstances of the friendship between Einstein and Lorentz using published and unpublished sources provides material for a close analysis of their relationship. In this analysis the concept of distance, both in a physical and a psychological sense, plays a central and clarifying role. It is concluded that for Einstein the distance between him and Lorentz was essential for the relationship to become as rich and intense as it was.

The development of modern mathematical biology took place in the 1920s in three main directions: population dynamics, population genetics, and mathematical theory of epidemics. This paper focuses on the first trend which is considered the most significant. Modern mathematical theory of population dynamics is characterized by three aspects (the first two being in a somewhat critical relationship): the emergence of the mathematical modeling approach, the attempt at establishing it in a reductionist-mechanist conceptual framework, and the revival of Darwinism. The first section is devoted to the analysis of the concept of mathematical model and the second one presents an example of a mathematical model (Van der Pol's model of heartbeat) which is a good prototype of that concept. In section 3 the main trends of mathematization of biology and the cultural and scientific contexts in which they found their development are discussed. Sections 4 and 5 are devoted to the contributions of V. Volterra and A. J. Lotka, to the analysis of the differences of their scientific conceptions, and to a discussion of a case study: the priority dispute concerning the discovery of the Volterra-Lotka equations. The historical analysis developed in this paper is also intended to detect the roots of some recent trends of mathematization of biology.

This paper is about the context of Albert Einstein's concerns at the time of a most intense intellectual effort — his own and that of a small group of scientists concerned with classical quantum theory. I describe contemporaneous interactions and differing views about the prospects for and the significance of the First Solvay Congress of 1911 as voiced by major participants. There are two axes around which the paper evolves: the Einstein-Nernst-Lorentz dialogue and the public institutional creation of the “Solvay” stage. In certain ways, this paper is about personal and institutional patronage: the working out of a difficult theoretical impasse requires individual and collective moral support. It is about the forging of the identity of a scientific problem and the personal and institutional setting, the public space, in which this problem was collectively addressed. But I also uncover heuristic playfulness and flexibility which accompanies theoretical change.

This paper charts eighteenth-century chemistry's transition from its definition as an art to its proclaimed status as a science. Both the general concept of art and specific practices of eighteenth-century chemists are explored to account for this transition. As a disciplined activity, art orients practitioners' attention toward particular directions and away from others, providing a structured space of possibilities within which their discipline develops. Consequently, while chemists throughout the eighteenth century aspired to reveal nature's “true voice,” the path of their investigations was directed by and toward their laboratory manipulations. So long as the chemical community maintained an ethos of polite cooperation and eschewed theoretical wrangling, this point was hidden by a rhetoric of “matter of fact” reporting. But as “facts” mounted in the 1770s and 1780s, especially in pneumatic chemistry, cooperation gave way to contention as chemists sought to name and organize their findings without the guidance of a communally accepted “natural” system. Lavoisier and his fellow “new” chemists offered a forceful solution to this dilemma by introducing a revolutionary network of theories, nomenclature, and instruments that unabashedly fused the productive manipulation of their laboratory work with what they claimed as the structure and activity of nature.

The question of the possible existence of black holes is closely related to the question of the action of gravitation on the propagation of light. It has been raised recurrently from the when that Newton referred to a possible bending of light in his Opticks. And it relies on apparently simple questions: Is light subject to gravitation? What is the effect of a gravitational field on the propagation of light? Could a particle of light emitted by a star be retained by its gravitational field?

From the end of the 1960s, the black hole idea has had a very important place in the relativistic literature, not to speak of the popularization of the theory. It turned out to be not only an important concept but also a tool that permitted us to understand general relativity better, indeed a tool that contributed greatly to changing the interpretation of Einstein's theory of gravitation. Here too I want to use this concept of the black hole to assist our understanding of the history of general relativity: the black hole is a fundamental milestone in the evolution of general relativity.

The thesis of the paper is that there is no “abuse” of science as suggested by the legend of Galileo but only a mutual opportunism characterizing the relation between science and politics.

Any scientific research depends on the accessibility of its subject matter, plus material resources. The absence of internal constraints, the hunger for novelty, translate into a powerful drive to secure both. The coupling between science and politics in our time is based on a mutual dependence: resources and accessibility are exchanged for solutions to problems and legitimation.

Scientific disciplines are highly sensitive to their environments with respect to the possibilities of extending their power of definition and of thereby obtaining resources. The ability of the sciences to expand their power of definition depends on the political “context of relevance.” The context, such as a socialist or fascist ideology, selects against certain sciences. But for a government to be able to favor one school at the expense of another there have to be competing factions within science, and their conflict has to be to some extent unresolved.

Modern democratic systems differ from totalitarian ones insofar as their interest in science is ideologically vague and primarily economic in nature. This does not mean that the same mechanisms of mutual utilization do not operate.

Developments in theoretical physics, even when they are revolutionary for physics, usually do not enter public awareness. The reaction to the special relativity theory is one of the few exceptions. The conceptual changes brought by special relativity to our notions of space and time, induced a lively debate not only within intellectual circles but in many strata of the educated middle class. In this article, I focus on a particular moment of public reaction to special and general relativity theory and to its creator Albert Einstein. I try to paint a picture of the anti-Einstein campaign in Germany of 1920, with finer brush strokes than those applied previously by others. My aim is to embed the campaign into the cultural and political climate of the Weimar republic. Without leaving the realm of physics only a superficial understanding of what happened seems possible. My thesis is that the anti-Einstein-campaign was organized, and the physicists involved in it (ab)used, mainly in order to rally support for one of the German right-wing parties, the Deutschnationale Volkspartei.

Starting from the thesis that a science constructs the knowledge of the part of the world allotted to it, the present paper aims at bringing together all the various aspects of physics (structural, epistemic, historical, social) under a unified conceptual framework — that provided by the Marxian concept “mode of production.” After an introduction providing the initial plausibility grounds for the undertaking, the concept is analyzed into its conceptual elements in Part I of the paper. The analysis presents the reconstruction initiated by Louis Althusser and developed by his followers. Part II starts from a characterization of physical problems. This offers a basis for “reading” physics in the terms introduced in Part I. The rest of Part II is devoted to the identification of all the aspects of physics with the conceptual elements in question. The paper aims at three things: to uncover the connections holding among seemingly disparate aspects of physics, usually discussed in almost total independence from each other; to take full account of the social dimensions of physics without vindicating social constructivism; to show that the boundaries separating the disciplines of philosophy, history and sociology of science are more arbitrary than usually considered.

The political changes in Czechoslovakia and in other Eastern European countries in 1989 are closely related to Jan Patoĉka's philosophy. He was one of the first speakers for the human rights manifesto “Charta 77” and died following his political interrogations in 1978. Vàclav Havel, the president of the ĉSFR, was one of his students. Patoĉka's philosophy is sketched here following his interpretation of Comenius, beginning with an early work of 1932 and until his interpretation of Comenius' The Paradise of the World and the Labyrinth of the Heart in his book Die Philosophic der Erziehung des J. A. Comenius (1970) (J. A. Comenius' Philosophy of Education).

As a phenomenologist who transcends both Husserl and Heidegger, Patoĉka's conflict with the political system of his country was inevitable. The regime could not put up with his thesis on the “open soul” which, due to its existential openness, can hear the “call of conscience.” Behind this thesis stands Patocka's teaching of the three movements of existence. And out of this follows his “Education of the Turning.” Patoĉka's theory of education leads straight to some nondogmatic conceptions of education such as the “Communication Pedagogics” which dates back to the dialogical education of Martin Buber.

Gravitational redshift of spectral lines as one of the three early-known experimental implications of Einstein's general theory of relativity and gravitation was intensively searched for by researchers all over the world, but around 1920 most of the contemporary evidence in the sun's Fraunhofer-spectrum conflicted with the predictions of relativity theory.

In 1923 the American astrophysicist Charles Edward St. John announced that his own solar spectroscopic data would force him to retreat from his former skepticism concerning the existence of gravitational redshift. This statement was at the time widely interpreted by scientists and journalists alike as the open confession of a rapid conversion of one of the few remaining serious scientific opponents of Einstein's theory.

This paper demonstrates that this illusion of a sudden “Gestalt switch” in St. John's evaluation of data can be dissolved by a careful step-by-step account of St. John's research practice between 1917 and 1923. After a fine-grained diachronic report of the development of St. John's interpretation of his and others' data, the second part of the paper consists in a systematic analysis of the heuristics and arguments used by St. John pro and contra gravitational redshift.

Einstein's mass-energy relationship was not confirmed experimentally until 1933 when Bainbridge showed that the Cockcroft-Walton experiment afforded a test of it. Earlier, however, it had been used constantly in the analysis of nuclear reactions, as can be seen in those involved in the determination of the mass of the neutron. Chadwick in 1932 was convinced that the neutron mass was about 1.0067 amu (atomic mass units), indicating that the neutron was a proton-electron compound, since that figure was less than the sum of the proton and electron masses. Chadwick's value was challenged in 1933 by Lawrence, who proposed a much lower value of 1.0006 amu, and by Curie and Joliot, who proposed a much higher value of 1.011 amu.Much controversy ensued; eventually, Chadwick and Goldhaber showed in 1934 that the neutron mass was about 1.0080 amu, greater than the sum of the proton and electron masses, proving that the neutron was a new elementary particle (which could decay spontaneously), and providing conclusive experimental support for excluding electrons from the nucleus. These results remained unchanged with further refinements in the last decimal place, the entire pursuit of which provided still further vindication of Einstein's massenergy relationship.

The aim of this paper is to provide a critical perspective for Einstein's opposition to the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum physics, by analyzing the ingenious rhetoric of Bohr's principle of complementarity. I argue that what Bohr presents as arguments of “inevitability” are in fact merely arguments for the consistency of the quantum-mechanical scheme. Einstein's resistance to being persuaded by this potent technique of argumentation, and his rejection of Bohr's interpretation of quantum physics, appear consequently as an eminently reasonable position and not as a conservative stand, as it is often presented by the adherents of the Copenhagen orthodoxy.