In chemistry one observes different relationships [rapports] between different bodies, which act such that they unite easily with one another. These relationships have their degrees and their laws. One observes their different insofar as, among several materials are confounded and that have some disposition to unite together, one perceives that one of these substances always unites constantly with a certain other [substance] preferably to all others.

Franz Borkenau's book, The Transition from Feudal to Modern Thought (Der Übergang vom feudalen zum bürgerlichen Weltbild [literally: The Transition from the Feudal to the Bourgeois World-Picture]), serves as background for Grossmann's study. The objective of this book was to trace the sociological origins of the mechanistic categories of modern thought as developed in the philosophy of Descartes and his successors. In the beginning of the seventeenth century, according to Borkenau, mechanistic thinking triumphed over medieval philosophy which emphasized qualitative, not quantitative considerations. This transition from medieval and feudal methods of thought to modern principles is the general theme of Borkenau's book, and is traced to the social changes of this time. According to this work, the essential economic change that marked the transition from medieval to modern times was the destruction of the handicraft system and the organization of labor under one roof and under one management. The roots of the change in thought are to be sought here. With the dismemberment of the handicraft system and the division of labor into relatively unskilled, uniform, and therefore comparable activities, the conception of abstract homogeneous social labor arises. The division of the labor process into simple repeated movements permits a comparison of hours of labor. Calculation with such abstract social unities, according to Borkenau, was the source from which modern mechanistic thinking in general derived its origin.

Grossmann, although he considers Borkenau's work a valuable and important contribution, does not believe that the author has achieved his purpose. First of all, he contends that the period that Borkenau describes as the period of the triumph of modern thought over medieval should not be placed at the beginning of the seventeenth century, but in the Renaissance, and that not Descartes and Hobbes but Leonardo da Vinci was the initiator of modern thought. Leonardo's theories, evolved from a study of machines, were the source of the mechanistic categories that culminated in modern thought.

If Borkenau's conception as to the historical origin of these categories is incorrect in regard to time, Grossmann claims it follows that it is incorrect also in regard to the social sources to which it is ascribed. In the beginning, the factory system did not involve a division of labor into comparable homogeneous processes, but in general only united skilled handicraftsmen under one roof. The development of machinery, not the calculation with abstract hours of labor, is the immediate source of modern scientific mechanics. This goes back to the Renaissance and has relatively little to do with the original factory system that was finally superseded by the Industrial Revolution.

While Borkenau, in tracing the social background of the thought of the period, relies chiefly on the conflicts and strife of political parties, Grossmann regards this as one element only in the formation of the general social situation, which in its entirety and in the interaction of its elements explains the development of modern thought.

Argument

State patronage and the modernizing role of the government have been considered crucial for the development of science in Russia during both Imperial and Soviet periods. This paper argues, on the contrary, that the start of Russian agricultural science had predominantly local and non-governmental sources of support. Amateur experiments by nobles aspiring to become “cultured” landlords, university professors applying their scientific knowledge to their own estates, and the efforts by local community administrations, zemstvo, to compete for grain markets all contributed, by 1900, to the establishment of various stations for agricultural research. The Imperial government became involved in this process rather belatedly, with an effort to further stimulate and coordinate the institutional network of agricultural science. By 1917, this network included more than 300 breeding and experimental stations. Despite revolutionary violence and the loss of former patrons, most of these stations managed to maintain their functions throughout the Civil War and formed the basis of Soviet agricultural science.

This article examines how antimicrobial resistance (AMR) came to be constituted as a matter of public concern in Sweden in conjunction with the development of an inter-professional organization called Strama, founded to promote rational prescription of antibiotics. An outbreak of penicillin-resistant pneumococci in the mid-1990s was crucial for this development, because it brought attention to AMR as an urgent public threat. This outbreak fuelled the constitution of AMR as caused by consumption of antibiotics and as a matter of disease control. As a consequence, Strama was able to mobilize the Swedish health officers responsible for disease control. The outbreak is conceptualized as a “transformative event” – an event that makes an issue and its associated risks concrete and urgent. Transformative events play the crucial role of expediting the transformation of issues into matters of public concern.

In this article, we trace shifting narratives of trauma within psychiatric, neuroscience, and environmental epigenetics research. We argue that two contemporary narratives of trauma – each of which concerns questions of time and psychopathology, of the past invading the present – had to be stabilized in order for environmental epigenetics models of suicide risk to be posited. Through an examination of these narratives, we consider how early trauma came to be understood as playing an etiologically significant role in the development of suicide risk. Suicide, in these models, has come to be seen as a behavior that has no significant precipitating event, but rather an exceptional precipitating neurochemical state, whose origins are identified in experiences of early traumatic events. We suggest that this is a part of a broader move within contemporary neurosciences and biopsychiatry to see life as post: seeing life as specific form of post-traumatic subjectivity.

In most historical accounts, eugenic doctrines and Christian beliefs are assumed to be adversaries. Such a perspective is too narrow, however, for while many prominent eugenicists were indeed religious skeptics, others sought to reconcile eugenics with Christianity. Various American Protestant social reformers tried to synthesize new biological theories with older biblical ideas about the meaning of a good inheritance. Such syntheses played an important role in disseminating eugenic doctrines into America's deeply Protestant heartland.

In The Empire of Chance, historians of science Gigerenzer et al. argue that statistical thinking has been “second to no other area of scientific endeavor” in its influence on “modern life and thought” (Gigerenzer et al. 1989, xiv-xv). This article describes how quantitative descriptions of risk associated with industrialization and technological change became part of the mentality of ordinary Americans. It explains why Americans began counting accidents, tells what kinds of accidents they counted and how they counted them, and shows how statistical representations of risk were used to justify prescriptions for public policy and individual behavior. On this frontier of the empire of chance, safety experts and self-styled “practical statisticians” were the principal colonizers. Distant from the centers of academic statistical science, they compromised rigorous scientific standards of methodology and accurate prediction in order to make convincing arguments outside their circles of expertise. To convey their point of view to audiences who were not literate in the field of statistics, they created a public language that conveyed statistical ideas through metaphors, graphic representations, and other rhetorical devices. They also engaged non-experts in collecting and analyzing data and, by the 1920s, even used quantitative self-measurement as a device to convince members of the public to alter their own risk-taking behaviors.

Friedrich August von Hayek (1899–1992) is mainly known for his defense of free-market economics and liberalism. His views on science – more specifically on the methodological differences between the physical sciences on the one hand, and evolutionary biology and the social sciences on the other – are less well known. Yet in order to understand, and properly evaluate Hayek's political position, we must look at the theory of scientific method that underpins it. Hayek believed that a basic misunderstanding of the discipline of economics and the complex phenomena with which it deals produced misconceptions concerning its method and goals, which led in turn to the adoption of dangerous policies. The objective of this article is to trace the development of Hayek's views on the nature of economics as a scientific discipline and to examine his conclusions concerning the scope of economic prediction. In doing so, I will first show that Hayek's interest in the natural sciences (especially biology), as well as his interest in epistemology, were central to his thought, dating back to his formative years. I will then emphasize the important place of historical analysis in Hayek's reflections on methodology and examine the reasons for his strong criticism of positivism and socialism. Finally, in the third and fourth sections that constitute the bulk of this article, I will show how Hayek's understanding of the data and goal of the social sciences (which he distinguished from those of the physical sciences), culminated in an analogy that sought to establish economics and evolutionary biology as exemplary complex sciences. I will challenge Hayek's interpretation of this analogy through a comparison with Darwin's views in The Origin of Species, and thus open a door to re-evaluating the theoretical foundations of Hayek's political claims.

The attitude of biologists to the history of their discipline varies. For some, a hazy knowledge of the recent past is all that is necessary to provide an explanatory basis for their work. They take it for granted that everything of value from the less recent past has been appropriately incorporated into present-day thinking. Other biologists see history as an integral part of their research: the historical roots of accepted facts and theories help in the evaluation of present positions. These biologists bring to history their specialized knowledge, which can be an advantage, but often they also bring an agenda that biases what they investigate and how they present it. We illustrate this by describing our own foray into history, which was motivated by findings in cell biology that suggested that some accepted views about heredity and evolution were wrong.

This paper examines the postwar reconstruction of the Polish academic system. It analyzes a debate that took place in the newly established university in the proletarian city of Łódź. The vision of the shape of the university was a bone of contention between the professors. This resulted in two contentious models of a university: “liberal” and “socialized.” Soon, universities were transformed into crucial institutions of the emerging communist state, where national history, ideology, and the future elite were produced and shaped. The social university was transformed into a socialistic university. Analysis of this process of transformation enables me to scrutinize the difficult clashes between the leftist intellectuals and the rising system of power that was not entirely hostile to them. The case of Poland also shows that sovietization did not mean solely a ruthless convergence of Central and Eastern Europe with a universal model most completely implemented in the USSR. Power hitting the ground was redeployed along various local interests, institutional conjunctures, and personal intransigencies. On a more universal level, I present this case in the context of the challenge of modernization and its many respective accommodations.

In this article we throw more light on Einstein's position as a pacifist and democrat during World War I than was possible up to now. This results from a systematical search for and evaluation of published and unpublished documents. Among others, it was possible to give evidence of Einstein's radicalization and to clear up the circumstances of his public appearance during the troublesome days of the Revolution in November 1918. Einstein's role in the Bund Neues Vaterland and other pacifist organizations and his interaction with other pacifists in Germany and abroad is exposed in detail and interpreted. In contrast to the generally accepted view, we give a reappraisal of Einstein's activity and show that his pacifism was always of a humanitarian nature. He only rarely applied social and political categories to the happenings during the war. Due to his main focus on physics Einstein's pacifism remained one more of creed than of deed.

European universities have been informally and formally closed to women from their founding in the twelfth century until the late nineteenth century. A few, exceptional women scientists received Ph.D.s and taught in these institutions before 1900: Laura Bassi served as lecturer in physics at the University of Bologna from 1732 to 1778 and held the chair in experimental physics at the prestigious Istituto delle Scienze from 1776 until her death in 1778 (Findlen 1993; Ceranski 1996). Anna Morandi Manzolini replaced her husband as lecturer in anatomy at the University of Bologna in 1755 (Messbarger 2001). Dorothea von Schlözer, daughter of the renowned Göttingen historian, received a doctoral degree for her work in mineralogy in 1787 (Schiebinger 1989, 257–60). These intermittent positions awarded to women were unique to Italy and Germany; none were granted women in England or France. Nowhere in Europe did women gain regular access to universities until the late nineteenth century.

A Catoptrica attributed to Euclid appears in manuscripts amongst treatises dealing with elementary astronomy. Despite this textual background, the treatise has always been read literally as a theory of mirrors, and its astronomical significance has gone unnoticed. However, optics, catoptrics, and astronomy appear strongly intermingled in sources such as, amongst others, Geminus, Theon of Smyrna, Plutarch and Cleomedes. If one compares the optical reasoning put forward in these sources to account for the formation of moonlight with arguments of Catoptrica, one is able to shed new light on several principles and propositions of Catoptrica, some of which had been deemed corrupt, meaningless, and obscure. Moreover, the present analysis offers a glimpse at the context of a specific stage in the evolution of ancient catoptrics: Whether literally or by analogy, several of its results appear to have been set against a wider astronomical background, which explains the inclusion of Catoptrica in the group of texts loosely defined as “little astronomy.”

In 1877, a young mathematician named Joseph Boussinesq presented a mémoire to the Académie des sciences which demonstrated that some differential equations may have more than one solution. Boussinesq linked this fact to indeterminism and to a possible solution to the free will versus determinism debate. Boussinesq's main interest was to reconcile his philosophical and religious views with science by showing that matter and motion do not suffice to explain all there is in the world. His argument received mixed criticism that addressed both his philosophical views and the scientific content of his work, pointing to the physical “realisticness” of multiple solutions. While Boussinesq proved to be able to face the philosophical criticism, the scientific objections became a serious problem, thus slowly moving the focus of the debate from the philosophical plane to the scientific one. This change of perspective implied a wide discussion on topics such as instability, the sensitivity to initial conditions, and the conservation of energy. The Boussinesq debate is an example of a philosophically motivated debate that transforms into a scientific one, an example of the influence of philosophy on the development of science.

Argument

This paper aims to show how a nineteenth-century Korean scholar's mathematical study reflects the Korean intellectual environment of his time by focusing on the rule of false double position and the method of root extraction. There were two major trends in Korean mathematics of the early nineteenth century: the first was “Tongsan,” literally “Eastern Mathematics,” which largely depended on Chinese mathematics of the Song and Yuan period adopting counting rod calculation; the second trend was Western mathematics, which was transmitted by the Jesuits and their Chinese collaborators from the late sixteenth century. There was also an intellectual transition in late eighteenth-century Korea when mathematics, which had been of only minor interest for Confucian scholars, became an important part of Confucian pursuits. We can gain an insight into the history of mathematics in Korea by examining and understanding Hong Kil-chu's (1786–1841) mathematical studies and the context of the academic world of his time.

This paper arrives at a normative position regarding the relevance of Henri Bergson's philosophy to historical enquiry. It does so via experimental historical analysis of the adaptation of cinematographic devices to physiological investigation. Bergson's philosophy accorded well with a mode of physiological psychology in which claims relating to mental and physiological existence interacted. Notably however, cinematograph-centered experimentation by British physiologists including Charles Scott Sherrington, as well as German-trained psychologists such as Hugo Münsterberg and Max Wertheimer, contributed to a cordoning-off of psychological from physiological questioning during the early twentieth century. Bergson invested in a mode of intellectual practice in which psychological claims had direct relevance to the interpretation of physiological nature. The in-part cinematograph-inspired breakdown of this mode had significance for subsequent interpretations of his philosophy. It is suggested that this experimental particularization of Bergson's contentions indicates that any adaptation of his thought for historical enquiry must be disciplinarily specific.

This article is based on a detailed survey of three British popular science magazines published during the interwar years. It focuses on the authors who wrote for the magazines, using the information to analyze the ways in which scientists and popular writers contributed to the dissemination of information about science and technology. It shows how the different readerships toward which the magazines were directed (serious or more popular) determined the proportion of trained scientists who provided material for publication. The most serious magazine, Discovery, featured almost exclusively material written by professional scientists, while the most popular, Armchair Science, favored writers who were not professional scientists, but who probably had some technical knowledge. Another magazine, Conquest, tried to provide a balance between authoritative and popular articles; however, it survived for only a few years.

It is often observed by historians of postwar American art that painters and sculptors of the 1960s sought a more mechanized “look” for their art. I argue that the changes reflected in the art have their source in a deeper shift – a shift at the level of production, expressed in new studio practices as well as in the space of the artworks themselves.

In the period immediately before, during, and after World War II, the dominant topos of the American artist was that of a solitary (male) genius, alone in his studio, sole witness to the miraculous creation of his art. I demonstrate that artists of the 1960s, against this backdrop of heroic modernism, engaged in a different rhetoric and practice, one based on the models of industry and business. The studio of Andy Warhol, named the “Factory,” is viewed as apodictic of this great change, with its rudimentary assembly line and highly social mode of production.

The change in practice instantiated in Warhol's Factory is significant in and of itself, but I argue further that it expressed itself in the “place of knowledge” – the space within (or in front of) Warhol's paintings and objects, and the newly social space in which they signify. The context for that signification thus becomes crucial to our understanding of the “Warhol phenomenon” celebrated in popular and arthistorical texts. The ambivalencies embedded in Warhol's Factory, where the artist's role oscillated between manager and proletarian worker, are seen as a function of their context. Conflicting signals are also broadcast by the works of art, which speak in the dialect of mass production with the accent of the irreplaceably unique.

As the American economy became more complex and differentiated in the post-1850 decades, so too did the demand for manufactured products, creating wide markets for both mass-produced standard goods and batch-produced specialties among consumers and producers alike. These developments conditioned the emergence of distinctive work cultures within the two broad spheres of manufacturing, as well as distinct approaches to technological selection and use, labor, marketing, and management. As the mass production dynamic has been well documented, this essay focuses principally on elaborating the practices of industrial specialists for comparison with those of “managerial capitalism.” Conditions and controversies in the textile, woodworking, and metalworking trades provide an in-depth example of larger patterns among batch-oriented sectors in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, including issues of the politics (i.e., power relations) in production and the recording of masculine identity and values. The role of public policies in facilitating the universalization of mass production rhetorics and practices is considered at the close.

Kurt Lewin's essay “Gesetz und Experiment in der Psychologie” of 1927, published in this issue of SiC for the first time in English translation, and his “Der Übergang von der aristotelischen zur galileischen Denkweise in Biologie und Psychologie” (in the English version: The Conflict between Aristotelian and Galilean Modes of Thought in Contemporary Psychology) of 19311 have together contributed most to shape his image as a metatheorist (or philosopher) of psychology. A careful examination of what has occasionally been called the “Lewinian tradition,”2 however, reveals that Lewin's metascientific contributions have been much more influential in Europe than in the United States, where he lived and taught as a Jewish refugee from 1934 until his early death on 2 February, 1947.