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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 09 April 2010
This chapter tries to show that there is indubitable evidence for the claim that the Yoga philosophy of Patañjali can be said to be a philosophy as therapeia. For this reference will be made particularly to the Sāṅkhya school, whose ontology and metaphysics are presupposed by Yoga philosophy. The Sāṅkhya school begins with the question about overcoming three kinds of ‘suffering’ that torment human beings, and Patañjali himself says that the implementation of yoga, is, among other things, for the sake of minimising the afflictions (kleśas, YS 2, 2). The second part of the chapter will be concerned with the philosophical activity referred to in Yoga itself, namely the active yoga, or yoga in the form of action (kriyāyoga, YS 2, 1), in order to show how this can be seen as advancing the case for Yoga as therapeia.
1 Students of Indian philosophy know that the so-called six orthodox schools are generally classified in pairs so that when one talks of the ontology and metaphysics of Yoga philosophy reference to the Sāṅkhya school is inescapable. One way of classifying the schools of Indian philosophy is by referring to the six schools of ‘Hinduism’ in order to contrast these from the Cārvāka/Lokāyata or materialist school and those of Buddhism and Jainism. The pairs of the six ‘orthodox’ Hindu schools are: Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, Pūrva and Uttara Mīmāṃsā (or Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta) and Sāṅkhya and Yoga. With the exception of the Sāṅkhya school all the basic works of the others are written in the cryptic and mnemonic sūtra style, making it difficult to understand them without a commentary. Although there are many commentaries to the Yogasūtra, it is usually read with the commentaries by Vyāsa (Vyāsabhāṣya) and Vijñānabhikṣu (Yogavārttika). The basic sūtra works of the schools of Indian philosophy were composed probably in the four centuries around our era (200 bce–200 ce). However, it is generally accepted that their basic ideas are earlier.
2 For other presuppositions in Indian philosophy see Potter, Karl H., Presuppositions of India's Philosophies (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1963)Google Scholar; Soni, Jayandra, ‘Intercultural Relevance of Some Moments in the History of Indian Philosophy,’ Topoi 17 (1998), pp. 49–55; pp. 49–52CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
3 See the chapters by David Burton and Christopher Gowans.
4 Pariṇāma-tāpa-saṃskāra-duḥkhair guṇa-vṛtti-virodhāc ca duḥkham eva sarvaṃ vivekinaḥ YS 2, 15 (tr. Rukmani).
5 This and the following translations are based on Śāstri, Suryanarayana S. S., The Sāṅkhyakārikā of Īśvara Kṛṣṇa, edited and translated (Madras: University of Madras 1965)Google Scholar, from where the original is also cited: I. duḥkha-trayābhighātāj jijñāsā tadabhighātake hetau | dṛṣṭe sā, ’pārthā cen naikāntātyantato ’bhāvāt ‖. The text is usually read with the commentary (bhāṣya) by Gauḍapāda and the anonymously written Yuktidīpikā.
6 In his explanation of the idea behind the objection in the stanza, Śāstri, ibid, p. 3 briefly summarizes the different remedies mentioned in the commentaries: ‘Physical disease can be cured by medicine and mental distress by indulgence in pleasure. Enemies may be circumvented by diplomacy and spirits may be won over by charm. Such means are not only patent but also easy. … The objection would be valid, if any of the means so patent in experience were either certain or final in its results. None of them, however, passes the test. Medicines fail to cure, fortifications fall and let in the enemy. Diplomacy is a double-edged weapon, and so are spirit-charms.’ For a critical discussion of recent scholarship, see Steiner, Roland, ‘Das ‘dreifache Leiden’ in Sāṃkhyakārikā 1’, in Indica et Tibetica. Festschrift für Michael Hahn, ed. Klaus, Konrad and Hartmann, Jens-Uwe (Wien: Universität Wien, Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien, 2007), pp. 507–520Google Scholar.
7 dṛṣṭavad ānuśravikaḥ sa hy aviśuddhi-kṣayātiśaya-yuktaḥ | tad-viparitaḥ śreyān vyaktāvyakta-jña-vijñānāt ‖SK 2‖
8 The other six categories are ahaṃkāra, the ‘I-maker’, the ego, or the the category responsible for ‘the sense of individuality’ and the five tanmātras or subtle elements, as supplied by the commentaries: sound (śabda), touch/touchability (sparṣa), form (rūpa), taste/tastability (rasa) and smell (gandha). These are categories which not only are themselves modifications, but they are also responsible for other modifications, namely, the sixteen mentioned immediately afterwards. These sixteen are mere modifications, without themselves being responsible for other modifications. This is the difference between the terms vikṛti (plural vikṛtayas) and vikāra (see next note as well).
9 Sixteen here refers to the jñānendriyas, the five organs of knowledge (like hearing, etc.), the karmendriyas, the five organs of sense (like speech, etc.), the five gross elements (like ether, etc.) and manas which is usually translated as the ‘mind’.
10 mūlaprakṛtir avikṛtir mahad-ādyaḥ prakṛti-vikṛtayaḥ sapta | ṣoḍaśakas tu vikāro na prakṛtir na vikṛtir puruṣaḥ ‖SK 3‖. The word puruṣa is best left untranslated here. Some dictionary meanings of it are: ‘man, male, human being, in plural people, mankind; the personal and animating principle in human and other beings, the soul or spirit.’ The specific meaning with reference to Sāṅkhya is given as: ‘the Spirit as passive and a spectator of the Prakṛti or creative force’ (Monier-Williams). The term can be seen as a synonym of ātman or jīva, and as an ontological category puruṣa or pumān (as in SK 11) would also refer to this defining principle, the principle of life, of human beings, without which the body would be a mere corpse. In this sense puruṣa, ātman or jīva can be understood in the sense of consciousness, cit or cetana, terms that are used to distinguish it from (primeval) matter in Sāṅkhya and Yoga (SK 11 uses the negative, acetana, to describe matter, translated here as ‘non-intelligent’).
11 hetumad anityam avyāpi sakriyam anekam āśritam liṅgam | sāvayavaṃ para-tantraṃ vyaktaṃ viparītam avyaktam ‖SK 10‖ triguṇam aviveki viṣayaḥ sāmānyam acetanaṃ prasava-dharmi | vyaktaṃ tathā pradhānaṃ tad-viparītas tathā ca pumān ‖SK 11‖.
12 The constituents refer to the three guṇas: sattva, rajas and tamas which together make up (primeval) matter. When they are in a state of equilibrium none is dominant. When this state is disturbed, the one or the other becomes predominant and so we have the evolved state. SK 13 says what functions they fulfil: ‘Sattva is considered to be buoyant and illuminating, Rajas to be stimulating and mobile; Tamas alone is heavy and enveloping; their functioning for the goal (of the Spirit) is like (the action of) a lamp’ (Śāstri's translation).
13 The translation is largely from Rukmani, with the difference that I have rendered citta-vṛtti as ‘the modification of the psyche’ and not ‘modifications of the mind’. I reserve the word ‘mind’ as a translation of manas. Patañjali's text is also quoted from her work: atha yogānuśāsanam ‖1, 1‖ yogaś citta-vṛttinirodhaḥ ‖1, 2‖ tadā draṣṭuḥ svarūpe ’vasthānam ‖1, 3‖ vṛttisārūpyam itaratra ‖1, 4‖ vṛttayaḥ pañcatayyaḥ kliṣṭā ’kliṣṭāḥ ‖1, 5‖ pramāṇa-viparyaya-vikalpa-nidrā-smṛtayaḥ ‖1, 6‖. Unless otherwise stated, the tr. and text of the Yogasūtra are from Rukmani's excellent study.
14 vyādhi-styāna-saṃśaya-pramādālasyāvirati-bhrānti-darśanālabdha-bhūmikatvānavasthitatvāni citta-vikṣepās te ’ntarāyāḥ ‖YS 1, 30‖ duḥkha-daurmanasyāṅgamejayatva-śvāsa-praśvāsā vikṣepa-sahabhuvaḥ ‖YS 1, 31‖ tat pratiṣedhārtham ekatvābhyāsaḥ ‖YS 1, 32‖.
15 This one-pointedness (ekāgratā) is an important exercise, discussed in more detail in YS 3, 11–12: ‘When there is weakening of attention to all things and there is the rise of one-pointedness, that is the change into ‘samādhi’ state of mind[/psyche]’ (YS 3, 11) and ‘Then again, when there is a similar [sequence] in the cognitive act of the past and the cognitive of the present, it is the change of one-pointed state of the mind[/psyche]’ (YS 3, 12) (Rukmani's tr.).
16 maitrī-karuṇā-muditopekṣāṇāṃ sukha-duḥkha-puṇyāpuṇya-viṣayāṇāṃ bhāvanātaś citta-prasādanam ‖YS 1, 33‖.
17 Two basic kinds of intense meditation (samādhi) are given YS 1, 17–18: ‘Saṃprajñāta (samādhi) is that accompanied by deliberation (vitarka) (or) by reflection (vicāra) (or) by bliss (ānanda) (or) by sense of ‘I’ (asmitā)’ (YS 1, 17) and ‘That preceded by the practice of cessation of modifications (knowledge) and which has (only) the subliminal impressions as residue, is the other (asaṃprajñāta-samādhi)’ (YS 1, 18). Saṃprajñāta-samādhi may be understood as an intense meditation that is based on the help of some object of concentration, such as deliberation (vitarka) or reflection (vicāra), and the other, asaṃprajñāta-samādhi, would be an intense meditation without the support of any such meditation aids.
18 tapaḥ-svādhyāyeśvara-praṇidhānāni kriyā-yogaḥ (YS 2, 1). samādhi-bhāvanārthaḥ kleśa-tanū-karaṇārthaś ca (YS 2, 2).
19 avidyā 'smitā-rāga-dveṣābhiniveśāḥ pañca kleśāḥ (YS 2, 3).
20 dhyāna-heyās tad-vṛttayaḥ (YS 2, 11).
21 sva-viṣayāsaṃprayoge cittasya sva-rūpānukāra ivendriyāṇāṃ pratyāhāraḥ ‖YS 2, 54‖ tataḥ paramā vaśyatendriyāṇām ‖YS 2, 55‖ deśa-bandhaś cittasya dhāraṇā ‖YS 3, 1‖ tatra pratyayaikatānatādhyānam ‖YS 3, 2‖ tadevārtha-mātra-nirbhāsaṃ sva-rūpa-śūnyam iva samādhiḥ ‖YS 3, 3‖.
22 vitarka-bādhane pratipakṣa-bhāvanam ‖YS 2, 33‖ vitarkā hiṃsādayaḥ kṛta-kāritānumoditā lobha-krodha-moha-pūrvakā mṛdu-madhyādhimātrā duḥkhājñānānanta-phalā iti pratipakṣa-bhāvanam ‖YS 2, 34‖.
23 Despite its brevity and conciseness the Yogasūtra devotes a relatively large number of sūtras (altogether at least 46) to the enumeration of so-called achievements, perfections or powers (siddhi, vibhūti, YS 3, 16 to YS 4, 6). These powers may be seen as unavoidable consequences of the ascetic discipline. So, for example, YS 3, 19 says that by meditating on ideas or notions ‘then [there follows] knowledge of other minds’; by meditating on the moon ‘there is knowledge of the arrangement of stars’ (YS, 3, 27); by meditating on ‘the pit of the throat there is the cessation of thirst and hunger’ (YS 3, 30). YS 4, 1 clearly says that these perfections or powers are achieved not only through intense meditation but can arise also by birth, through drugs (auṣadhi), from spells (mantra) or through strict asceticism (tapas). However, already in YS 3, 37 it is clearly stated that ‘These powers are obstructions (upasarga) in samādhi…,’ and YS 3, 50 clinches the argument in favour of disregarding these powers as hindrances: ‘As a result of passionlessness even with regard to these [perfections] there follows, after the dwindling of the seeds of the defects, Isolation’; James Haughton Woods, The Yoga-System of Patañjali or the Ancient Hindu Doctrine of Concentration of the Mind (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1914), p. 284. It is precisely this isolation which is the goal of Saṅkhya and Yoga because it is a knowledge of the essential natures of consciousness (puruṣa) and primeval nature (prakṛti).