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The principle that people's lives and fundamental interests are of equal value and that they must therefore be given equal weight has immense intellectual appeal and intuitive force. It is often enough to discredit a theory or proposal simply to show that it violates this principle. When measures are said to be discriminatory or unfair it is this principle which is in play. Recent philosophers of widely differing schools and outlooks give versions of this principle a central role in their theories.
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- Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements , Volume 23: Philosophy and Medical Welfare , March 1988 , pp. 75 - 96
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- Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 1988
References
1 Dworkin, Ronald, Taking Rights Seriously (London: Duckworth, 1977), 198.Google ScholarPubMed
2 Ibid. 182.
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8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid. 144.
11 Smith, George Teeling, Office of Health Economics, The Measurement of Health (London, 1985).Google Scholar
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25 Ibid.
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32 Ibid. 8.
33 Ibid. 14.
34 Ibid. 13.
35 Ibid. 9.
36 Ibid. 13.
37 Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972).Google Scholar
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39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41 See this volume, pp. 33–55.
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53 See ibid.
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