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The Modality of Freedom

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 January 2010

Christopher Peacocke
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Extract

The classical problem of free will is one instance of the Integration Challenge. The Integration Challenge in its general form is that of reconciling our metaphysics of any given area with our epistemology for that same area. In the case of free will, the challenge is that of reconciling our seeming first-person knowledge of our exercise of free thought, deliberation, choice and action with a description of what is really going on in the world as characterized in terms of causation, determination, explanation and causal possibility.

Type
Papers
Information
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements , Volume 43 , March 1998 , pp. 349 - 375
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 1998

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