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How Can You Spot the Experts? An Essay in Social Epistemology

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 May 2021

Alvin I. Goldman*
Affiliation:
Rutgers University

Abstract

In the history of western philosophy, people were often encouraged to seek knowledge by starting from their own minds and proceeding in a highly individualistic spirit. In recent contemporary philosophy, by contrast, there is a movement toward Social Epistemology, which urges people to seek knowledge from what others know. However, in selected fields some people are experts while others are laypersons. It is natural for self-acknowledged laypersons to seek help from the experts. But who, exactly, are the experts? Many people claiming to be experts are not the real thing. How can laypersons identify genuine experts? This essay explores the problems that arise, pointing out some of the mistakes that can be made and how to avoid them.

Type
Papers
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 2021

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