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If my argument here is successful, it will follow that this paper should have been included in the first volume of this series, The Human Agent (Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures, 1966–7); for I want to contend that the topic of dreams belongs to philosophy of mind rather than to theory of knowledge.
page 236 note 1 Dreaming (1958).Google Scholar
page 236 note 2 Theaetetus, 158A.Google Scholar
page 239 note 1 Dreaming, ch. 17.
page 240 note 1 Collected Works of S. T. Coleridge, ed. Hartley Coleridge, 1 296.
page 241 note 1 Dreaming, p. 39.Google Scholar
page 241 note 2 Ibid., p. 30.
page 241 note 3 The intervention of Mr Vesey produced a riposte to this argument from Professor Malcolm, which consisted in fully admitting the facts but denying their implications. The nub of his reply, as far as I understand it, is to allow that Coleridge remembered composing Kubla Khan during sleep but to deny that ‘remember’ is here used with its usual grammar. My reply would be to ask Professor Malcolm when, according to him, Kubla Khan was composed. If he says that this occurred during Coleridge's sleep, then ‘remember’ is after all being used with its usual grammar; if he says that this occurred after Coleridge's waking, this amounts to what I have above called his first way out and is open to the same objections.
page 242 note 1 P. 303.
page 242 note 2 Collected Psychological Works, v, 678.Google Scholar
page 242 note 3 ‘Patterns of Dreaming’, in Scientific American (11 1960) 85.Google Scholar
page 244 note 1 Pp. 162 ff.
page 244 note 2 (Oxford, 1968.)
page 244 note 3 Ibid., p. 118; cf. also pp. 144–5.
page 245 note 1 Dreaming, p. 66Google Scholar. See, however, p. 68.
page 246 note 1 Ibid., ch. 13. Miss H. Ishiguro has pointed out to me that the scientific philistinism of which I am here complaining is not necessitated by Malcolm's characteristic view of dreaming as a unique state not identifiable with thinking, imagining, etc., but only by the statement quoted in the text, which seems itself to result from a muddle between such events as dreaming that one jumped over the moon and jumping over the moon. If one asks when the latter occurs, the answer is obviously ‘Never’, but there is no reason why Malcolm should not, like anyone else, ask when the former occurred and answer the question by using Kleitman's techniques.
page 246 note 2 (London, 1967.)
page 247 note 1 Scientific American (11 1960) 88.Google Scholar
page 247 note 2 Sleep, p. 168.Google Scholar