There are many people who think that deconstruction has run its course, has had its day, and that it is now time to return to the important business of philosophy, or perhaps to serious ethical, social and political questions. Derrida's work, it is said, leads nowhere but a sterile philosophy of difference that in its de-politicized, de-historicized abstractness is a form of conservatism little better than the kinds of identity thinking to which it seems to be so radically opposed. In short, we must go ‘beyond’ deconstruction.
1 Two authors who evidence this further thought, in very different directions, are Dews, Peter, Logics of Disintegration (London: Verso, 1987), esp. Ch. 1Google Scholar, where he tries to show how deconstruction is prefigured, and some of its perplexities resolved in the work of Fichte and Schelling; and Gasché, Rodolph, The Tain of the Mirror (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard, 1986)Google Scholar, whose aim seems to be to treat deconstruction as a deepening of the transcendental project, a Husserlian graft.
2 ‘…That Dangerous Supplement …’, in Derrida, Jacques, Of Grammatology, trans. Spivak, Gayatri C. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), 158.Google Scholar
3 Jacques Derrida, Spurs: Nietzsche's Styles (Eperons: Les Styles de Nietzsche), trans. Barbara Harlow (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979).
4 In Derrida, Jacques, Positions, trans. Bass, Alan (London: Athlone, 1972), 59.Google Scholar
5 In Twilight of the Idols, trans. Hollingdale, R. J. (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968), 40–41.Google Scholar
6 For instance, Madness and Civilization, trans. Howard, R. (London: Tavistock, 1965)Google Scholar and Discipline and Punish, trans. Sheridan, A. (New York: Vintage, 1979).Google Scholar
7 Rorty, Richard, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979).Google Scholar
8 Quine, W. V. O., ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’, in From a Logical Point of View (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953).Google Scholar
9 Goodman, Nelson, Ways of Worldmaking (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1978).Google Scholar
10 Singer, Peter, Animal Liberation.Google Scholar
11 Such a logic, of ‘infrastructures’, is outlined by Gasché in The Tain of the Mirror (see note 1).
12 I discuss this further in the section on ‘Textual Idealism’ below.
13 ‘Violence and Metaphysics’, in Writing and Difference, trans. Bass, Alan (University of Chicago, 1978).Google Scholar
14 Ibid., 79.
15 Christina Howells has made an excellent start with her ‘Sartre and Derrida: Qui Perd Gagne’, Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 13, No. 1 (1982), 26–34.Google Scholar
16 Speech and Phenomena, trans. Allison, David (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973).Google Scholar
17 Peter Dews’ fascinating version of this thesis (see his Logics of Disintegration) (note 1, above), deserves more subtle treatment than I offer here.
18 ‘Différance’, in Margins of Philosophy, trans. Bass, Alan (University of Chicago Press, 1982).Google Scholar
19 Caputo, John's most original work is best represented by his Radical Hermeneutics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987)Google Scholar. For ‘cold hermeneutics’, see Ch. 7.
20 Someone who does is Rose, Gillian in her Dialectic of Nihilism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984)Google Scholar. Her Ch. 8, on Derrida, deserves separate treatment.
21 Ricoeur, Paul, The Rule of Metaphor, trans. McLoughlin, Kathleen (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978), 311.Google Scholar
22 For example, in Of Grammatology, op. cit., 4, 60.Google Scholar
23 In Positions, op. cit., 62.Google Scholar
24 Ibid., 66. Here he insists on materialism precisely to avoid ‘a new selfinteriority, a new “idealism”, if you will, of the text’.
25 Of Grammatology, op. cit., Pt II, Ch. 2, 158.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid., 159.
28 Critical Inquiry, Autumn (1986), 167.Google Scholar
29 Critical Inquiry, Autumn (1985), 292.Google Scholar
30 Critical Inquiry, Autumn (1986), 168.Google Scholar
31 I am alluding here to a remark by Heidegger in ‘Language’, in his Poetry Language, Thought, trans. Hofstadter, A. (New York: Harper & Row)Google Scholar, in which he says (à propos of understanding language) that he is not trying to go anywhere, but for once to get to where we are already.