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NOTES ON BOUNDED INDUCTION FOR THE COMPOSITIONAL TRUTH PREDICATE

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 March 2017

BARTOSZ WCISŁO  and
MATEUSZ ŁEŁYK
BARTOSZ WCISŁO*
Affiliation:
Institute of Philosophy, University of Warsaw
MATEUSZ ŁEŁYK*
Affiliation:
Institute of Philosophy, University of Warsaw
*
*INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF WARSAW WARSAW, POLAND E-mail: [email protected]
†INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF WARSAW WARSAW, POLAND E-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

We prove that the theory of the extensional compositional truth predicate for the language of arithmetic with Δ0-induction scheme for the truth predicate and the full arithmetical induction scheme is not conservative over Peano Arithmetic. In addition, we show that a slightly modified theory of truth actually proves the global reflection principle over the base theory.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Symbolic Logic , Volume 10 , Issue 3 , September 2017 , pp. 455 - 480
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 2017 

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References

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