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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 August 2009
Territorial disputes are not the only, probably not even the main cause of war, and territorial settlement is not the only and perhaps not the most important aspect of a peace treaty. Still, territorial change after a war is its most conspicuous effect, one which is held in the memory of generations. For two generations of Frenchmen, Alsace-Lorraine was an open wound, a program unifying them much better than any slogan relating to internal affairs. For the generation of Germans which matured after the First World War, the idea of the lost provinces was an intolerable humiliation. During the past few years, similar ideas have become dominant in the minds of the Russians.
1 On the different manners to pose the question of the causes of war see Wright, Q., A Study of War, (Chicago, 1942) vol. II, pp. 727 ffGoogle Scholar.
2 War as part of culture tradition is masterfully discussed by Malinowsky, B., “An Anthropological Analysis of War,” Am. Journ. Sociol., 46: 521 ffCrossRefGoogle Scholar.
3 In this paper, the term “civilization” is used in the meaning given to it by Toynbee, A., A Study of History (1936–1939)Google Scholar: a family of nations forming an intelligible field of study.
4 Only partly mitigated by rules concerning the forms of warfare and the treatment of prisoners.
5 It is noteworthy that the equilibrium situation, at least partly, depends on value judgments. Thus, a modern state renounces much easier a claim on an allo-ethnic province than on a province inhabited by the dominant ethnic group.
6 In Russia, the Japanese war (1904–05) was considered by many as unjust; the defeat was accepted without bitterness, and cordial Russo-Japanese relations could be established a few years later. Similar was the attitude of many Englishmen toward the war with the American colonies.
7 About this process, see my Introduction lo the Sociology of Lam, (Cambridge, Mass., 1939) pp. 281–83Google Scholar. An attempt to apply the analogy to the solution of the problem of international order has been made by Martin, Leo, “Integrating Forces for an International Community,” Am. Cath. Sociol. Review, 4: 194CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
8 The process is slow because there is no opposition to the social group “humanity.” whereas opposition to a particular group on the part of the neighbors was one of the precipitating factors in the emergence of the early state.
9 A certain amount of social utility is or at least was present in the pattern of the reward of the victor: the awareness of this pattern inhibited quite a few rulers’ propensity to measure their forces with those of their neghbors. Today other sufficiently strong inhibitions exist to make this one superfluous.
10 The corollary is abandonment of territory. One of the earliest examples is the gift of the Ionian Islands, on the part of Great Britain, to Greece (1863). Another is the emancipation of the Philippines by the United States. Firm rejection of the idea of conquering any additional territory is one of the principles of the rulers of Kemalist Turkey.
11 This term will be used in this paper to designate the territory between the frontier line of 1921 and the Molotov-Ribbentrop line of 1939.
12 Pravda, January 5, 1944 (article of Zaslavzky against W. Willkie).
13 For a survey of Poland's claims and their justification, see Halecki, O., “Polish-Russian Relations—Past and Present” in Review of Politics, 07, 1943Google Scholar. See also Campbell, F. S., “Poland's Eastern Frontier,” Thought, 03, 1944, pp. 17 ffGoogle Scholar.
14 TASS communiqué, January II, 1944.
15 This argumentation has been amply used in the polemics between Russian and Polish émigrés in this country. See the letters to the editor of New York Times, by A. Kerensky and A. Konovalov, January 12, 1944, and Professor Halecki, January 17, 1944.
16 The attempt to outlaw war (the Kellogg-Briand pact) has remained on paper; up to the present day, the recourse to war is not a violation of international law.
17 Many peace treaties (especially between Russia and Poland) were called “eternal”; none has proved to be so.
18 On January 26, 1944, Mr. Eden said in the House of Commons: “We have not at any time adopted since the war broke out the line that nothing could be changed in the territorial structure of countries.”
19 In this regard, the Soviet leaders are entirely supported by the people of Russia, See my article “The Problem of Russia in Post-War Reconstruction,” Thought, March 1944, pp. 36–38.
20 The principle of compensation is used not only when an area is lost by a state, but also when one of the competitors on the political scene acquires additional territory, so that the balance of power is disturbed in its favor. Napoleon III unsuccessfully demanded compensation for the aggrandizement of Prussia. Germany actually received compensation in French Equatorial Africa for the expansion of the French colonial Empire in Northern Africa (Morocco).
21 On the concept of international feud see Wright, , op. cit., vol. II, pp. 1316 ffGoogle Scholar.
22 The Anglo-French feud was near to revival in 1895 (Fashoda affair) and in 1940 (after Oran and Dakar). To terminate an international feud is at least as difficult as to put an end to a vendetta situation.
23 Poland and Lithuania were fused into one state through the Lublin Union (1569).
24 References to the historical rights of the Ukrainian and Belorussian peoples were made in the Pravda editorial on the severance of diplomatic relations with Poland, April 28, 1943.
25 The Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement was invalid, since it disposed of a territory belonging to a third party; it has been explicitly invalidated by the Stalin-Sikorski agreement of July 31, 1941.
26 On September 3, 1940, Churchill said: “We do not propose to recognize any territorial changes which take place during the war unless they take place with the free consent and good-will of the parties concerned.” On January 25, 1944, replying to a member of the House of Commons, Eden said that this remains the government's position.
27 TASS communiqué, January 11, 1944.
28 This is a survival of tribal ethnocentrism.
29 France had to cede a line of fortresses along the frontier.
30 Which continued to exist despite the participation of the two states in the Triple Alliance and which determined Italy to join the camp of the enemy of her allies.
31 First of all signing of the mutual assistance pact with Czechoslovakia, December 12, 1943.
32 The opposition of the USSR against federation in Central Europe was first expressed in War and tlic Wording Class (a journal continuing the notorious Comintern), on August 18. 1943. On November 18, 1943, Izvestia published the following statement: “Molotov outlined emphatically Russia's stand (on federations) at the recent Moscow conference; C. Hull and A. Eden offered no objections.” On December 22, 1943, an article appeared in War and the Wording Class: there the reestablishment of the Baltic states' independence was linked with plans of “the reactionaries” for establishing “blocs and federations.” “Undoubtedly,” said the Soviet paper, “many of these reactionaries would prefer to federate wiith fascist Germany.”
33 See Pravda, February 8, 1943.
34 The Belgian case is not so clear since the Flems are much nearer to the Dutch than to the Walloons with whom they formed the new Belgian state. This anomaly has led to great complications in the course of the past fifty years.
35 Another vindication was that of correcting an injustice (a treaty signed under duress).
36 The very meaning of the Curzon line is dubious, and a vivid controversy has recently broken out on this point between Russian and Polish emigres.
37 Terms used in the Pravda editorial on the severance of diplomatic relations with Poland (April 26, 1943).
38 This is, however, an error. According to C. Hull's statement (November 15, 1943), plebiscites will be held in liberated areas to select the form of government and the leaders. This implies the designation, by the population, of the state to which they would like to belong.
39 See for instance the leader in New York Times, December 31, 1943.
40 Bessarabia was acquired by Russia from Turkey (not Rumania) in 1812. Then it was an almost uninhabited area and, later on, was colonized from Russia and Rumania. The USSR never recognized its annexation by Rumania (in 1918), so that it could claim it according to the principles of legitimacy.
41 When the Karelian area was acquired by the USSR from Finland, almost the entire population (450,000) emigrated to Finland. After the reconquest by the Finnish army (in 1941), about half (237,000) returned to their old homes. See International Labor Office. The Displacement of Population in Europe, by Kulisher, E. M., (Montreal, 1943) pp. 60–61Google Scholar.
42 See “Constants in Russian Foreign Policy,” Nineteenth Century and After, November–December, 1943. p. 198.
43 It is noteworthy that a large group of Carpathorussians living in this country strongly oppose this solution and express the desire that their old country be united with the USSR.
44 The very root of the conflict between the USSR and its great western allies is that the former takes for granted an antiquated configuration of the war and peaceculture pattern which is no longer accepted by the western democracies. About the clash of these values see my article quoted above, note 19. This incompatibility of values results in a situation which is very adequately characterized as follows: “Even if (the Russians) were wholly right, the way in which they are handling the dispute is calculated to convince the world that they are wholly wrong.” (London) Economist. 01 21, 1944Google Scholar.
45 The right to conduct diplomatic relations with foreign countries and to have semi-autonomous armies, in the framework of the army of the USSR.
46 This is merely a statement in terms of probability. The present writer suggests as just the following solution: 1) free plebiscite, carried out according to the Saar pattern; 2) partition of the contested territory, in ratio of the expressed votes, with consideration for economic and administrative expediency; 3) stimulation of the exchange of the remaining minorities, under the supervision of the plebiscite commission.