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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 April 2016
One of the hazards in writing a book that surveys a large number of thinkers is that readers are likely to praise the book in general but take issue with the chapter that treads into their bailiwick. I am no exception as I will focus on Beiner's chapter on Habermas. I conclude, however, with some general observations about Beiner's idea and ideal of political philosophy. I offer this response in the same spirit in which Beiner wrote the book. He tells his reader that to hold back from the very toughest challenge is a form of condescension (xi). So I will not hold back.
1 What follows is an interpretation of Habermas's politics as presented in Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996). A common mistake in Habermas interpretation is to draw heavily on Habermas's moral philosophy and apply it directly to politics. For a more detailed version of this reading see Simone Chambers, “Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy,” in The Oxford Handbook of the Classics of Political Theory, ed. Jacob Levy (forthcoming).
2 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 186.
3 Campaign-finance reform rather than the moral transformation of politicians like Obama and Romney is at the top of this agenda.