Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 August 2009
Continuing philosophic doubt concerning the moral foundations of human rights threatens to undermine the growing belief in liberal democracy. This doubt has its roots in the reaction against the Enlightenment and is evident even in John Rawls's retreat from the apparent universalism of his theory of justice. There are good grounds, however, for regarding the traditional Western belief in moral and political autonomy as a sound basis for human rights and liberal democracy.
1. Ever the Orlando Furioso of American expatriates, he adds: “It is a TV-revolution we are witnessing, a rush towards the ‘California-promise’ that America has offered to the common man on this tired earth. American standards of dress, nourishment, locomotion, entertainment, housing are today the concrete Utopia in revolutions…. The new temples to liberty … will be McDonald's and Kentucky Fried Chicken” (George Steiner, “The State of Europe,” Granta 30 (Winter 1990): 130). Anthony Lewis, who brought Steiner's remarks to American attention in The New York Times (1 June 1990), rightly criticizes Steiner for being “far too cynical in his dismissal of the longing for political freedom.”
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