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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 16 May 2019
Nearly nine years after a Tunisian street vendor named Mohamed Bouazizi set himself ablaze in provincial Tunisia, a sense that the aspirations of the Arab Spring were always doomed to fail has set in among pundits and policymakers. The United States, and to a large extent the European Union, have all but given up on any pretense of democracy promotion in the region and have instead turned again to well-trodden policy repertoires emphasizing a realpolitik approach.
1 Anderson, Lisa, “Demystifying the Arab Spring: Parsing the Differences Between Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya,” Foreign Affairs 90, no. 3 (2011): 2–7Google Scholar.
2 For example, see Brownlee, Jason, Masoud, Tarek, and Reynolds, Andrew, The Arab Spring: Pathways of Repression and Reform (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
3 Michael Wahid Hanna, “Contrary to Popular Opinion, Egypt's Transition Wasn't Always Doomed to Fail,” The Monkey Cage, January 28, 2016, ; Kristen Kao and Ellen Lust, “Snapshot—Why Did the Arab Uprisings Turn Out as They Did? A Survey of the Literature,” Project On Middle East Democracy (POMED), August 23, 2017, https://pomed.org/pomed-snapshot-why-did-the-arab-uprisings-turn-out-as-they-did-a-survey-of-the-literature/.