The author argues that we have obligations to our fellow citizens as well as to those outside our community. Since these obligations can conflict and since neither automatically trumps the other, the author provides the general principles needed to resolve the conflict. While rejecting the notion of global citizenship, he argues for a globally oriented national citizenship and spells out its political and institutional implications.

The argument advanced here seeks to demonstrate that terms like ‘guerrilla warfare’ and ‘low intensity conflict’ are fundamentally flawed. They do not exist as proper categories of war. Often they constitute inappropriate distinctions that impede intellectual understanding of internal war phenomena, which has in the past had a negative impact upon policymaking. The usage of these terms in strategic studies literature does not facilitate understanding but rather undermines the attempt to comprehend the complexity of warfare as a whole. What we call low intensity conflict can be fully understood – can only be understood – within Clausewitzian parameters, which embrace the entire spectrum of war.

The ideas debate in mainstream IR/IPE was generated by cumulative dissatisfactions with rational choice theory and with Realist tenets. This article examines the contours of this debate and explains how it reached its limit in the form of ‘conventional constructivism’, a bowdlerised form of critical theory and Gramscian cultural studies. ‘Context’ and Gramsci's ‘common sense’, however, are sufficiently equivalent terms to enable productive conceptual connections across the intradisciplinary divide. The overarching obstacle remains the resistance of mainstream IR to integration with other social sciences.

Over the past two decades, monetary crises have played a key role in spurring increased monetary cooperation. From one, materialist, vantage, such crises appear as exogenous shocks, which matter primarily as they alter the material incentives to cooperation. However, such frameworks obscure the importance of debates over the meaning of crises, monetary understandings, and state interests themselves. I therefore offer a constructivist theory of crises, and trace the post-1980s evolution from New Classical interpretations of crises, which stressed domestic policy errors and obscured interests in cooperation, to subsequent New Keynesian interpretations, which have stressed market instabilities and legitimated greater cooperation.

This article argues that the study of international political economy (IPE) in general, and the analysis of modern finance in particular, have much to gain from the insights articulated in poststructuralist international relations. In contrast to recent critiques of poststructuralism, this article argues that the study of international finance necessitates a consideration of the discursive practices which bring capitalist concepts such as money, profit and capital into being. Financial practices do not exist prior to, or independently from, ideas and beliefs about them. Thus, IPE should recognise the production of economic and financial knowledge as an important site where power is exercised.

The constructivism-inspired study on hegemony focuses on the dominant state's ability to shape the beliefs and values of ruling elites in secondary states as a basis of hegemony while paying less attention to the attitude of the mass public in secondary states toward hegemony and the effects of its ‘socialisation’ with hegemonic ideas. This article provides a conceptual framework for studying the relations between hegemony and the mass-public of secondary states and then subjecting it to a preliminary test against postwar Japan's cooperation with the United States on China policy.

The main argument of this article is that hegemony may be strengthened and maintained if the mass public of secondary states is socialised with hegemonic conceptions of world order, state identities and underlying ideologies, and acquires an independent constraint on hegemony. The mass public's socialisation with hegemonic ideas, which amounts to a cultural transformation in secondary states, may take place as a result of propagation by the dominant state and secondary state elites, or as a result of important international and domestic events caused by the hegemon, and then come to feed back on the political structures and processes of secondary states in ways conducive to the maintenance of hegemony. When hegemonic ideas are firmly embedded in the security culture of secondary states, ruling elites in those states may cooperate with the hegemon because they themselves genuinely embrace hegemonic ideas. More importantly, some ruling elites may cooperate with the hegemon out of political expediency as the hegemon-induced cultural transformation may change political structures and processes in such ways as to link the ruling elites' political legitimacy closely with secondary states' continued support for hegemony.

This article analyses the extent to which Israeli-Palestinian water relations were affected and transformed by the Oslo process. Focusing in turn on the management of water systems and supplies, the monitoring of water resources and the development of new supplies, the article suggests that many of the seeming and much-lauded achievements of the Oslo process were more cosmetic than real. Comparing Israeli-Palestinian water relations before and since the onset of the Oslo process, the article contends that the Oslo agreements did little more in this particular sphere than to dress up and discursively repackage Israel's domination of the West Bank water sector in a new vocabulary of Israeli-Palestinian ‘cooperation’.

In ‘The Politics of Bandwidth‘, Geoffrey Herrera examines the relationship between the information revolution and international affairs. His main point is that the evolution and ultimate shape of a mature digital information network will be decided by a three-way political struggle between states, firms and individuals. This short essay intends to expand and refine some of Herrera's assumptions. More importantly, however, the essay draws attention to the factor that Herrera neglects, namely the difference that being a democracy makes when determining the outcome of the three-way struggle.

Refinements in reception and application of philosophemes in International Relations theory are always welcome, and particularly in cases where distortions abound as the result of selective importation. One such case is, without doubt, the philosophy of I. Kant. Until rather recently, few attempts were made in IR theory to interface the reception of his writings in ‘anthropology, philosophy of history, politics and pedagogy’ with some more holistic appreciation of the philosophical project to which they belong. This tendency alone produces some distortions, which are only amplified by a baffling reluctance to engage the question of the plausibility of this project in the very form given to it by Kant himself. Hardly anything has been written in IR about what problems twentieth century Kant scholarship may raise for a reception practice which proceeds by ‘lifting’ Kant's political writings over into analyses of contemporary international politics.This echoes the familiar criticisms of M. Doyle's reading of the perpetual peace (for a recent critical reading of Doyle's thesis, see G. Cavallar ‘Kantian Perspectives on Perpetual Peace’, in Review of International Studies, 27:2 (2001), pp. 229–48), but should also be understood as a plea for greater sensitivity towards discourses in political philosophy more generally. This could include work on the conditions of transcendental-philosophical approaches, as they inform the critical philosophy developed by K. O. Apel and J. Habermas, and, by extension, the work on cosmopolitan democracy by Held et al. The result is that a plurality of ‘Kantian legacies’ exist in IR theory, and that their respective proponents appear to be talking past each other in addressing different constituencies.

Words may, through the devotion, the skill, the passion, and the luck of writers prove to be the most powerful thing in the world.William Golding, Nobel Lecture, http://www.nobel.se/literature/laureates/1983/golding-lecture.html