The year 2004 marked the 25th anniversary of the signing of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. A significant landmark in the development of a coherent strategy for the promotion and protection of women’s human rights, it established the principle that for women to enjoy equal rights, they needed an extra layer of ‘protection’. More importantly, it detailed states’ legal obligations in the area of women’s rights. Since then, the development of women’s human rights has continued to challenge the boundaries between the public, the private and the international. It was in this context that the Beijing women’s conference (1995) created a climate of expectation among women’s groups and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that the project to advance women’s human rights in practice might gather and sustain momentum. Yet, it is evident that there remains an enormous gap between the rhetoric and realities of women’s human rights, whereby women’s rights continue to be contested in countries across the world and governments are often unwilling to fulfil their international obligations.

The central aims of this article are twofold: first to debate whether or not women’s human rights can underpin a universal feminist project; second to defend women’s human rights as a useful political tool that can be used to challenge injustice and discrimination against women. The first section of the article briefly sets out the universality/particularity debate in both human rights theory and in feminist theory. This serves as a point of departure for the subsequent discussion of universality and particularity in relation to women’s human rights specifically. Section one of the article is entitled ‘debating’ women’s human rights as a universal feminist project, because this is, indeed, a matter of dispute (as evidenced by the contributions to this forum). That women’s human rights are universal is contested by some feminists although the reasons for their scepticism are quite different from those advanced by ultra-conservatives and religious fundamentalists.

In 2004 the French National Assembly and Senate passed legislation which makes it illegal for Muslim women to wear headscarves (the hijab) within French public schools. To be precise the legislation refers to the banning of ostentatious religious symbols within the secular domain of the public school system, but is clearly aimed primarily at Muslim women, following a long-running dispute over this issue. Similar debates are taking place in other European countries such as Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Spain. A bill modelled on the recent French legislation has been tabled in the Belgian senate, whilst various court cases have been brought in other European countries by Muslim women who have been banned from wearing headscarves by employers or schools. Following a ruling of the German Supreme Court that a Muslim teacher should be allowed to wear a headscarf, as this did not contravene current legislation, the state of Baden-Wuerttenberg acted to introduce legislation to ban headscarves, and this legislation is likely to be copied by six other German states.

The International Labour Organisation’s Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work of 1998 formalised an approach to global labour issues known as the Core Labour Standards (CLS). The CLS have privileged a specific set of labour standards as possessing the kinds of universalistic qualities associated with ideas of ‘human rights’; the abolition of forced and child labour, equality of opportunity, and trade union rights. But what does this ‘human rights’ approach mean from the point of view of those women workers who dominate employment in some of the most globalised, and insecure, industries in the world? In this article, I make the case for critical feminist engagement with the gender-blind, and neoliberal-compatible, approach to economic rights as set out in the CLS. Not least, this article raises wider concerns about the insufficiency of approaches to economic rights that are designed to work within the (gendered) structures of a neoliberal economic development paradigm. It is suggested that the CLS have endorsed a voluntarist approach to labour standards that views the promotion and regulation of human rights by global corporations as unproblematic. The article challenges this perspective, drawing upon the work of number of feminist scholars working in the area of women’s employment and corporate codes of conduct. These feminist writings have specifically avoided the language of human rights; thus questions need to be asked concerning the possibilities and the limitations that the CLS opens up for women’s human rights activism.

How universally useful are human rights in addressing violence against women? This article addresses this question by looking at the link between gender, ethnicity and human rights to uncover the complexities that underpin current debates about universal justice and multiculturalism. While my discussion of rape in Mexico and Pakistan illustrates significant particularities with respect to how violence against women is constituted in these different cultural contexts, it also shows that culturally specific manifestations of violence against women often share striking similarities in the way that they are allowed to persist, justified and made invisible. As such, they are part of a global mechanism that reproduces gender subordination in a predominantly patriachal world.

This article examines wartime sexual violence, one of the most recurring wartime human rights abuses. It asserts that our theorisations need further development, particularly in regard to the way that masculinities and the intersections with constructions of ethnicity feature in wartime sexual violence. The article also argues that although women and girls are the predominant victims of sexual violence and men and boys the predominant agents, we must also be able to account for the presence of male victims and female agents. This, however, engenders a problem; much of the women’s human rights discourse and existing international mechanisms for addressing wartime sexual violence tend to reify the male-perpetrator/female-victim paradigm. This is a problem which feminist human rights theorists and activists need to address.

Such is its pervasiveness that human rights discourse is used to legitimise humanitarian and military intervention in the affairs of other states, provide a rationale for ‘ethical’ foreign policy, justify the punishment of war crimes, and validate the formation of international coalitions mandated to eradicate terrorism wherever its is found. At grass-roots level, human rights talk is deployed to lobby governments and to press for socioeconomic and legal change, to combat the dehumanising treatment of specific populations, to ground educational initiatives and spawn local, national, international, and sometimes global networks oriented to its advancement, and to induce the patient and meticulous documentation of its violations. In terms of women, human rights activism has been instrumental in problematising violence against women, prompting the recognition by the UN Human Rights Commission in 1992 of rape during war as a form of torture, and as a war crime or crime against humanity in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (which came into force in 2001). It also led to the appointment in 1994 by the UN Human Rights Commission of Radhika Coomaraswamy as the first Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women and its Causes and Consequences. Activities centring on human rights produced the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), which was adopted by the UN General Assembly on 18 December 1979 and became operational as an international treaty on 3 September 1981 when it was ratified by its twentieth signatory.

The ‘separation fence’ ‘constructed by Israel to isolate itself from the Palestinians’ raises many questions. Why was the construction of a fence perceived by the Israelis as a solution and as the only solution? What determined the specific, serpentine path of the fence and what impact does it have on both Palestinian and Israeli societies? A resulting reconfiguration of the power structure within Palestinian society is clearly unfolding and deserves analysis.

The government’s targeting of homosexuality in May 2001, following years of ‘turning a blind eye’ to Cairo’s gay scene, is studied here in terms of the links between the sphere of interpersonal relations and notions of national security within international relations. The persecution of men for alleged same-sex relations not only filled newspaper columns and created a spectacle to divert people’s attention away from the government’s failings. More importantly, the event represented an opportunity for government officials, the media and other civil society activists – both within Egypt and abroad – to ‘perform’ a discourse of national security through which national sovereignty was (re)produced and political order was maintained. However, this national security threat was not only posed by the external threat of Western governments, international NGOs and other transnational actors concerned with respect for human rights within Egypt. More importantly, this threat was constructed as originating with those people failing to conform to the ‘norm’ of heterosexual relationships.

The US, China and Japan are often portrayed as three giant states dominating the region of East Asia in perpetual potential conflict. This article proposes that such assessments should be tempered in the light of changing regional and global dynamics and, in particular, in view of the growing centrality of the region of East Asia itself for foreign policy agendas. Adopting a framework underpinned by the concept of strategic regionalism, this article focuses upon the developing collective identification of region, and assesses the possibility for joint leadership in East Asia.

The prevailing scholarly orthodoxy regarding recent diplomatic initiatives in the Asia-Pacific assumes that East Asia is evolving into a distinctive regional community. The orthodoxy attributes this development to the growing influence of the diplomatic practices espoused by the Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN) and its related institutions. However, a paradox remains, namely: despite the failure of ASEAN’s distinctive practice to fulfil its rhetorical promise in Southeast Asia both immediately prior to and in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis in 1997, it is nevertheless considered sufficient to validate the projection of ASEAN defined norms onto a wider Pacific canvas. This study analyses how an academic preference for constructivism has misinterpreted the growth in official rhetoric extolling East Asian regionalism since 1997 in a way that has helped produce and reinforce this paradox. By contrast, we contend that government declarations of a developing East Asian identity actually serve to obscure the continuation of traditional interstate relations and do not herald any wider, let alone inexorable, movement towards an integrated regional community.