Both the ‘CNN effect,’ whereby images revealing large-scale suffering push governments into humanitarian interventions, and the ‘bodybags effect’, whereby images of casualties pull them away, were evident in the Kosovo War, as was the ‘bullying effect,’ whereby the use of excessive force risks draining away public support for interventions. Although Serbs deliberately tried to present themselves as victims, however, the harsh methods used to suppress Kosovar Albanian aspirations ensured that it was they who appeared as the victims. The Serb effort was also counter-productive in that it made the KLA harder, instead of easier, to defeat.

The economic crises in 1997–9 in Asia, Brazil and elsewhere represent collectively the first post-Cold War ‘crisis of globalization’, and a significant set-back for the process of international economic liberalization. Contrary to some arguments, the crises do not represent the final ideological triumph of liberalism in a post-Cold War era. Rather they must be seen as a further spur to rethinking significant aspects of the neoliberal project. A comparative analysis of Asia and Latin America in this context demonstrates that while trade liberalization and a broad neoliberal economic strategy are unlikely to be abandoned, there is strong evidence that the tide of capital account liberalization has turned, and that emerging ‘sites of resistance’ are becoming salient factors in the political equation in the relationships of both regions to the wider global economy. Asian and Latin American responses to the crisis of globalization refute notions of convergence, on which many recent conceptions of the global political economy have rested, and point to the emergence of a genuine contestation of policy ideas that will have significant implications for the future management of the global economic order.

The debate over the East Asian crisis has thus far been led by economists who have focused on technical economic issues and policy goals at the expense of macro historical-structural questions. Foremost amongst the neglected questions is whether and under what conditions ‘Postwar East Asian Capitalism’ (PWEAC) will either continue to flourish or undergo a radical political transformation ‘after the crisis’. This question must be understood in the context of the changing geopolitical framework of the post-Cold War era. PWEAC is under great pressure for reform from both external and internal forces. Whether a ‘new political architecture’ for capitalism in East Asia is emerging is the central issue and one which will determine the future direction of Asia. The demise of authoritarian-oligarchic capitalism in Asia may have been accelerated by the economic crisis. The most enduring result of the Asian crisis is not the presumed derailing of the (re)ascent of Asia in the world economy but rather the weakening of the non-democratic state forms that have characterized East Asia's capitalism for decades. Popular demands for change represent a real challenge to both the domestic authoritarian-oligarchic power structure of PWEAC and its crucial geopolitical underpinning and external orientation.

A people that has existed for centuries under a system of castes and classes can arrive at a democratic state of society only by passing through a long series of more or less critical transformations, accomplished by violent efforts, and after numerous vicissitudes, in the course of which property, opinions, and power are rapidly transferred from one to another...

Alexis de Tocqueville

Democracy in America, Vol. II, 1840

To reason with governments, as they have existed for ages, is to argue with brutes. It is only from the nations themselves that reforms can be expected.

Thomas Paine

The Rights of Man, Preface to the French Edition, 1791

The Asian Pacific region is highly unstable, but not for the reasons usually assumed. Contrary to the assertions of Realists, who argue multipolarity makes Asia ‘ripe for rivalry’, overwhelming US strategic preponderance should make the balance of power quite stable. Likewise, while much is made by more liberal International Relations theorists of the relative absence of strong international institutions and democracy in Asia, recent trends seem to point in a more positive direction. The real source of instability lies in the beliefs and values held by regional actors. Contested sovereignty on the Korean peninsula and in the Taiwan straits makes military conflict seem a real possibility. Latent isolationism in the US and Japan may lead to a mishandling of a crisis were one to emerge. This Constructivist line of analysis suggests that more attention should be paid to these intangible potential sources of conflict and miscalculation.

This article examines the politics and explanatory plausibility of performative accounts of state action through a critical analysis of the themes of continuity and change in the work of David Campbell. As political interventions, performative models reproduce a number of taken-for-granted conceptual distinctions. As explanations, performative models are undermined by an account of the social that privileges representation. Drawing on materialist feminist critiques of performativity, I argue for the necessity of locating accounts of subject formation and state action in the multiple logics that constitute the social.

This article explores Jim George's claim that Hans Morgenthau's notion of political realism is founded upon a spectator theory of knowledge and that it discloses no meaningful distinction between theory and practice. An investigation of Morgenthau's understanding of scientific inquiry, the relation of theory and practice, and his views on American foreign policy suggests that both of these claims may be misplaced. Rather Morgenthau's realism is an authentic moral voice in the discourse of world politics which emphasizes the importance of judgment and the need to locate statecraft in historical, social, and political context. It is a realism that is representative of a rich moral tradition, one which orders, arranges, and prioritizes fundamental human values and which is concerned with how these values might be realized. This conclusion not only emancipates a valuable tradition of scholarship, it also raises important question about how we engage and organize the discipline of international relations and it suggests that some critical thinking spaces may provide a rather limited refuge for those wishing to go beyond Morgenthau and realism.

R.I.S. Jim, can we begin by asking you to sketch for us how your personal background—your early experiences and education—influenced your research and writing, if at all?

Peter Sutch's article offers an excellent overview of the constitutive theory of individuality which I developed in Ethics in International Relations. Sutch offers a lucid expository section which is followed by a series of criticisms of the theory. These (taken together with others I have encountered) require of me that I sharpen and restate my argument in crucial ways. I welcome this opportunity to do so. What follows is not just a defence of the original argument but an elaboration of it. My comments fall under four headings:

Mervyn Frost's restatement of his constitutive theory of international relations raises a number of crucial points which need elaboration and discussion. Discussing the issues under the key headings used by Frost in his reply to my ‘Human Rights as Settled Norms’, I wish to focus on the following claim which I take to be central to the development of any norm-oriented approach to political and international theory. The claim is simply this; we are required, as a necessary component of post-positivist and constructivist theory, to take account of ethical and political inequalities in the development of any series of ‘settled norms’ that constitute the prevailing domain of discourse. This claim, I believe, accurately captures the core concerns of my earlier article and informs those tensions that remain to be discussed here.