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The embarrassment of changes: neo-realism as the science of Realpolitik without politics*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 1993

Friedrich Kratochwil
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Extract

The fundamental change occasioned by perestroika, the dissolution of the Soviet Bloc, the reunification of Germany, and the end of the ‘Cold War’ has become a crucial test for the explanation of change provided by the established paradigm of international politics, neo-realism. In at least three respects, this approach was embarrassed by the chain of events.

Type
Research Article
Information
Review of International Studies , Volume 19 , Issue 1 , January 1993 , pp. 63 - 80
Copyright
Copyright © British International Studies Association 1993

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References

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6 My argument here is that a critical reflection on political praxis could profit more from a coherent elaboration of the standards of practical reason and judgement than from the problematic attempt of applying the model of theoretical reason to practical problems. In other words, the appropriate model for a critical examination of practice is Kant's second and third rather than first critique. For an attempt of applying the approach outlined in Kant's Kritik der Urteilskraft to the problem of politics see Beiner, Ronald, Political Judgement (Chicago, 1983)Google Scholar

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