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Bargaining theory and diplomatic reality : the CSCE negotations

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 October 2009

K. J. Holsti
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Extract

Over the past two decades, psychologists, economists, and political scientists have developed a substantial literature on diplomatic bargaining. Its descriptive and normative development has substantially increased our understanding of the fundamentals of bargaining structures and strategies, outlined the fundamental choices facing negotiator and hypothesized an array of variables to explain outcomes.

Type
Research Article
Information
Review of International Studies , Volume 8 , Issue 3 , July 1982 , pp. 159 - 170
Copyright
Copyright © British International Studies Association 1982

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References

1. Walton, Richard E. and McKersie, Robert B., A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations (New York, 1965).Google Scholar

2. Snyder, Glenn and Diesing, Paul, Conflict Among Nations (Princeton, 1977)Google Scholar. See also George, Alexander L. and Smoke, Richard, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York, 1974)Google Scholar, and Young, Oran, The Politics of Force (Princeton, 1968).Google Scholar

3. Cf., Hopmann, P. Terrence, King, Timothy D., and Walcott, Charles, Bargaining in International Arms Control Negotiations (forthcoming), Druckman, Daniel (ed.), Negotiations: Social-Psychological Perspectives (Beverly Hills, Calif., 1977)Google Scholar, and Zartman, I. William, The Politics of Trade Negotiations Between Africa and the European Economic Community: The Weak Confront the Strong (Princeton, 1971).Google Scholar

4. Zartman, op. cit.

5. Rosenau, James N., ‘Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy’, in Farrell, R. Barry (ed.), Approaches to Comparative and International Politics (Evanston, III.), pp. 27–92.Google Scholar

6. A detailed examination of bargaining at the CSCES, based on the files of the Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, is in Holsti, K. J., ‘Who Got What and How: The CSCE Negotiations in Retrospect’, in Spencer, Robert (ed.), Canada and European SecurityGoogle Scholar (forthcoming); see also Birnbaum, Karl E., ‘East-West Diplomacy in the Era of Multilateral Negotiations: The Case of the CSCE’, in Andren, Nils and Birnbaum, Karl E. (eds.), Beyond Detente: Prospects for East-West Cooperation and Security in Europe (Leyden, 1976).Google Scholar

7. Carle, Francois, ‘Les Pourparlers Exploratoires d'Helsinki’, Etudes Internationales, 4 (December 1973), pp. 502–504.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

8. Druckman, Daniel, Human Factors in International Negotiations: Some Social-Psychological Aspects of International Conflict (Beverly Hills, Calif., 1973), pp. 21–22.Google Scholar

9. Walton and McKersie, op. cit. p. 399.

10. Legvold, Robert, ‘The Problem of European Security’, Problems of Communism (January-February 1974), p. 33.Google Scholar

11. Snyder and Diesing, op. cit. p. 190.

12. Ibid. p. 525.

13. Zartman, op. cit. p. 226 George and Smoke's case studies also show that successful deterrence requires much more than mEitary strength and rhetorical statements of commitment (see their Deterrence and American Foreign Policy, esp. chs. 17–21).

14. Baldwin, David, ‘Interdependence and Power: A Conceptual Analysis’, International Organization, 34 (Autumn 1980), esp. pp. 500–503.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

15. Walton and McKersie, op. cit. p. 416.

16. Hopmann, P. Terrence, ‘Asymmetrical Bargaining in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe’, International Organization, 32 (Winter 1978), pp. 141–78.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

17. Rosenau, op. cit. p. 86.

18. For a slightly different interpretation, see Steinberg, Blema, ‘Goals in Conflict: Cuba, 1962’, Canadian Journal of Political Science, 14 (March 1981), esp. pp. 87–89.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

19. Snyder and Diesing, op. cit. p. 163.

20. Ibid. p. 162.

21. Ibid. p. 163.

22. Ambiguity is often a deliberate method to conceal underlying incompatibilities that cannot be resolved through negotiation.