Published online by Cambridge University Press: 30 November 2011
Why have non-Western powers, such as China, pursued a grand strategy of commercial integration into the liberal system? In developing a general theory of competitive pressure, this article builds upon a growing body of literature that seeks to develop a liberal systemic theory. Powerful network externalities – system-level pressures and incentives – have emerged as a by-product of the highly integrated liberal core. Outsiders have been moved by an interest in accessing these network benefits as well as a fear of falling behind in the struggle for relative power. In a plausibility probe, the article explores China's decision to join the world.
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