Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-v9fdk Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-08T09:20:03.144Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

The Reasonableness of Agnosticism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 October 2008

Alan Brinton
Affiliation:
Buise State University, Idaho

Extract

Agnostics often hold that, since there is not a clear preponderance of evidence either in favour of theistic belief or against it, their position of suspended belief is more rational than either theism or atheism. I would like to examine an objection raised recently by Clement Dore against the agnostic's reasoning on this matter.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1984

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

page 627 note 1 Agnosticism’, Religious Studies, 18 (1983), 503–7.Google Scholar

page 627 note 2 In ‘The Will to Believe’ and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy (1897; rpt. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979).Google Scholar His other general defence of this doctrine is to be found in ‘The sentiment of rationality’ in the same volume.

page 629 note 1 Both also in ‘The Will to Believe’ and Other Essays.