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Prolegomena to any future non-doxastic religion

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 April 2013

ANDREW CHIGNELL
ANDREW CHIGNELL*
Affiliation:
Susan L. Sage School of Philosophy, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York 14853, USA e-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

I discuss some trends in recent philosophy of religion, focusing on J. L. Schellenberg's Prolegomena to a Philosophy of Religion. I pay special attention to Schellenberg's dual emphases on ‘the Ultimate’ as metaphysical object of inquiry and various non-doxastic states (‘faith that’, ‘faith in’) as psychological objects of inquiry. This view is contrasted throughout to what might be called a ‘liturgical’ orientation in philosophy of religion.

Type
Articles
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 49 , Special Issue 2: Critical Essays on J. L. Schellenberg's Philosophy of Religion , June 2013 , pp. 195 - 207
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013

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