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The problem with the problem of mourning

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 February 2025

Leigh Vicens Open the ORCID record for Leigh Vicens [Opens in a new window]
Leigh Vicens*
Affiliation:
Department of Religion, Philosophy, and Classics, Augustana University, Sioux Falls, SD, USA
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Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

In her recent book The Image of God: The Problem of Evil and the Problem of Mourning (2022), Eleonore Stump takes up a question she thinks has been unduly neglected by contemporary philosophers of religion: Is the world as good as it would have been had original sin, and all subsequent sin and suffering, not occurred? Stump contends that if we do not answer this question in the affirmative, we are left with a problem – a picture of a world which is a disappointment to God; and this picture could in turn undermine belief in an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good Creator. In response to this problem, Stump sets out to defend the felix culpa view, according to which the world is even better with the Fall than it would have been without. However, I argue in this article that the felix culpa view has unacceptable consequences regarding God’s desires and will, that we can live with the problem of mourning unresolved, and that we need not affirm the felix culpa view to resolve the problem of mourning anyway.

Keywords

problem of evilsinmourningfelix culpa
Type
Original Article
Information
Religious Studies , First View , pp. 1 - 11
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Copyright
© The Author(s), 2025. Published by Cambridge University Press.

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