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Augustine's compatibilism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 October 2004

KATHERIN A. ROGERS
KATHERIN A. ROGERS
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Delaware, Newark, DE 19716
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Abstract

In analysing Augustine's views on freedom it is standard to draw two distinctions; one between an earlier emphasis on human freedom and a later insistence that God alone governs human destiny, and another between pre-lapsarian and post-lapsarian freedom. These distinctions are real and important, but underlying them is a more fundamental consistency. Augustine is a compatibilist from his earliest work on freedom through his final anti-Pelagian writings, and the freedom possessed by the un-fallen and the fallen will is a compatibilist freedom. This leaves Augustine open to the charge that he makes God the ultimate cause of sin.

Type
Research Article
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 40 , Issue 4 , December 2004 , pp. 415 - 435
Copyright
© 2004 Cambridge University Press

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