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Politiques du marché du travail et négociations par branches d’activité dans un modéle d’appariement

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 August 2016

Olivier L'Haridon  and
Franck Malherbet
Olivier L'Haridon
Affiliation:
GREG - HEC et Université Paris IV.
Franck Malherbet*
Affiliation:
THEMA - CNRS - Université de Cergy-Pontoise, IZA et fRDB.
*
Université de Cergy-Pontoise, UFR économie et gestion/THEMA, 33, boulevard du port, 95011 Cergy-Pontoise cedex, France ; email: [email protected].
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Résumé

Dans la plupart des pays européens, la redéfinition du contrat de travail et de ses modalités de rupture est au cœur des débats contemporains de politique économique du marché du travail. Ces débats s'appuient sur l'impo-sante littérature consacrée aux liens entre protection de l'emploi et performance du marché du travail développée au cours des dix dernières années. Toutefois, une source de divergence importante entre les marchés du travail européens, le degré de centralisation des négociations salariales, a été curieusement éludée dans la plupart de ces études. L'objet de cet article est précisément d'envisager d'un point de vue théorique la nature des interactions entre politiques du marché du travail et niveaux de négociation. Dans cette perspective, nous développons un modèle dynamique du marché du travail dans la lignée des travaux de Pissarides (2000) intégrant différentes branches d'activité. Notre analyse montre que dans ce cadre de référence, les négociations de branche conduisent systématiquement à une allocation inefficace des ressources. Il existe alors une justification explicite à l'introduction des politiques de l'emploi. Nous montrons alors qu'un ensemble de politiques, notamment fiscales et de protection de l'emploi, est susceptible d'assurer l'équivalence entre équilibre de branches et optimum.

Summary

Summary

Labor contracts' redefinition and severance's modalities are of particular importance in the European debate on the contours of labor market reform. This debate relies on the impressive literature devoted to the link between labor market institutions and economic performance. It's however striking that most of the contributions in this field has eluded one important source of divergence across European countries namely the level at which wage bargaining takes place. The motivation of this article is to consider, from a theoretical viewpoint, the very nature of the interactions between the wage bargaining's level and the labor market policies. In this perspective, we appeal to a search and matching model in the style of Pissarides (2000) in an economy made up of a number of industries. In such a framework we demonstrate that wage bargaining at the industry level leads to an inefficient resource allocation. We next show that well designed labor market policies permit to reach a first best allocation.

Keywords

modèle d'appariementniveau des négociations salarialespolitiques de l'emploiLabor Market PoliciesWage NegotiationsUnemployment

JEL classification

J60: General J41: Labor Contracts J48: Public Policy
Type
Research Article
Information
Recherches Économiques de Louvain/ Louvain Economic Review , Volume 75 , Issue 2 , June 2009 , pp. 183 - 228
Copyright
Copyright © Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de recherches économiques et sociales 2009 

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Footnotes

*

Nous tenons à remercier sans engager leur responsabilité, Pierre Cahuc, Olivier Chariot, Rodolphe Dos Santos Ferreira, Grégory Jolivet, Mustafa Ulus, André Zylberberg ainsi que deux rapporteurs anonymes pour leurs remarques et leurs suggestions sur une vision antérieure de ce papier.

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