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Corruption et mobilisation des recettes publiques : une analyse économétrique

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 August 2016

Gbewopo Attila ,
Gérard Chambas  and
Jean-Louis Combes
Gbewopo Attila
Affiliation:
Clermont Université, Université de Clermont I, CERDI- UMR CNRS
Gérard Chambas
Affiliation:
Clermont Université, Université de Clermont I, CERDI- UMR CNRS
Jean-Louis Combes
Affiliation:
Clermont Université, Université de Clermont I, CERDI- UMR CNRS
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Résumé

L'objet de cet article est d'analyser l'effet de la corruption sur la mobilisation des recettes publiques. Une analyse économétrique sur données de panel (125 pays et couvrant la période 1980-2002) permet de ne pas rejeter l'hypothèse d'un effet négatif de la corruption sur les recettes publiques. Cet effet négatif de la corruption n'affecte pas de manière identique les différentes composantes des recettes. En raison probablement des opportunités différentes de rente, la corruption modifie la structure du prélèvement public au profit des recettes tarifaires assises sur le commerce international et au détriment des impôts directs et indirects, dont en particulier la TVA. Il apparaît également qu'un canal de transmission important de la corruption sur le prélèvement public est celui transitant par un affaiblissement du civisme fiscal capté à travers des variables de l'action publique.

Summary

Summary

In this paper, we analyze the relationship between corruption and public revenues. An empirical investigation of panel data (125 countries and covering the period 1980-2002) makes it possible not to reject the hypothesis that corruption has a negative effect on public revenues collection. However, the impact is different on the various components of revenue. This is because different rent opportunities are created by corruption which seems to modify public revenues structure in favour of customs tariffs revenues while reducing direct and indirect taxes such as VAT. It also appears that a major channel of corruption is the weakening of the tax morality which in this study is captured by various public service delivery variables.

Keywords

corruptionprélèvement publicpays en développementdonnées de panelCorruptionpublic revenuedeveloping countriepanel data

JEL classification

C33: Panel Data Models • Spatio-temporal Models O17: Formal and Informal Sectors • Shadow Economy • Institutional Arrangements H2: Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue O10: General
Type
Research Article
Information
Recherches Économiques de Louvain/ Louvain Economic Review , Volume 75 , Issue 2 , June 2009 , pp. 229 - 268
Copyright
Copyright © Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de recherches économiques et sociales 2009 

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Footnotes

*

Pour toute correspondance, écrire à Gbewopo Attila, CERDI, 65 Boulevard François Mitterrand 63000 Clermont Ferrand, France. E-mail: [email protected]. Tel: + 33 4 73 17 74 41 ; Fax: + 33 4 73 17 74 28.

References

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