In the world of academic specialties and subspecialties, philosophy of biology certainly counts as a self-respecting, if not otherwise respected, field of study. It has its own exemplary works, its own lines of communication, etc. In this regard, philosophy of biology might be compared with philosophy of physics.

During the past two decades, much philosophy of science has been focused on issues about the norms and methods by which scientific theories are rationally appraised; and increasingly, philosophers have turned to history of science as a touchstone for assessing normative methodologies purporting to elucidate scientific rationality. But even among such historical methodologists, there is much disagreement and unclarity about how historical study of science can arbitrate between rival methodological theories; and until progress is made at this meta-methodological level, the very legitimacy of this role for history will remain controversial. (Keynotes in the controversy are sounded in Kuhn (1970b , pp. 235—41; Lakatos (1971); Giere (1973); McMullin (1976); Burian (1977); and Laudan (1977, pp. 158-63).) This paper begins by arguing that the meta-method implicit in much historical methodology is different from the explicit meta-methodology most often touted.

What is the structure of evolutionary theory? The question seems to presuppose a unique right answer. But the relevant notion of structure is highly relative to broad philosophic theories about scientific theories. At present no one such theory dominates. One once did. It went by the name ‘Logical Positivism’. During its heyday a unique right answer to our question might have been expected. There is no reason to expect one now.

Not only should one not suppose that there is a uniquely correct structural description of evolutionary theory, neither should one suppose that giving a structural description of evolutionary theory is essentially uncovering what is implicit in biological work. That approach is appropriate only when conceptual fossilization has occurred. In the case of evolutionary theory molding is more appropriate than uncovering.

Much recent discussion has been devoted to questions concerning what role considerations of the history of science should play in developing and evaluating philosophical analyses of science. It is generally, if not universally, conceded that the philosopher of science must appeal in some way to actual scientific practice and to the historical development of actual science if his analysis is to have any content, and it has been argued (Achinstein 1977) that even the most “ahistorical” of the positivists made, or presupposed, such an appeal.

It is now fairly common to distinguish two polar positions regarding the relation of history to philosophy of science: radical logicism is the doctrine that an appeal to actual scientific practice or to the history of science can never serve to refute any philosophical analysis of scientific concepts, while radical historicism is the view that really there is nothing more to the philosophy of science than historical description and analysis (i.e., that conformation to the history of science is always the determining factor in evaluating the adequacy of a philosophical analysis of science).

The “Code of Ethics” formulated by the Engineer's Council for Professional Development—and adopted by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers and the American Institute of Chemical Engineers— claims that “engineers shall hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public in the performance of their professional duties… . [Moreover,] should the Engineers’ professional judgment be overruled under circumstances where the safety, health, and welfare of the public are endangered, the Engineers shall inform their clients or employers of the possible consequences and notify other proper authority of the situation, as may be appropriate.“ The other major engineering societies endorse “Codes of Ethics” with a similar provision.

Most philosophers have a schizophrenic attitude toward the history of science. On the one hand, they want their philosophical accounts of how science ought to be done to do justice to typical scientific practice; but on the other hand, they want to avoid any confusion of historical facts with philosophical norms. A fine example of such a schizophrenic attitude is the one expressed by Wesley Salmon who says: “If a philosopher expounds a theory of the logical structure of science according to which almost all of modern physical science is methologically unsound, it would be far more reasonable to conclude that the philosophical reasoning had gone astray than to suppose that modern science is logically misconceived.” (Salmon 1970, p. 73).

But after conceding so much, he takes it all back when he adds: “In spite of this the philosopher of science is properly concerned with issues of logical correctness which cannot finally be answered by appeal to the history of science….

One of the most interesting and influential views in Aristotle's work is his distinction between the practical life and the contemplative life. The division is based on two important claims. The first is a philosophical psychology which involves a hierarchy of human faculties, the highest of which is the intellect. The second is a distinction between two kinds of human doing. One sort of doing is essentially aimed at ends for the sake of which it is undertaken and the other is a doing pursued for its own sake, merely as an exercise of appropriate faculties, skills, or capacities. The hierarchy of faculties and division of human doings grounds Aristotle's view that the exercise of intellect, what he calls “contemplation”, is the highest form of human activity.

Schrödinger's argument about a “cat penned up in a steel chamber” is a timely challenge to those concerned with the philosophy of quantum theory; the argument prompts difficult decisions about correlated quantum mechanical systems, locality, reality and completeness. Here Schrödinger's own text is reproduced and, in view of the text, several plausible axioms and formal rules are chosen. Then, beginning with the axioms and using the rules, a contradiction is derived. This result establishes that Schrödinger's argument can be viewed as a paradox, a derivation of a contradiction from plausible assumptions. A final section of the paper refines the paradox and treats two possible resolutions as representative of a watershed issue in the foundations of quantum mechanics.

Comments concerning the method of formalization were provided when I applied the method to the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen argument (1978).

Almost everyone agrees that new technologies frequently have profound effects upon how we live as individuals, as groups, and as societies. As one author puts it: “One of the most persistent themes in the social sciences, history, and the humanities is the impact of technology and technological change on all aspects of social life.” (Merrill 1968, p. 576). Technology has come to be a central concern in much public debate on such issues as nuclear power, industrial and automobile pollution, transportation systems, energy, and military hardware.

Always bearing in mind Francis Bacon's claim that knowledge is power, we develop and employ technology for a variety of economic and social reasons. Moreover, technology is “people-embodied”, engineers being the principal agents of technological innovation and, thus, social change.

The purpose of this paper is to defend ‘quantum logic’ against a vigorous attack of J.H. McGrath (1978). The case is serious, as he allegedly discredits quantum propositional logic showing it unmotivated and useless. The object of his criticism is the procedure of “taking a well-known theory and distilling its logic” (Finkelstein 1969), or “reading off quantum logic from quantum mechanics” (McGrath 1978). This procedure is indeed the corner stone of the quantum logic philosophy, so if it were be “discredited in a most general way” and shown to be “fundamentally misconceived” (McGrath 1978) then the idea of quantum logic has broken down. I am going to show, on the contrary, that McGrath's account of the ‘reading off’ procedure is not sufficiently precise resulting in the failure of his ‘acrobatic’ counterexample.

The purpose of this contribution is to consider a model theoretic semantics of quantum logic. The quantum logic to which we refer here comprises the system of sequential quantum logic (Stachow 1980b). This system establishes the implication relation with respect to logically connected propositions and also with respect to the more general class of sequentially connected propositions of the language of quantum physics.

A dialogic semantics for logically connected sentences is developed in Stachow (1976, p. 203), where it is shown that a logical system, usually called the system of quantum logic, is complete and sound with respect to the dialogic semantics. The dialogic semantics is extended to sequentially connected sentences in Stachow (1980b) and to modal sentences in Mittelstaedt (1979, p. 479).

In comparison with other approaches to a language for science, the dialogic approach is developed from a pragmatic and methodological point of view (Stachow 1980a).

I begin this paper by surveying the kinds of questions that arise in the emerging field of Technology and Society Studies. This survey leads me to ask if the area of value theory is sufficiently well-developed to sustain intelligent and critical discussion of the value issues in this field. I note that philosophers have had little to say about the kinds of value questions that arise and, in the remainder of the paper, I argue that what little there is has often got off on the wrong foot — either because of assumptions that are wrong-headed or because the approach is question-begging for some of the central value issues.

While the field of Technology and Society Studies is as yet rather ill-defined, a perusal of the literature and the course descriptions suggests the categorization that follows.

The question is oversimple. We are more likely to find the right set of answers if we focus sharply a distinction which is invariably blurred by those who discuss the issue, especially those who argue that “temporal becoming” is a mind-dependent feature of reality. We must distinguish the “indexicality theme” from the “elapsive theme”. Failure to do so has bred some confusion, I think.

A bit of background first. Those who discuss the mind-dependence of temporal becoming think of that issue as analogous to the traditional one about the mind-dependence of secondary qualities. Do colors, felt hotness, and salty taste exist in the mind-independent world? Or only within experience? “Roses are red, just like some of our after-images.” “No they aren't. Roses only have a property of selectively reflecting light in the 7200 Å region. That makes them look red to us. But they aren't really red.” “You're both wrong.

In concluding their major survey, “Quantum Logics,” Greechie and Gudder (1975) listed four outstanding directions for future research, the last of which was, “Explain the meaning of the word ‘logic’ in the title of this paper.” Broadly speaking, there are two radically different points of view on this. There is the view that, taken strictly, ‘logic’ is a misnomer: quantum logic studies certain algebraic structures naturally arising from the formal, apparatus of quantum theory, structures which may afford insights into quantum physics, on a number of levels, but which do not in any way involve giving up or replacing classical logical laws. (Cf., e.g., Jauch (1968, p. 77).) In contrast, there is the view that the non-Boolean structures arising from the Hilbert space formalism should be taken as giving rise to a genuine non-classical logic, in conflict with classical logic, but appropriate to the description of quantum mechanical reality.

The problem of the direction of causation has received considerable press. Justifiably so, since it is a major bottleneck in accounts of causation and explanation. But there is another, not unrelated, yet unexamined, temporal issue for those same accounts. Numerous writers have uncritically assumed that there are instances of simultaneous causation. (A necessary condition for e and e', two causally related events, to be in a simultaneous causal relation is that there be no time-difference between e and e' or that e and e' occur at the same time.)

The assumption is not impotent. Alleged instances of simultaneous causation have been used to argue against various views of causation/explanation. For example, Richard Taylor (1966), Douglas Gasking (1955) and Baruch Brody (1972) have used such cases to critique regularity or nomic-subsumption accounts. Myles Brand (1979) in a very recent paper uses simultaneous causation to challenge Wesley Salmon's statistical relevance analysis (1970).

It has been argued, most notably by Putnam (1969, 1974) that socalled quantum logic (which we shall often refer to as. orthomodular logic (OML)) is the one true logic,-as has been shown by quantum mechanical experiments. Putnam also has strong universalist tendencies, which would require him to use the same logic in all domains of reasoning, including mathematics, and it has been urged, recently (as one horn of a dilemma) by Hellman (1981), that there might be some problems in working out the classical mathematics of the Hilbertspace foundations of.quantum mechanics in a quantum logic framework.

In this paper we show (given one natural framework)(§3) first that if the first-order Peano arithmetic is formulated with quantum logic that it has the same theorems as the classical first-order Peano arithmetic. Distribution (for first-order arithmetical formulas) is a theorem not of quantum logic but rather of arithmetic.

“How does a poem mean?” asked John Ciardi, noted poet and critic (1959, p. 663). Because he was convinced that “there will never be a complete system for understanding poetry,” Ciardi urged his Harvard and Rutgers students to discover “the total experience” of a poem and never to look merely for what it means (1959, p. 666).

Like a good poem, the total meaning of the concept of matter always eludes us. As Heisenberg put it: what we know is not nature itself, but “nature exposed to our method of questioning.” (Cited in Capra 1975, p. 126). For this reason, and because high-energy physics is in a state of rapid development, it would be presumptuous to attempt to say what matter or elementary particles are (See Woodruff 1963, p. 578). Moreover this “what” question is more properly a scientific one, about the correct referents of a specific theory of matter. “How does ‘matter’ mean?” or “how does ‘elementary particle’ mean?” is more properly a philosophical question.

Correlations between the behavior of pairs of particles are generated in the following experimental situation. An on-line source emits a stream of two-particle systems, where each system is in one and the same quantum state. After emission, the particles – call then (I) and (II) – move off in opposite directions. Each particle then encounters one of several possible barriers that either it passes or doesn't. A short distance behind each barrier is a detector set to register the presence of the particle, should it get that far. Finally, the detectors are connected by a timed relay and counter that registers a “coincidence count” should the two detectors fire within a set, brief time interval. When the experiment is run with various different barriers, detection rates accumulate for each barrier singly, and coincidence rates (the correlations) for the various pairs of barriers.

Few topics in the philosophy of science have received as much discussion as the topic of explanation. Yet as Hanna's (1979, pp. 291-316) survey of recent research on scientific explanation makes abundantly clear, the field is riddled with competing “paradigms”, “models”, and “formulas” with little sign of any consensus.

It is useful in this sort of situation to engage in metatheoretic ascent. What do we or ought we to expect of a theory of explanation? Unless some measure of agreement can be reached about that question, how can we expect agreement (or even rationally adjudicable disagreement) on the adequacy of particular candidate theories? The purpose of this paper is to sketch a meta-theoretic characterization of what: a theory of explanation ought to be like. The view I will put forth is surely not the only one, but it is a view which I believe to be implicit in the work of a number of influential writers on the subject, including Hempel (1965).

My contribution to this symposium is focused on the retreat from strong conditions of causality that have been forced upon us by quantum mechanics. My intent is to describe in more or less successive stages the retreat from the paradise of deteministic causation. This retreat has taken place through a thicket of quantum-nechanical details. It is ny intention to describe the general principles involved but to refer to the literature for proofs and full technical elaboration, even of matters that are crucial to the conceptual development.

The history of the efforts to prove or disprove the possibility of hidden variables begins at least with von Neumann and includes important work by Kochen and Specker and others, but much of the recent analysis has centered around Bell's inequality and related results. In spite of its importance and significance I shall ignore this earlier history and begin with these recent discussions.