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Is Temporality Mind-Dependent?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2022

Paul Fitzgerald
Paul Fitzgerald*
Affiliation:
Fordham University
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Extract

The question is oversimple. We are more likely to find the right set of answers if we focus sharply a distinction which is invariably blurred by those who discuss the issue, especially those who argue that “temporal becoming” is a mind-dependent feature of reality. We must distinguish the “indexicality theme” from the “elapsive theme”. Failure to do so has bred some confusion, I think.

A bit of background first. Those who discuss the mind-dependence of temporal becoming think of that issue as analogous to the traditional one about the mind-dependence of secondary qualities. Do colors, felt hotness, and salty taste exist in the mind-independent world? Or only within experience? “Roses are red, just like some of our after-images.” “No they aren't. Roses only have a property of selectively reflecting light in the 7200 Å region. That makes them look red to us. But they aren't really red.” “You're both wrong.

Type
Part X. Time, Causation and Matter
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1980 , Issue 1: Volume One: Contributed Papers 1980 , 1980 , pp. 282 - 291
Copyright
Copyright © 1980 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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