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In the Theoretician's Laboratory: Thought Experimenting as Mental Modeling

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 June 2023

Nancy J. Nersessian
Nancy J. Nersessian*
Affiliation:
Princeton University
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Extract

After a lang period of neglect there has been a recent wave of interest in thought experiments in science, in mathematics, and in philosophy (See, e.g., Horowitz & Massey, 1991). I will restrict my analysis to thought experiments as they function in science, although I believe the account has implications for thought experiments, generally. The two most influential views on the topic in philosophy and history of science in this century represent the extremes of empiricism and rationalism. Pierre Duhem dismissed all thought experiments as bogus precisely because they are “not only not realized but incapable of being realized” (Duhem 1914, p.202).

Type
Part IX. Thought Experiments: The Theoretician's Laboratory
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1992 , Issue 2: Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers 1992 , 1993 , pp. 291 - 301
Copyright
Copyright © 1993 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

1

I acknowledge and appreciate the support of NSF Scholars Awards DIR 8821422 and DIR 9111779 in conducting the research discussed here.

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