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From Vicious Circle to Infinite Regress, and Back Again

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 June 2023

Bas C. van Fraassen
Bas C. van Fraassen*
Affiliation:
Princeton University
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The demise of foundationalism in epistemology was complete by the time of the Second World War: knowledge and rational opinion do not rest on absolutely secure, self-authenticating foundations, neither in experience nor elsewhere. This realization came to philosophers in large measure at the hands of that same detested logical positivism so often been depicted as foundationalism's last gasp. (Cf. Reichenbach (1938), Ch. 3; in a larger historical perspective, the demise may possibly be dated much earlier.) I will not argue for this; I take the demise for granted. The task which lay, and still lies, before us is to find a way of life after foundationalism.

Type
Part I: Presidential Address
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1992 , Issue 2: Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers 1992 , 1993 , pp. 6 - 29
Copyright
Copyright © 1993 by the Philosophy of Science Association

Footnotes

1

I want to acknowledge many helpful discussions and correspondence relevant to this paper, especially with Richard Foley, Ronald Giere, Elizabeth Lloyd, Hilary Putnam, Eliot Sober, Ernest Sosa, Fred Suppe, and Nobuharu Tanji.

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