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Dynamic Deliberation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 June 2023

William L. Harper
William L. Harper*
Affiliation:
The University of Western Ontario
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Brian Skyrms' investigation of dynamic deliberation began when he contrasted dynamical deliberation based on evidential decision theory with dynamical deliberation based on causal decision theory (Skyrms 1982). According to Skyrms, counter intuitive features of deliberation dynamics based on evidential decision theory undercut attempts by Ellery Eells and Richard Jeffrey to use dynamical considerations to argue that evidential decision theory could be trusted to agree with the recommendations of causal decision theory in the examples that had been used to motivate causal decision theory.

Type
Part XI. The Dynamics of Rational Deliberation
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1992 , Issue 2: Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers 1992 , 1993 , pp. 352 - 364
Copyright
Copyright © 1993 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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