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Ayer and Russell on Naive Realism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2022

Michael Bradie*
Affiliation:
Bowling Green State University

Extract

In his book, Russell and Moore: The Analytic Heritage, A. J. Ayer takes issue with Russell's defense of scientific realism and his rejection of naive realism. ([1], pp. 126f.) Russell's position is succinctly stated in An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth ([3], p. 13) as follows:

Scientific scripture, in its most canonical form is embodied in physics ( including physiology). Physics assures us that the occurrences which we call ‘perceiving objects’ are at the end of a long causal chain which starts from the objects, and are not likely to resemble the objects except, at best, in certain very abstract ways. We all start from ‘naive realism, i. e. , the doctrine that things are what they seem. We think that grass is green, that stones are hard, and that snow is cold.

Type
Part V. Epistemological Foundations of Science
Copyright
Copyright © 1976 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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References

Ayer, A. J. Russell and Moore: The Analytic Heritage. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1972.Google Scholar
Ayer, A. J. The Origins of Pragmatism. San Francisco, California: Freeman, Cooper & Company, 1968.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Russell, B. An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth. Baltimore, Maryland: Penguin, 1962.Google Scholar