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Norway: Strong Parliament Facing New Challenges

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 January 2025

Hilmar Rommetvedt*
Affiliation:
NORCE Norwegian Research Centre, Norway
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Abstract

Type
Dynamics in Legislative–Executive Relations: Global Outline for 2019–2024
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This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution and reproduction, provided the original article is properly cited.
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2025. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of American Political Science Association

As Ishiyama (Reference Ishiyama, Khmelko, Stapenhurst and Mezey2020, 203) argued, analyses of the dynamics of legislative–executive relations should include both decline and revival of parliaments, and explanatory factors should comprise exogenous and endogenous as well as “distal” (long-term) and “proximate” (immediate) aspects. This article examines the Norwegian Parliament (i.e., the Storting)—one of “the strong parliaments of Scandinavia” (Damgaard Reference Damgaard, Copeland and Patterson1994) and ranked 23rd among 158 legislatures on the Fish and Kroenig (Reference Fish and Kroenig2009, 756) power index.

In the 1960s, Rokkan (Reference Rokkan and Dahl1966) found that the central arena in Norwegian politics was the corporatist bargaining table, where government representatives met with trade unionists, farmers, fishermen, and representatives of employers’ associations. Important decisions in economic policy rarely were made in the Storting. Elections and votes counted in the choice of governing personnel, but other resources decided when public policies were negotiated in the corporatist arena. For decades, most observers of Norwegian politics supported the “decline of legislature thesis.” However, from the late 1970s onward, the Storting became more active and influential vis-à-vis the executive (Rommetvedt Reference Rommetvedt2003, Reference Rommetvedt2023a). The corporatist apparatus, composed of numerous public boards, councils, and committees with interest-group representation, was gradually downscaled, and interest groups increasingly lobbied Parliament (Rommetvedt et al. Reference Rommetvedt, Thesen, Christiansen and Nørgaard2013). In 2014, in celebration of the 200th anniversary of the Norwegian Constitution and the Storting, historians and political scientists concluded that since the 150th anniversary, the Parliament had strengthened its position (Narud, Heidar, and Grønlie Reference Narud, Heidar and Grønlie2014).

The Norwegian political system is based on negative parliamentarism. There is no investiture vote in Parliament, but the government must resign in case of a vote of no confidence. Election periods are fixed for four years. From 1945 to 1961, five or six parties were represented in the Storting, but the Labor Party controlled the majority of seats. Consequently, Labor could form single-party majority governments. Since then, the number of parliamentary parties has increased, and the latest general election in 2021 ended with 10 parties in the Storting. Since the mid-1960s, most governments have been coalition and/or minority governments.

Minority coalition governments depend on complex negotiations, among the parties in government and with one or more opposition parties, to obtain the necessary support from a majority in Parliament. This could strengthen Parliament, but resources are needed to realize the potential. In the case of Norway, the political–administrative resources and working capacity of the Storting and the parliamentary party groups were modest, but they have increased markedly. The number of people employed by the parliamentary party secretariats increased from 23 in 1971 to 202 in 2020. In the same period, the Storting’s administration increased from 151 to 492 employees (Rommetvedt Reference Rommetvedt, Christiansen, Griglio and Lupo2023b, 529). This has paved the way for a much more active and influential Parliament.

After the general election in 2013, the Conservatives and Progress Party formed a minority coalition government headed by Conservative Erna Solberg and supported by the Christian Democrats and Liberals. The Solberg government continued in office after the general election in 2017. The Christian Democrats and Liberals had a standing invitation from the Prime Minister (PM) to join the government and, in January 2018, the Liberals accepted. The Christian Democrats were deeply divided; however, after a dramatic vote on “choice of direction” at the national convention, the party leader—who preferred collaboration with center-left parties—resigned. The new leadership decided to accept the PM’s invitation, and the Christian Democrats entered the center-right coalition in January 2019. Consequently, the coalition government parties gained control of the majority of seats in the Storting. However, the majority status was lost a year later when the Progress Party decided to leave due to disagreements with the coalition partners, particularly regarding immigration policy.

A few weeks later was the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic and, on March 12, 2020, the government launched strict regulations. The Storting “took on a more active role than usual by adopting extensive compensatory financial measures without discussion within the Ministries” (Norwegian Official Report 2023, 2). At first, the pandemic led Norwegians to “rally around the flag” and, for a while, the popularity of the PM’s Conservative Party increased. Nevertheless, in September 2021, the coalition parties lost the election. The Labor Party lost votes as well, but other center-left parties won. Labor leader Jonas Gahr Støre wanted to form a majority coalition together with the Centre and Socialist Left parties, but the Centre Party strongly opposed the inclusion of the Socialist Left. After tough negotiations, the Socialist Left withdrew. A new minority coalition government was formed by Labor and the Centre Party based, however, on parliamentary support of the Socialist Left.

The new government struggled with several problems, including a new wave of the coronavirus; Russia’s war against Ukraine; and increased prices for electricity, food, and petrol. This time, the various “crises” did not lead to rallying around the flag. The two government parties suffered great losses in the opinion polls (Rommetvedt Reference Rommetvedt2023c) and in the local election in September 2023. For the first time in 99 years, Labor lost its position as the largest political party in any election (local, regional, or national) in Norway.

For the first time in 99 years, Labor lost its position as the largest political party in any election (local, regional, or national) in Norway.

In recent years, many Norwegian MPs and government ministers have been involved in various types of scandals related to #MeToo, unjustified coverage of travel and housing expenses, and disqualification due to the appointment of friends or acquisition of stocks by ministers or their spouse. The latter scandal included Erna Solberg and her husband during her tenure as PM, and she was strongly criticized by the Storting’s Standing Committee on Scrutiny and Constitutional Affairs. A Christian Democrat leader, two deputy leaders of the Labor Party, and eight members of the Labor-Centre Party government have resigned or been dismissed. This included two ministers who had their master’s degree canceled due to plagiarism.

Recent surveys among Norwegian citizens show that based on a scale from 0 to 10, the average level of trust in Parliament has decreased from 6.4 in 2021 to 5.4 in 2023 and trust in government has decreased from 6.2 to 5.0 (Norwegian Agency for Public and Financial Management 2024). It remains to be seen whether the decline in political trust is the beginning of a long-term trend or a temporary setback. However, Norwegian political institutions are robust—ranked fifth in the world on V-Dem’s Liberal Democracy Index (Nord et al. Reference Nord, Lundstedt, Altman, Angiolillo, Borella, Fernandes, Gastaldi, God, Natsika and Lindberg2024, 59)—and earlier research indicated that the impact of scandals is short-lived. Voters primarily blame individual politicians and, to a lesser degree, their parties (Hammerstad Reference Hammerstad2024); however, this may have changed after a period with several scandals.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I thank Irina Khmelko and John Ishiyama for useful comments and suggestions.

CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

The author declares that there are no ethical issues or conflicts of interest in this research.

References

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