Legislative–Executive Relations in Israel: Constitutional Crisis 2023–2024

Israel has a weak parliament that is dominated by the executive branch (Cohen 2024; Tuttnauer and Hazan 2023). The judiciary is independent and strong, and it plays an important role in balancing the weak parliament and the strong executive branch (Roznai 2024; Zamir 2021). Between 2019 and 2024, Israel’s legislative–executive dynamics changed dramatically (Akirav 2024; Roznai 2024). Four factors led to this change: the indictment of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, overlapping crises, political polarization, and populist rhetoric. This Spotlight article focuses on how Netanyahu’s indictments changed the legislative–executive relationship, specifically after October 7, 2023.

The Indictments Against Prime Minister Netanyahu

In February 2019, for the first time in the history of Israel, the attorney general announced the filing of an indictment for crimes of bribery, fraud, and breach of trust against an incumbent prime minister. Because Netanyahu was unable to form a government after the April 2019 election, he convinced his coalition partners to vote to dissolve the 21st Knesset and hold new elections. This also occurred after the election of September 2019. The main issue that dominated the second election was whether it was appropriate for a candidate for the prime minister position to be facing indictments. The third election in March 2020 resulted in the establishment of an emergency government due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The fourth election took place in March 2021, resulting in Netanyahu spending a year as the leader of the opposition, a role he strongly disliked. After the 2022 election, Netanyahu formed the most extreme government in Israel’s history, including parties from the right wing, the extreme right wing, and the ultra-Orthodox. The coalition agreement of this government included numerous policy-specific procedural rules that enabled these previously marginalized parties to fulfill their extremist goals in Israeli politics. The government’s majority rule (i.e., 64 of 120 seats) transformed into the tyranny of the majority, leading to further oppression of the weaker Knesset and enabling the ultra-Orthodox party and other extreme right-wing parties to push forward their extremist agenda.

In February 2023, a group of coalition Israeli legislators proposed a private bill to amend the “Basic Law: Government Regarding the Prime Minister’s Inability to Fulfill His Position.” To amend the Basic Laws, a simple majority is required for seven and an absolute majority for six of the laws. Thus, it is relatively easy for any given government to change the Basic Laws for its own reasons. The number of amendments that Israel made in the Basic Laws is higher compared to other Western democracies. ¹ The content of the amendments is an additional indicator of the weakness of the Israeli parliament and the ability of the government to set its agenda regarding significant changes in checks and balances. For example, in 2014, the government amended “Basic Law: Government (Vote of No-Confidence)” from semi-constructive to become fully constructive. Scholars indicated that a full constructive vote of no-confidence is rare in democracies, and it constrains the power of the opposition to oversee the government (Tuttnauer and Hazan 2023).

To accelerate the process of amending the “Basic Law: Government Regarding the Prime Minister’s Inability to Fulfill His Position,” a special committee was established—it was the second special committee since the establishment of Israel and both by the same government. This committee held only eight meetings, and the amendment passed on the third hearing—less than a month since it had been tabled. The executive branch prevented a proper legislative process for amending a Basic Law and avoided deep and professional committee discussions. The coalition’s majority in the committee guaranteed its passage. The passage of the amendment dramatically changed legislative–executive relations. In its current form, it is almost impossible to declare that the prime minister is unable to fulfill his position.

In January 2024, the Supreme Court determined that the amendment to “Basic Law: Government Regarding the Prime Minister’s Inability to Fulfill His Position” would be in effect only starting in the next Knesset term because it targeted a particular individual, which constituted an abuse of the Knesset’s authority. The weak parliament was unable to stop the dominant executive branch from promoting a fundamental change in this Basic Law. The independent Supreme Court did.

Netanyahu’s innocence is one factor that explains the observed dynamics of the parliament losing power to the executive branch. The five consecutive elections between 2019 and 2022 concerned Netanyahu’s argument that he was innocent (Navot and Goldshmidt 2022; Oren and Waxman 2022). Scholars have indicated that the criminal proceedings against Netanyahu led to an overlap of his personal interest in escaping the law and the aspiration of the parties that compose the right-wing religious bloc to rein in the courts (Akirav 2024; Navot and Goldshmidt 2022).

After the Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, Netanyahu and his coalition partners prioritized remaining in power. In doing so, they changed the legislative–executive dynamic. The most visible evidence of this is the shift in fund allocation to prioritize the coalition’s interests and the exclusion of ultra-Orthodox men from military draft. During wartime, a country has two critical requirements: funding for the military and soldiers. The following sections examine how the ultra-Orthodox party neglected the necessity for funding and soldiers and instead prioritized the interests of its ultra-Orthodox voters.

Coalition Funds

On October 15, 2023, the Ministry of Finance CEO wrote: “The allocation of budgets that have not yet been allocated and are not related to supporting the fighting, the affected civilian population, or the provision of essential services of the economy must be frozen.” ²

At the beginning of November 2023, Minister of Finance Bezalel Smotrich (i.e., leader of the National Religious Party) refused to freeze the coalition funds. The finance committee’s chair, Moshe Gafni (i.e., leader of the Haredi party United Torah Judaism) led a vote to approve the use of the coalition funds for the ultra-Orthodox. The coalition’s majority in the committee guaranteed its passage. The government also needed to adjust the 2024 budget. The finance minister broke the law by presenting the bill 16 days later than the Basic Law allowed. He did so to ensure that he would be able to transfer the ultra-Orthodox parties’ coalition funds to the yeshivas (i.e., traditional Jewish educational institutions). ³

Opposition legislators and non-governmental organizations filed a petition with the Supreme Court regarding the 2024 budget. Following allegations of a lack of transparency in the war budget, the Supreme Court judges gave the government three weeks to explain the level of detail required in the budget proposal. To convince the ultra-Orthodox legislators to vote in favor of the 2024 budget, the government approved a proposal to exclude yeshiva budgets from the mandatory reductions in the 2024 budget that applied to all government ministries to raise funds to finance the war. The budget for the yeshiva institutions remained the same as the year before October 2023. Thus, the ultra-Orthodox legislators voted in favor of the 2024 budget, and Netanyahu managed to remove the threat to the stability of his government. These debates in the finance committee demonstrate how the executive branch did not deliberate or compromise during and after hearing the opposition legislators or professional advisors. Netanyahu and his coalition’s partners put their personal needs before those of Israeli society in wartime, and the Supreme Court played a minor role in this event.

Opposition to the Drafting of Young Ultra-Orthodox Men into the Army

In 2017, the Supreme Court invalidated the two laws that exempted yeshiva students from military service. Instead of passing a law requiring equal military service, the government ordered the Israeli Defense Forces to not draft yeshiva students until March 31, 2024, bypassing the parliament. On March 26, 2024, the Supreme Court discussed petitions claiming that the government’s decision was illegal. Two days later, the Supreme Court issued an interim order prohibiting the transfer of funds to those yeshivas whose students had refused the draft. Once the parliament was excluded from the process, the independent Supreme Court balanced the dominant power of the executive branch over the weak parliament.

Conclusion

Since his indictments in 2019, Netanyahu—with his proxies (i.e., legislators)—worked hard to change the executive–legislative relations in Israel to increase the powers of the executive branch at the expense of the legislative branch. Netanyahu’s most recent government did not allow the parliament to hold professional discussions regarding essential issues, including the budget during wartime and the drafting of yeshiva students. In some cases, the Supreme Court managed to balance the dominant power of the executive branch over the weak parliament and did not in other cases. The analysis of the dynamics of the legislative–executive relations in Israel shows that the power shifted toward the executive branch during the past five years. The Supreme Court appears to be the only institution that currently can limit the power of the executive branch to any significant degree.

Since his indictments in 2019, Netanyahu—with his proxies (i.e., legislators)—worked hard to change the executive–legislative relations in Israel to increase the powers of the executive branch at the expense of the legislative branch.