The term, Artificial Intelligence (AI), has changed since it was first coined by John MacCarthy in 1956. AI, believed to have been created with Kurt Gödel's unprovable computational statements in 1931, is now called deep learning or machine learning. AI is defined as a computer machine with the ability to make predictions about the future and solve complex tasks, using algorithms. The AI algorithms are enhanced and become effective with big data capturing the present and the past while still necessarily reflecting human biases into models and equations. AI is also capable of making choices like humans, mirroring human reasoning. AI can help robots to efficiently repeat the same labor intensive procedures in factories and can analyze historic and present data efficiently through deep learning, natural language processing, and anomaly detection. Thus, AI covers a spectrum of augmented intelligence relating to prediction, autonomous intelligence relating to decision making, automated intelligence for labor robots, and assisted intelligence for data analysis.

The rules international organizations (IOs) make deviate considerably from the traditional sources of international law in Article 38 of the International Court of Justice's (ICJ) Statute and the ways those are understood: as generated, enforced, and interpreted by states based on their consent. As this panel demonstrates, IO “rules” take various forms—e.g., guidelines, recommendations, and standards—and are promulgated by not only traditional interstate organizations but public/private hybrids, transnational networks involving agencies inside states, private associations of industry or other experts, or subsidiary committees of the parties (COPs) or meetings of the parties (MOPs). These rules enjoy varying degrees of authoritativeness, often purport to have some impact on state and non-state actors, and depart, sometimes quite openly, from reliance on state consent. And even when IOs turn to the traditional sources—treaties, custom, general principles—these take untraditional forms that blur distinctions between binding and non-binding law. Whether these governance efforts are described as systems of “global administrative law,” “global constitutionalism,” or “transnational legal orders” or as new forms of “international public law,” they are certainly different from your grandmother's public international law. Like “soft” law before it, these governance efforts have drawn the ire of legal positivists who ask, with some justice, what is meant by “law” if everyone (public, private, and in-between) is a potential “lawmaker” and no one can be certain about whether their efforts entail legal responsibility and, if so, for whom.

In this presentation, I would like to focus on the latest developments concerning remedies established by the Inter-American Human Rights System (IAHRS), and offer some suggestions to reform both the content of reparations as well as the Inter-American Court's process for supervising reparations.

Good afternoon. I am Monica Hakimi. I am from the University of Michigan Law School, and it is my pleasure to moderate this panel on the recent invasion in Ukraine. The invasion has caused me, as I suspect it has caused many of you, a great deal of horror, sadness, and fear. We hope to spend the hour today interrogating the question of what the invasion means for jus ad bellum, in particular, and for the international legal order more generally.