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Remarks By Amelia Porges

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2017

Amelia Porges
Amelia Porges*
Affiliation:
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative; Adjunct Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. Ms. Porges spoke in her personal capacity, and her remarks do not necessarily reflect the views of the USTR or U.S. Government
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Abstract

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Type
The Role of the Nonmarket Economies in the New Round of Trade Negotiations
Information
Proceedings of the ASIL Annual Meeting , Volume 81 , 1987 , pp. 230 - 235
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of International Law 1987

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References

1 As a result of political controversy in the United States concerning religious freedom in Romania, the U.S.-Romania trade agreement and MFN treatment for Romanian goods were terminated in mid-1988 at Romania’s request.

2 The omnibus trade legislation eventually enacted in August 1988, H.R. 4848, contains four provisions directly bearing on trade with China or other nonmarket economies. (1) Section 1411 amends section 406 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2436) to clarify terms and criteria for decision on whether market disruption exists. (2) Section 1316 amends antidumping provisions for NME goods in section 773(c) of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1677b(c)) to simplify investigation methodology. (3) Section 1336(a) requires a one-year Commerce Department study on the new market orientation of China, Chinese price structures, and U.S. trade law. (4) Section 1106 requires that when any major state trading regime accedes to the GATT, the President must reserve the right to withhold application of the GATT bilaterally and may not apply the GATT bilaterally until either (a) the country in question enters into a bilateral agreement that its state trading enterprises will trade in accordance with commercial considerations (and accord U.S. enterprises adequate commercial opportunities), or (b) a bill approving bilateral application of GATT is enacted into law (using “fast-track” approval procedures).

3 Neither article XXXV nor article II would prohibit holding tariff negotiations at a point after the accession process, however, as the United States did with Hungary.

4 It is worth noting that treating China’s advent as a new accession has positive aspects for China as well. Strictly speaking, resuming the old China seat would require that China renegotiate the former Republic of China schedule of tariff concessions up to the current PRC rates ( and compensate for increases in bound rates). There would also be the matter of liability for back dues, and the need for express adoption of amendments to the GATT during the interim period. Last but not least in importance is the possibility that China itself may wish to invoke article XXXV against one or more contracting parties—an option that would be cut off by a pure resumption scenario. But technical details aside, it appears that the resumptionversus-accession question is primarily a political issue for China, in which resumption symbolizes the ability to enter the GATT without negotiating special terms for doing so.

5 Office of U.S. Trade Representative, National Trade Estimate: Report on Foreign Trade Barriers (October 30, 1986).