The cultural prerequisites of democracy have been receiving considerable attention over the past decades. Confucian values are regarded as incompatible with liberal democracy and are considered to impede democratization. This article explores the effect of Confucian values on the commitment of ordinary Chinese people to democracy. Support for democracy is divided into attachment to democracy and adherence to liberal democratic values. Attachment to democracy indicates explicit support for democracy, while adherence to liberal democratic values reflects implicit support for democracy. This study examines the impacts of Confucian values on each of these areas. The results show that there was no evidence that Confucian values inhibit the Chinese public's support for democracy in a democratic transition, but they are negatively connected to liberal democratic values, which are fundamental to the resilience and consolidation of a fledgling democracy. However, liberal democratic values are prone to increase with the generational shift.

Conservative Christian groups in Britain have been involved in a number of high profile and controversial policy issues. Scholarly research into the political activities of such groups, however, remains limited. This article addresses this lacuna by exploring the collective action frames deployed by conservative Christian groups in their attempts to influence national level policies and debates. Drawing on elite interviews with group representatives, it argues that these frames have been constructed largely in response to the pressures of secularization, but have, in many respects, become secularized themselves.

This article illuminates the relationship between level of religious restriction and the onset of religious civil war in the context of autocracy. That is, we investigate how autocrats' religious restriction accounts for religious civil war. We hypothesize that in autocracies, moderate religious restriction is likely to engender religious civil war (Hypothesis 1), policy change from religious laissez-faire to moderate restriction raises the probability of religious civil war (Hypothesis 2), and the transition from tight restriction to moderate restriction is likely to trigger religious civil war (Hypothesis 3). To test our hypotheses, we conduct statistical analyses as well as case studies. The results confirm Hypotheses 1 and 2, but not Hypothesis 3. This suggests that (1) within autocracies, different levels of religious restriction exert different effects on religious civil war and (2) moderate religious restriction is dangerous enough to spark religious civil war and religious laissez-faire helps to generate religious peace.

What role does religion play in preventing civil war from recurring? Politicians have proposed that when warring groups share the same religion, achieving a durable peace will be easier. We test this hypothesis empirically using a large-n sample of all ethnic civil wars that began and ended between 1950 and 2006, and a measure of co-religiosity between the ethnic group in power and the main opposition group. The analysis shows that there is no positive relationship between co-religiosity and the duration of post-civil war peace, showing that sharing the same religion may not help to bring about peace following an ethnic civil war. To the contrary, the closer religious ties, the less likely it is that peace will last after the end of the conflict, and the higher the risk that conflict will recur.

The central claim of this article is that the multi-dimensional changes in the modern family structure may be explained as a manifestation of the simultaneous processes of secularization and religionization. On the one hand, the rising acceptance of secular alternatives to the traditional family structure indicates that modernization processes weaken religious behavior and authority, as the classical secularization thesis has claimed. On the other hand, ongoing loyalty to the religious family patterns, and even their relative intensification, reflect the opposite trend. Serving as a case study, the changes in the Israeli religious family structure — reflected by civil marriage, cohabitation, and out-of-wedlock children — clearly illustrate how modernization generates horizontal and vertical fragmental processes in which religion and secularism supplement as well as compete with each other, creating an increasingly divided society in which religiosity and secularism flourish side by side among various groups and within distinct realms.

Research has documented that religious minorities often face the brunt of religious discrimination. Yet formal tests, using global collections, have been lacking. Building on the religious economy theory and recent work in law and politics, we propose that minority religions face discrimination from the state because they represent unwanted competition for the state supported religion, are viewed as a threat to the state and larger culture, and lack support from an independent judiciary. Drawing on the recently collected Religion and State-Minorities collection on more than 500 minority religions, we find support for each of the propositions, though the level of support varies based on the targets of state discrimination. In general, the support is strongest when explaining discrimination against minority religion's institutions and clergy, but weakens when explaining more general discrimination against the membership.

Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, United States Muslims have been increasingly targeted as “others,” accused of holding dual-loyalties, and seen as potentially subversive. Nevertheless, Muslim American interest groups have not recoiled from foreign policy engagement. I argue that this is because mobilizing around symbolic foreign policy issues provides them with an opportunity to access the policy dialogue as a minority group making rights claims. To illustrate this argument, I conduct a discourse analysis of Muslim American policy engagement toward the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. I rely on primary documents produced by the Council on American Islamic Relations and the Muslim Public Affairs Council, the two leading United States Muslims organizations, as well as interviews conducted with institutional elites. I find that, through their policy advocacy, these organizations are framing their demands around United States interests and minority group rights, while positioning themselves as the legitimate representatives of the Muslim American community.

The relationship between religion and immigrant political participation has not been rigorously investigated in the literature set in Australia. In this study, I test whether religious attendance influences electoral and non-electoral participation among immigrants. Drawing on data from the 2013 Australian Election Study, I demonstrate that the impact of religious attendance on political participation may be overstated. I find that religious attendance is not significantly related to electoral and non-electoral participation among immigrants in Australia. This result may relate to three factors: the ability of religious attendance to affect immigrants’ key political resources; competition between religious and secular organizations; and the political salience of particular religious denominations within the Australian context. This study does not provide the much sought-after empirical confirmation to associational theories of political participation, but instead sounds a note of caution about the universal applicability of such theories.