Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-l7hp2 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-01T00:59:53.735Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Nonuniqueness of the Equilibrium in Lewis and Schultz's Model

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 January 2017

Jinhee Jo
Jinhee Jo*
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627. e-mail: [email protected]
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Lewis and Schultz (2003) develop a statistical signaling model to deal with international conflicts or bargaining situations in which states have private information about their payoffs. They claim that they can confirm that there always exists a unique equilibrium in their model. In this paper, I show that Lewis and Schultz's claim is not true and their model admits multiple equilibria under some parameter settings. Monte Carlo analysis shows that when there are multiple equilibria, the parameter estimates may not converge to their true values even if the number of observations increases.

Type
Research Article
Information
Political Analysis , Volume 19 , Issue 3 , Summer 2011 , pp. 351 - 362
Copyright
Copyright © The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Political Methodology 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Brent, Richard. 1973. Algorithms for minimization without derivatives. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall.Google Scholar
Fearon, James D. 1995. Rationalist explanations for war. International Organization 49: 379–414.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Goemans, Hein E. 2000. War and punishment: The causes of war termination and the First World War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Jo, Jinhee. 2011. Replication Data for: Non-uniqueness of the Equilibrium in Lewis and Schultz's Model. http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/15905 (IQSS Dataverse Network [Distributor] V1[Version]).Google Scholar
Lewis, Jeffrey B., and Schultz, Kenneth A. 2003. Revealing preferences: Empirical estimation of a crisis bargaining game with incomplete information. Political Analysis 11: 345–67.Google Scholar
Powell, Robert. 2004. Bargaining and learning while fighting. American Journal of Political Science 48: 344–61.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Signorino, Curtis S. 1999. Strategic interaction and the statistical analysis of international conflict. American Political Science Review 93: 279–98.Google Scholar
Signorino, Curtis S. 2003. Structure and uncertainty in discrete choice models. Political Analysis 11: 316–44.Google Scholar
Smith, Alastair. 1999. Testing theories of strategic choice: The example of crisis escalation. American Journal of Political Science 43: 1254–83.Google Scholar