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Adam, Eve, and The Fall in Paradise Lost

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 December 2020

Fredson Bowers
Fredson Bowers*
Affiliation:
University of Virginia, Charlottesville
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Abstract

The justification in Paradise Lost of the ways of God to men depends as much on Milton's dramatic and psychological motivation of the Fall as on its theological structure. The designed contrasts between Adam's and Eve's reactions on first awakening to life absolve Eve of the usual charge of vanity by establishing her as a feeling in relation to Adam as a ratiocinating being. Under the influence of Satan's venom Eve fails in love to Adam and then to God. But in Milton's view Adam is the faultier of the two because of his conscious failure to assert the absolute authority of his reason over her misguided feelings. Milton formally depends upon Paul's statement that Adam fell undeceived, but in his psychological motivation of the three key episodes of the Fall he differs from the usual interpretation of the Church Fathers that Paul meant only that Satan had not deceived Adam directly as he had deceived Eve. Milton thus reconciles the apparent paradox that Adam was not deceived but instead foolishly overcome by female charm. The scene in which he weakly yields permission is a direct foreshadowing of his acceptance of the apple since both contain the same false rationalization of his unwillingness to accept the responsibilities of his superior wisdom and its proper exercise in command.

Type
Research Article
Information
PMLA , Volume 84 , Issue 2 , March 1969 , pp. 264 - 273
Copyright
Copyright © Modern Language Association of America, 1969

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References

1 The syntax is not clear here and, as often, a double meaning may be present. That is, “so unapprov'd” may modify “may come and go” and thus mean “that evil went, after its coming, is evidence that it was not approved,” in which case “so” means “thus” or “since”; or it may have the more conventionally assigned meaning, “so long as it is not approved, evil in its coming and going will leave no spot.” This last, however, conflicts with Adam's later statement that he did not know he was mutable.

2 It is true that Adam may take too optimistic a view when he comforts her with the hope “That what in sleep thou didst abhor to dream, / Waking thou never wilt consent to do” (v.120-121). Eve calls her dreams, “of offence and trouble, which my mind / Knew never till this irksom night” (v.34-35). And when she saw the angel pluck and eat the fruit, “mee damp horror chil'd / At such bold words voucht with a deed so bold” (v.56-57). And finally, “O how glad I wak'd / To find this but a dreaml” (v.92-93). On the other hand, after her damp horror she herself had eaten and flown into the air, and so did not abhor all of the dream until later.

3 This statement does not go contrary to Adam's belief that evil cannot harbor in her pure creation, since there he was treating only the origin of evil. His second axiom, that evil may pass through the unapproving mind without tainting it, is alone applicable. Milton's point must be that at the time of the morning prayer the dream is cleansed but the poisoned spirits in Eve's blood have not yet begun their working. When at some indeterminate time during the day or the following night evil does come into her mind, she does not originate it since it derives from the infection Satan placed in her bloodstream. This second time she approves the evil, which now repeats the dream. This is no quibbling, for in the distinction there is indeed a difference. That is, Eve is surely made the less culpable for not being corrupted by the dream itself. We should have heard no more of it if the infection of her spirits, independently, had not worked on the memory of the dream and thereby turned her disapproval to approval through its appeal to her pride. The dream, then, both is and is not the motivation that leads us to accept the alteration in Eve that leads to the Fall. It is not, because by itself it would have had no efficacy. It is, because it was the matter on which, subsequently, her infected spirits worked to change her thoughts to approval.

4 This is a point that is commonly confused. Adam was set in Paradise with certain duties, among which was the responsibility for governing Eve. His responsibility for her care cannot be abrogated by his releasing her from the duty to obey, since his hierarchical position gives him no right to make such a release. After the Fall, when he is trying to place all the blame on her, he alleges that he had fulfilled his duty by warning her, and “beyond this had bin force, And force upon free Will hath here no place” (ix.1173-74). This self-justifying statement, which is false, has served to confuse the critics. Whether or not Adam ultimately should have used force to restrain his wilful wife is not actually in question and indeed need not be discussed since the issue proves to be a red herring. The fact is that Adam fails to use the last weapon in his power before the question of force could properly arise. That is, in his effeminate subjection, when his reasonable arguments do not persuade Eve to remain by his side, he voluntarily relinquishes the intermediate step between argumentation and force, which is the command to her to refrain from seeking Satan. He cannot truly defend this failure to assert his right of command by alleging its interference with Eve's free will, for a command left the hearer with free will whether to obey or to disregard. I am indebted to Anthony Low in PQ, xlvii (1968), 30–38, for noting that Milton took up this question in Samson Agonistes, 11. 1369–76, where Samson discusses with the Chorus the ethics of his obeying the Philistine command to attend the festivities at the temple. The point is there made that outward force has not yet been applied and that the commands of the Philistine lords are no forceful constraints; thus if Samson obeys the commands he would do so by his free will knowing that God may be offended. It would seem legitimate to conclude, in the light of this passage, that if Adam had followed his adjuration to Eve to demonstrate her constancy by her obedience with a command to remain by him, instead of weakly continuing, “But if thou think, trial unsought . . .” with its transfer of responsibility and thereby its tacit permission for her to go, she would have been in a very difficult position. Indeed, we have no evidence to suggest that faced with an absolute command she might not have exercised her free will to obey 272 rather than to disobey it. It is Adam's unwillingness to issue the command, a responsibility with which he is charged, that allows the Fall to progress. This is his crucial failure, and it is as important as Eve's. We do not know, of course, whether he truly believed that a command would negate the principle of free will as if it had been the equivalent of physical force, as he alleges in his recriminatory speech at ix.1173-74, or whether he did not dare to issue such a command for fear of mortally offending his beautiful wife. The fact is, the gap between his clear statement about constancy and obedience and the immediately following weak capitulation seems abrupt and even unmotivated precisely because the required step of command has been skipped. We should believe that Milton planned this effect and indicated to the reader what should have been the course of Adam's action by the very abruptness without transition from objection to permissiveness.