The foundation a year or two ago of the British Institute of Philosophical Studies is an event of real importance in the intellectual life of our country. It is an indication of the widespread interest in ultimate problems which now exists, certainly wider than at any previous time; and it is a means of diffusing that interest more widely still. No doubt there is an almost universal tendency to distrust philosophical “systems” or ready-made interpretations of the universe; but there is a deep and wide concern about the problems with which philosophy is concerned, even if there is little expectation of satisfactory solutions. This state of affairs calls for special attention from those who are convinced of the supreme value of Religion for the guidance of life and the interpretation of the universe.

The life of man in society provides the subject-matter for many different sciences. It is analysed usually by reference to the kind of relation which connects men; and so, if men buy or sell one from the other, economics gives an account of the factors in such a relation; if a policeman directs traffic and the citizen obeys, political science explains government. But clearly no one of these relations between men is altogether independent of the others. Social life is the whole complex of human relations, and there is no man at all who is not thoroughly social. The fundamental fact of mental life life is not the atomic but the related individual. No mind exists which is not in contact with other minds; and there is no mind whose fundamental characteristics are not social.

The object of this article is not to criticize Professor Watson's psychology, still less his physiology; neither do I wish to attempt a fundamental metaphysical criticism, such as that contained in Professor Lloyd Morgan's article in the April number of the Journal, but it appears to me that a purely logical criticism, admitting Professor Watson's facts and observations, and assuming his mechanistic point of view, may be a useful preliminary to such wider and more fundamental inquiry.

“ The doubtful story of successive events.” With this contemptuous phrase1 Bernard Bosanquet brushed aside the claim of history to be considered a study deserving the attention of a thoughtful mind. Unsatisfactory in form, because never rising above uncertainty; unsatisfactory in matter, because always concerned with the transitory, the successive, the merely particular as opposed to the universal; a chronicle of small beer, and an untrustworthy chronicle at that. Yet Bosanquet was well read in history; he had taught it as a young man at Oxford, and his first published work had been a translation of a recent German book on the Athenian constitution; he knew that a vast amount of the world's best genius in the last hundred years had been devoted to historical studies; and when, late in life, he asked himself what it came to, that was all he could say.

It is probably true to say that the majority of philosophers have considered the universe to be mental. If the universe is really mental, it follows that matter cannot be quite real, and many philosophers have in fact brought forward cogent reasons for regarding matter as in some sense illusory. Those who hold this view are called Idealists. Idealism has historically assumed a number of different forms, between some of which there is little in common, but all forms of Idealism agree in maintaining that objects, such as chairs and tables, of which common sense believes the external world to exist, are not material.

That philosophy has an important effect upon life I am convinced. This effect is, however, not a direct one, nor is it one which it is easy to describe.

Among the studies on the history of philosophy recently published in Italy, one that may be of some interest to the English reader is by DR. Abbagnano, a young pupil of Aliotta, and is devoted to the new English idealism.1 Truthfully speaking, the term ‘ new ’ is inappropriate, or partly so, because Abbagnano dedicates the greater part of his study to what we might call the ‘ old ’ idealism in England, represented by Stirling, the two Cairds, Wallace, Green, and Bradley. However, he does also pass in review the more recent doctrines, particularly those of J. H. Muirhead, G. H. Howison, D. G. Richtie, J. E. Creighton, J. B. Baillie, J. S. Mackenzie, H. Jones, W. E. Hocking, A. S. Pringle Pattison, and G. P. Adams. Abbagnano regards as a distinctive trait of English idealism inspired by Hegel as opposed to Hegel himself, this, that “for Hegel the absolute is essentially process, change and becoming; it is thought which differentiates itself and becomes articulate in a life of its own, in the threefold rhythm of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, in which each moment passes into the next. For Green, Bradley, and Royce, the absolute is on the other hand immutability, completeness, static perfection, in which each process and becoming is overcome and resolved.” At any rate, Abbagnano is equally unsympathetic towards Hegel and towards his followers, against whom he opposes, not without scholastic ingenuity, his own irrationalistic views, set out in another book whose contents are sufficiently expressed in the title.1

Probably no psychologist is really satisfied at heart with the present position as regards the psychology of Meaning. A similar situation existed not so very long ago—and in a measure still exists—with respect to the psychology of the emotions. But the difficulties with regard to Meaning are even more formidable than those with regard to Emotion. In both cases the difficulties are of the most fundamental character, and may be said to involve the very foundations of the science itself. In both cases also the difficulties are to some extent of the same kind, and have their origin in analogous conditions.

Some new information has recently come to light with regard to philosophy in Russia. It appears that it is next to impossible for anyone living there to study the subject or indeed to form an adequate conception of it. There is not a single teacher of philosophy or logic in any of the Universities ; a course of the history of philosophy is only read in theethnological department of the Moscow University. It is proposed, however, to introduce the teaching of logic and of the history of philosophy in certain towns “ when a sufficient number of teachers are available,” and with this purpose a department of philosophy at the ‘ Institute of red professorship ’ has been opened. But the qualifications required of the future professors of philosophy make one more than doubtful of their capacity to teach the subject. All that is required of them is that they should have read the first volume of Lange's History of Materialism, Hoffding's History of Modern Philosophy, Gomperz's Greek Thinkers up to Socrates (only the early part of Gomperz's work has been translated into Russian, and the knowledge of foreign languages is not required from the candidates), Wundt's Introduction to Philosophy, and the writings of various philosophizing Marxists. In addition to these academic qualifications they must have a recommendation from the communist party or some similar organization. The kind of ideas that are being instilled into these prospective teachers may be gathered from the writings of the accredited ‘ red ’ philosophers in the only philosophical periodical which is being published in Russia, Under the Banner of Marxism, and in other magazines.

At first sight it may seem as if Imagination can easily be characterized as a continuous process of having images; but this is very soon found to be inadequate and misleading. On the one hand we have a great number of good witnesses who insist that in their best imaginative work they have made use of no images, or of very few; and on the other, everybody makes distinction between flights of fancy, for example, which certainly involve successions of images, and true imagination. Perhaps a better method of approach is found when we examine how the material dealt with in the imaginative process is built together. In the flight of fancy image follows image, and the transition from one to the next seems to be determined by something in the nature of each individual step of the whole chain, or by each individual act of imaging. Thus the train as a whole is very apt, to the outsider, to appear jerky, ill-connected,

Summary: In Germany several important books have recently been published, and several interesting conferences have been held. Among the publications which are here surveyed are Personal Presentations of Contemporary Philosophy, by a group of prominent philosophers; Contemporary German Philosophy of Value, by AugustMesser; On the Battlefield of Logic, by JosephGeyser; together with numbers of two periodicals—Annals of Philosophy and International Philosophical News.