A study of moral values is a study of the values relevant to character and conduct. Since conduct consists of actions (including refusals to act) and character is exhibited in and inferred from actions, the phrase “values relevant to actions” would perhaps suffice. The term “values” needs little amplification. But it is necessary to observe that there are on the face of it two sets of values relevant to actions, namely (1) those which actions themselves possess, so that we differentiate them as good and bad actions—a differentiation which may be made by a spectator in regard to a process in which he himself takes no part; (2) those asserted implicitly by an agent in his action considered as an interference with the course of events. In the most obvious and typical cases this second set of values attach themselves, not to actions, but to the environment of action as modifiable by it; in particular, to states or events which action may help to maintain or bring about. Thus the act of tidying a room implies a preference under the given circumstances for a tidy rather than an untidy room.

Simplicius, writing in the sixth century, distinguishes physical science from astronomy on the ground that, whereas it is the function of the physicist to “inquire into the nature of the heavens and the stars, into their potentialities, their quality, their becoming and passing away,” astronomy has no competence in questions of this primary character. Its function is “to determine the order of the heavenly bodies, their figures, magnitudes, distances from the earth, sun and moon, their eclipses, conjunctions, the quantitative and qualitative properties of their motions,” etc. For this purpose it requires arithmetic and geometry, but cares not how the heavenly motions be described, whether in terms of excentrics or epicycles, so long as the appearances can thus be accounted for.

I was led to philosophy by politics. There can be no foundation for political action except in ethics; and there can be no foundation for ethics except in some form of metaphysics, whether religious or other. And one cannot travel very far along the philosophic road— particularly if one has in mind the need of arriving at some definite destination—without finding as an obstacle the perennial problem of Free Will. It is an obstacle which has somehow to be crossed. It cannot be evaded or ignored. The man who is dealing with public affairs—with the principles of Criminal Law, for example, or with the factors that make for peace or war, and indeed with any of the major questions that confront our society—if he tries to think things out, is faced constantly by the problem of individual human responsibility; just as the man of religion is faced by it constantly.

Even the best of artists are human, and therefore capable of turning out bad work. The father of poets has set his children the example of nodding, and small blame to his children if in this, as in other matters, they have followed where Homer led. Critics, that hardy and self-sacrificing race of beings who voluntarily incur the enmity of artists for the sake of the common welfare, have to classify the various manners and causes of nodding in poets. I do not claim to be a critic, but I want to call your attention to a particular kind of nodding which presents a curious problem in the theory of art. I will call it the nod of the uncongenial subject.

Nothing is more surprising to the ordinary reflective man than the concept of a finite universe, yet it is to such a concept that the latest development of mathematical science, so admirably expounded in Jeans's Astronomy and Cosmogony, requires us to adapt ourselves. A finite universe is one in which anything moving outwards in a straight line, and maintaining its direction, must after an interval return to its starting-point. This seems a self-contradiction. A straight line, we think, must go on for ever.

The transition from a vague generalization to an accurate statement is the first step on the road to science. It is a step of great importance. Vague generalizations find a ready entrance into many minds, and produce a comfortable sense of satisfaction that is easily mistaken for knowledge, and that stops further questioning. An exact statement of fact, on the other hand, draws attention to detail, and shows itself to be set in a mass of further detail that it challenges you to explore. “Nature abhors a vacuum” sounds final; it explains why water will rise in an ordinary suction-pump rather than allow a vacuum to be produced; why the schoolboy’s “sucker” will lift a stone; and many other phenomena of a similar kind. It explains everything by a phrase and stimulates no inquiry. But when Galileo noted that the pump would raise water only to a height of about 32 feet, and pointed out that this gives a measure of the extent to which Nature abhors a vacuum in its dealings with water, new questions arose, stimulating further investigation.

Philosophers less subtle than those of the Middle Ages feel no difficulty about such words as “and” or such phrases as “member of”; but even to write “man and society” has committed us to an assumption which may not be justifiable, and to say that men are “members” of a community or of a trade union is so alarming a metaphor that it would startle Duns Scotus. It is unwise, however, to ask philosophers what they mean when they feel very passionately about what they say, for the confusion becomes even greater than it was if passion gets into explanation. It is supposed to be obvious that men exist and that States and Trade Unions and Churches exist; and who would be so foolish as to raise difficulties about the difference between existence and essence? Many who claim to be scientists with regard to politics or economics suppose it to be obvious that there is an “essence” called “public opinion” or “the will of the people” or “utility”; and what Occamite would now dare to say that entities are not to be multiplied ?

This survey first deals with The Downfall of Values, a collection of essays by Max Scheler, late Professor of Philosophy at Cologne. It then summarizes a small book on The Controversy Concerning Causation in Recent Physics, by Hugo Bergmann, for which Einstein has written a preface. Next it considers Georg Stieler's inquiry into The Individual and the Mob. Finally, it deals with Wilhelm Worringer's contribution to æsthetics in his Abstraction and Empathy.