Published online by Cambridge University Press: 30 January 2009
A sign seen in the Philosophy Department of the University of Uppsala reads: A philosopher is one who will deliver a paper on the Hangman's Paradox at a conference on capital punishment. I might take as a supporting example of this tendency to focus on the irrelevant or the inappropriate a real paper to a medico-legal conference on organ transplants which argued that it would be morally justifiable to remove a heart from a healthy would-be heart donor. There are also many amusing and intelligent papers on the ‘survival lottery’—a hypothetical arrangement which would allow individuals to be seized and cannibalised for their organs. These articles are light-hearted exercises in argumentative ingenuity, harmless in themselves, but they are offered in a world in which street children in Brazil are snatched for their kidneys, Chinese political dissidents have their organs seized officially at their place of execution, and poor peasants in Turkey and India sell their own kidneys or those of their relatives, for money. At the same time, the most frequently cited paper on the fraught topic of abortion is one in which pregnancy is compared to the plight of one unwillingly or unintentionally connected to a violinist who temporarily needs the link in order to survive.
1 Judith Jarvis, Thomson, ‘A Defense of Abortion’ Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1, 1971.Google Scholar
2 Russell, B., The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell: volume 1, 1872-1914 (London: Allen & Unwin, 1967).Google Scholar
3 Nussbaum, M., ‘Virtue Revived’, Times Literary SupplementGoogle Scholar, cited in Himmelfarb, G.On the Demoralization of Society: from Victorian Virtues to Modern Values, (London: IEA, 1995), pp. 250–251.Google Scholar
4 Himmelfarb, G., On the De-moralization of Society: from Victorian Virtues to Modern Values, (London: IEA, 1995), p. 32.Google Scholar
5 Ayer, A. J., The Meaning of Life and Other Essays (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1990), pp. 6–7.Google Scholar
6 Rescher, N., Rationality: a philosophical inquiry into the nature and the rationale of reason, (Oxford, 1988), p. 52.Google Scholar
7 Moore, G. E., ‘A Defence of Common Sense’ in Contemporary British Philosophy, ed. Muirhead, J. H., 2nd ser., 1925, reprinted in Philosophical Papers (London: Allen & Unwin, 1959).Google Scholar
8 Rescher, N., op cit. p. 95.Google Scholar
9 Putnam, H., Reason, Truth and History (Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 173.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
10 ibid., p. 264.
11 Schmidtz, David, Rational Choice and Moral Agency (Princeton University Press, 1995), pp. 248–249.Google ScholarSchmidtz comments: ‘To answer a person's “why be moral” question, we need to show that he or she has reason to be moral. If we try to answer by arguing that being moral is rational, we had better make sure he or she has reason to be what we are calling rational. We may connect morality to what we call rationality, but unless people have reason to be what we call rational, the connection will be inconsequential.’Google Scholar
12 Foot, P., Virtues and Vices (Oxford: Blackwell, 1978) pp. 6–7.Google Scholar
13 Putman, H., Reason, Truth and History (Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 157.Google Scholar
14 Himmelfarb, G., On Looking into the Abyss—untimely thoughts on culture and society (New York: Random House, 1994), p. 25.Google Scholar
15 Butler, J., Fifteen Sermons, ed. Roberts, T. A., (SPCK Press, 1970), p. 56.Google Scholar
16 Ross, W. D., The Right and the Good, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930), p. 336, n.l.Google Scholar