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Our Knowledge of One Another1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 February 2009

R. I. Aaron
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Extract

There can be no doubt that we do know one another. We know that others exist and we know a good deal about others. The question is how we know others. To say that others do not exist would be to assert a solipsism—a theory which no serious philosopher has ever maintained. Solipsism is absurd. Not because it is self-contradictory, for there is nothing self-contradictory in the notion that I alone exist having the experiences and thoughts which I do have and that apart from me nothing and no one else exists. It is absurd simply because others do exist and I know this; because, that is to say, it contradicts the known evidence. This is the sole—but the adequate—ground for concluding solipsism to be absurd. Any discussion of this present problem, therefore, must begin with, the recognition of the fact that knowledge of others occurs.

Type
Articles
Information
Philosophy , Volume 19 , Issue 72 , April 1944 , pp. 63 - 75
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1944

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References

page 65 note 1 DrBroad, , in Mind and its Place in Nature (p. 331)Google Scholar once made some such suggestion.

page 66 note 1 Incidentally, if I am genuinely satisfied that I have “caught” the thought of another, that provides me with a proof of the existence of at least one other mind. For if I am infected another mind must be infecting me—since I cannot be infected by a non-existent mind. This causal proof would rest on the supposition that I had in fact experienced a telepathic experience and that I had recognized it as such. It would also presuppose, of course, an acquaintance with the notion of other minds existing.

page 67 note 1 Might not one say with equal truth that we are prepared beforehand for relationships with animals and indeed with plants? For we find that the emotional responses of human beings are frequently directed towards animals and plants, and even to physical things.